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ABSTRACT
A DIRTY DILEMMA: DETERMINANTS OF ELECTRONIC WASTE IMPORTATION
Jamila N. Glover
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Jesse T. Richman

During the 1970s-1980s waste, specifically toxic waste from manufacturing, became a
globally traded commodity. By the late 1980s, waste trade became a global political and
environmental topic because many believed that developed countries were ‘dumping’
hazardous material on less developed nations despite knowing that less developed countries
often lack adequate infrastructure to dispose of waste in an environmentally responsible
manner, prompting international regulatory responses.
This study focuses on the fastest growing category of traded toxic waste – electronic
waste. In 2014, approximately 41.8 million tons of electronic waste was generated globally.1
During this same period 1.6 million tons were traded in the global economy. Electronic waste is
particularly intriguing because of its mix of toxic dangers and high value opportunities. Unlike
other hazardous waste, electronic waste is composed of toxic materials such as lead, mercury,
cadmium and brominated retardants that can adversely affect human health and the
environment and valuable recyclables such as iron, copper, gold, silver, and rare earth metals.
Scholars debate whether the domestic political structure, international environmental
agreements or economic factor is the primary determinant that induce states to import
hazardous waste. The aim of this study is to provide insight to this puzzling question.
The study creates a Waste Trade Framework that is a compilation of political, economic
and environmental determinants. The framework is then tested using partial least squaresstructural equation modeling. The study finds that when developed and developing countries

1

C.P. Baldé, Wang, F., Kuehr, R., Huisman, J, "The Global E-Waste Monitor," (Bonn, Germany 2014).

are evaluated jointly, the economic factor has the largest impact on electronic waste import
volume. When developed and developing countries are modeled independently, electronic
waste import volume in both country types is most influenced by the political economic factor
(the interaction of politics and the economy).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: A DIRTY DILEMMA

During the 1970s-1980s waste, specifically toxic waste, became a globally traded
commodity. Manufacturing firms, primarily in developed nations, sought to discard hazardous
by-product waste. Other nations accepted the waste as a method to increase state revenue.
By the late 1980s, waste trade became a global political and environmental topic because many
believed that developed countries were ‘dumping’ hazardous material on less developed nations
despite knowing that less developed countries often lack adequate infrastructure to dispose of
waste in an environmentally responsible manner. In 1989 the Basel Convention was
established in response to the growing concern. The Convention aims to reduce the generation
of hazardous waste and to protect the environment and human and animal heath from
hazardous waste.1 Notably, it does restrict waste trade but rather set guidelines for both the
transboundary movement and disposal practices of hazardous waste. This in combination with
the demand for waste disposal services led to the growth of the waste trade industry. As a
result, hazardous waste became a global commodity, the buying and selling of a product or
service in the capitalist market for profit.2

CHANGE IN HAZARDOUS WASTE
As globalization continues the types of hazardous waste changes. The digital revolution
notably transitioned society from analogue technology to digital technology. Improvements in
technology enable manufacturing firms to produce and distribute consumer goods globally at a

1

Basel Convention, "Convention Overview," Accessed June, 2016,
http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/tabid/1271/Default.aspx.
2

Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 161.

2
lower cost. At the same time, the ‘digital revolution’ spurred the production of electronic
consumer goods. Typewriters and adding machines have been replaced with personal laptops
and tablets. Landline phones and film cameras have been replaced with cellular phones and
Smartphones. Appliances have been updated with smart features. Smart Refrigerators allow
you to see what is inside without opening the door. Stove-tops have Wi-Fi cook ability with
virtual LED flames.3 All these products have toxic components and are considered electronic
waste once discarded.4 Electronic waste is now considered the fastest growing waste stream5
and is a significant portion of 21st century toxic waste.
In 2014, approximately 41.8 million tons of electronic waste was generated globally.6
Interestingly, the widespread use of electronic goods is profound in both developed and
developing countries. Consumers in developed countries have more disposable income to
purchase electronic products. On average customers in developed nations replace larger
electronic products every five years; smaller electronics such as smart phones are replaced
more often.7 Electronic waste in the European Union increases 3-5% annually, about three
times faster than other municipal waste streams.8 Rwanda produces between 10,000 and
15,000 tons of e-waste annually and expects an annual growth rate of 6%.9 The Rwandan
government states that the increase is attributed to economic development and to the nation’s
initiative to improve information and communication technologies that require the use of tools

3

Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) allows a user to connect an electronic device to an internet connection. LED (light emitting diode)

4

Although a formal definition of e-waste has not been established, most agree that it consists of products that have an electronic
plug or have electrical components. Rolf Widmer et al., "Global Perspectives on E-Waste," Environmental Impact Assessment
Review 25, no. 5 (2005): 438-39.
5

Ludgren (2012), Balde et al. (2014), Cucchiella et al. (2015), Wang et al. (2016).

6

Baldé.

7

Chris Ely, "The Life Expectancy of Electronics " Consumer Technology Association,
https://www.cta.tech/News/Blog/Articles/2014/September/The-Life-Expectancy-of-Electronics.aspx.
8

Tina Wakolbinger et al., "When and for Whom Would E-Waste Be a Treasure Trove? Insights from a Network Equilibrium Model of
E-Waste Flows," International Journal of Production Economics 154 (2014): 263.
9

Paul Ploumis, "Rwanda Announces Opening of Newly Built E-Waste Recycling Facility," Shanghai Metals Market
https://news.metal.com/newscontent/100721639/rwanda-announces-opening-of-newly-built-e-waste-recycling-facility.

3
such as laptops and mobile phones. These changes have also facilitated the demand for newer
products.10
Figure 1.1 illustrates the development of electronic waste generation and electronic
waste trade. It is estimated that global e-waste production will be nearly 50 million tons in
2018.11 The rapid and continual growth of e-waste has created a dirty dilemma in which nationstates, both developed and developing, generate more e-waste than they are either willing or
able to dispose of domestically. Transforming e-waste into a global commodity, a good that can
be bought and sold, in the international system may serve as solution to the dilemma.

ELECTRONIC WASTE AND ELECTRONIC WASTE TRADE
According to the United Nations Commodity Trade Database, electronic waste (e-waste)
can include “electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and
reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories
of such articles, waste and scrap of primary cells, primary batteries and electric accumulators;
spent primary cells, spent primary batteries and spent electric accumulators; electrical parts of
machinery or apparatus.”12 Circa 1997, e-waste trade experienced a sharp decline after the
Basel Ban Amendment, prohibiting developed countries from sending toxic waste to developing
countries was ratified in 1995. During the early 2000s e-waste trade was relatively flat. Around
2006, e-waste trade begins to gain momentum. Although, e-waste consists of more than

10

Ministry of Trade and Industry, "National E-Waste Management Policy for Rwanda," ed. Ministry of Trade and Industry (Kigali,
Rwanda 2015), 2.
11

Baldé, 24.

12

United Nations, "United Nations Comtrade Database," Accessed June 2016, https://comtrade.un.org/. Commodity HS 854810

4
personal computing devices it is worth mentioning that after the launch of the iPhone in 200713
e-waste trade has increased year over year (Figure 1.2).14

Fig. 1.1 Causal Loop Diagram of key drivers of electronic waste generation and trade

13

Apple and the iPhone are credited with being the leader in the market and catapulting global consumer use of hand held devices.
The initial launch of the iPhone sold over 100 million units in only 74 days in the United States. By 2008 it was available for sell in
21 countries. In 2010 there were 85 million IOS users. Time Magazine, "8 Years of the Iphone: An Interactive Timeline," Time
Magazine http://time.com/2934526/apple-iphone-timeline/.
14

United Nations. Commodity HS 854810 import volume data 1996-2014.

Ton

5
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Fig. 1.2 Global Electronic Waste Import Volume

Beyond the growth of electronic waste trade, it is important and interesting in two ways.
First, it operates paradoxically to international trade theories. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
(HOS) international trade theory posits that a country produces and exports goods in which it
has a comparative advantage. It also assumes that importers buy a product and/or service from
the exporters. Exporters gain revenue as importers not only pay the purchase price for the
goods but also pay an importation tariff. However, electronic waste trade does not align with
this behavior. First, some countries import waste despite not having a comparative advantage
in waste management, processing and disposal. Additionally, in waste trade, exporters
generally pay a fee to importers because the exporter is paying for ‘disposal services’. Thus,
importers of electronic waste are revenue earners.
The structural dichotomy of electronic waste is another interesting aspect of e-waste
trade18 and is also presumably a reason why e-waste trade does not follow traditional trade
conventions. Like other hazardous material, electronic waste contains toxic components, lead,
mercury, cadmium and brominated retardants, that can adversely affect human health and the

18

Robinson (2009) provides an overview of the production, structure and environmental impacts of e-waste.

6
environment.19 People are exposed to these toxins via the water stream, air pollution, soil
contamination and by physically handling the product. Studies show that over exposure to
these materials can lead to irreversible cognitive deficits and impair motor skills particularly in
children.20 At the same time, electronic waste is composed of iron, copper, gold, silver and
other rare earth metals, 21 which makes it optimal for urban mining.22 These metals, now
considered technology metals, are essential to the production of electronic consumer devices
and advanced weaponry systems.23 Consequently, the value of these components play a role
in electronic waste trade.
From 2006 to 2008 the value of e-waste rose 139% from $232 million (USD) to $556
(USD). In 2008 the Basel Convention formally acknowledged e-waste as a valuable commodity
by shifting its perspective of viewing it as value less waste to a resource that provides economic
benefits.24 Achim Steiner, the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment
Programme UNEP comments that,
“Today, the protection of vulnerable countries remains as important as ever. At the same
time, if the Convention is to retain its relevance in the 21st century it is necessary to
identify a practical approach that provides protection to countries that need it, while at
the same time supporting the realization of the economic incentives and benefits of
environmentally sound recycling and resource recovery operations in those countries
that are in a position to do so.”25

19

Balde et al. (2014)

20

Chen et al. (2011), Luo et al. (2011).

21

Michelle Heacock et al., "E-Waste and Harm to Vulnerable Populations: A Growing Global Problem," Environmental Health
Perspectives (Online) 124, no. 5 (2016): 550.
22

Urban mining in the context of this paper refers to the extraction and recovery of coveted metals from obsolete products for
profitability purposes. Urban mining can also be considered a form of electronic waste recycling. Literature discussing urban mining
include works by Balde et al. (2014), Krook and Bass (2013), Johansson et al. (2013), Brunner (2010).
23

Technology Metals Research, "What Are Technology Metals?," Accessed May 7, 2017, http://www.techmetalsresearch.com/whatare-technology-metals/.
24

Secretariat of the Basel Convention, "Our Sustainable Future: The Role of the Basel Convention," (Geneva, Switzerland:
UNEP/SBC, International Environment House I, 2008), 3.
25

Secretariat of the Basel Convention, "Basel Convention Bulletin," (Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP/SBC, International Environment
House I, 2011), 3.
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In 2010 revenue from global hazardous waste management services was $20.2 billion
dollars USD (4 percent of all global environmental services revenue).26 During this period, the
value of electronic waste traded was $657 million.27 By 2015, imported electronic waste was
valued at approximately $1.2 billion USD, a 651% increase since 1996 (Figure 1. 3).28
Consequently, electronic waste trade has evolved into a form of reverse logistics, where
products are purposely imported for reuse, remanufacturing, recycling or disposal.29

$1,400

US$ (milions)

$1,200
$1,000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
Fig. 1.3 Value of Global Imported Electronic Waste

Interestingly, after the Basel Convention shifted its view from waste to resource, the
value/ton of electronic waste increased substantially in developed countries as compared to
developing countries (Figure 1.4).
26

United States International Trade Commission, "Environmental and Related Services," ed. United States International Trade
Commission (Washington, DC 20436 2013), x. Environmental services include water and wastewater services, solid and hazardous
waste services, and remediation services.
27

United Nations. Commodity HS 854810 import value data 1996-2014.

28

Ibid.

29

Rahman and Subramanian (2012) discusses how factors within the causal loop diagram influence computer recycling operations.
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Fig. 1.4 Value/Ton of Global Imported Electronic Waste

It is important to note that like other traded goods, the market plays a critical role in the
value of e-waste. To a degree, the value of electronic waste is influenced by those who control
the market. E-waste trade can be described as a global oligopoly in which a few countries
control and import most of the world’s electronic waste most likely because they have a
comparative advantage in extracting the metals. The top 15 importers are predominately
developed countries and account for 89% of global import e-waste volume (Table 1A).
Consequently, these nations can impact the value of e-waste and alter the supply of the
extracted components. In turn, this affects the resale price of the metal and ultimately the cost
of new electronic equipment. An example of this occurred around 2010 - 2011 when the cost of
technology metals increased substantially. Although, the prices leveled off it reminded
companies that they rely heavily on China which sources most of the material.30
Even without price/market manipulation, the value of e-waste can also be affected by the
general supply and demand of the technology metals.

30

Ian Hardy, "Could You Cope with Smartphone Rationing?," BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40248405.

9
“The problem with the technology metals is that [the] supply of them, or more
specifically [the] maximum rates of production of them, is critically dependent mostly upon our
production of base metals. In the case of the rare-earth metals, mined as a group, the key
supply issue is the complex metallurgy of the separation of the individual rare earths from each
other.”31
Nonetheless, importing electronic waste is beneficial in two significant ways, opportunity
for revenue and job creation. States earn revenue not only from being paid by other nations to
accept the commodity but they also reap financial benefits from the components that can be
extracted, repurposed and resold. Also, job growth in waste management facilities has resulted
from the massive and rapid growth of e-waste and the increase in global sustainable
development and green economies initiatives. Recycling facilities in Brazil, China and the
United States, [the world’s top e-waste importers] employ roughly 12 million people.32 Beyond
this, “recycling is likely to grow steadily and form a vital component of greener waste
management systems, which will provide decent employment.”33
However, the repositioning of hazardous waste to a resource, the increasing value of ewaste, and its rapidly growing stream lead to two sub-debates. First, a controversial discourse
on the flow of e-waste (who imports e-waste and from whom) and perhaps more interesting, the
dispute over what constitutes a comparative advantage in importing waste.

WASTE TRADE PATTERN DEBATE
Academic interest in analyzing the phenomenon of waste trade leads to divergent
theories. Proponents of the pollution haven hypothesis/north south divide theory posit that
31

Technology Metals Research.

32

United Nations Environment Programme, "Waste: Investing in Energy and Resource Efficiency " in Towards a Green Economy
Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, 2011), 292.
33

Ibid.
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asymmetries in the world distribution of income cause less developed countries to enact lax
environmental laws in hopes of increasing national revenue. Therefore, the flow of waste is
from developed countries (presumably with more stringent regulations) to less developed
countries (inclined to have lax regulations).34
Along similar lines, the race to the bottom theory conjectures that some states’ economic
growth strategy is based primarily on specializing in ‘dirty’ industries.35 Dirty industries are
characterized as having high emissions and pollutants that are detrimental to the environment
and harmful to human and animal life. Scholars argue that hazardous waste management
should also be included in the spectrum of dirty industries because of its harmful environmental
effects.36
Alternatively, scholars argue that the flow of waste is to developed nation-states. 37
These scholars posit that economically advanced nations have a comparative advantage in
innovation and technology that leads them to efficiently and effectively properly dispose of
waste while maintaining strict environmental regulations. Therefore, the flow of waste can be
exported from both developed and developing countries to a developed nation.
Additional studies indicate that the flow of waste is not from rich to poor countries but
flows from developed to developed countries. This is large in part due to multilateral trade and
environmental agreements. Lastly, others surmise that e-waste is traded regionally.38

34

Literature on the pollution haven hypothesis indicating that the flow of waste is from rich to poor countries include Clapp (1994,
2001), French (2000), Kellenberg (2009, 2010), Lucier and Gareau (2015).
35

Cristina A. Lucier and Brian J. Gareau, "From Waste to Resources? Interrogating 'Race to the Bottom' in the Global
Environmental Governance of the Hazardous Waste Trade," Journal of World-Systems Research 21, no. 2 (2015): 499.
36
Jennifer Clapp, "What the Pollution Havens Debate Overlooks," Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 2 (2002): 13.
37

Studies illustrating that advanced countries are more prone to import waste include O'Neill (2000), Jacott et al. (2001), Ederington
et al. (2005), Baggs (2009).
38

Regional waste trade is discussed in Lepawsky & McNabb (2010), Clapp (2010), and Lepawsky (2014).
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Table 1.1 Debate about the Flow of Hazardous Waste Trade
Num.

Argument

Theory

Relevant Literature
Clapp (1994, 2001), French
(2000), Ladou and Lovegrove
(2008), Kellenberg (2009,
2010), Lucier and Gareau
(2015)

1

Less advanced
countries import waste
primarily from advanced
countries.

Pollution Haven Hypothesis
North/South Divide
Race to the Bottom

2

Advanced countries
import a substantial
amount of waste.

Economic Gravity Model
Economic HOS Model
New Endogenous Growth
Theory

O'Neill (2000), Jacott et al.
(2001), Ederington et al. (2005),
Baggs (2009)

3

Waste is imported/
traded regionally.

Economic Gravity Model
New Economic Geography
Theory

Lepawsky & McNabb (2010),
Clapp (2010), Lepawsky
(2014,2015)

Note: Bolded literature focuses on electronic waste.

Over the last two decades developed nations have consistently imported more electronic
waste volume than developing countries (Figure 1.5).39 These statistics contradict the popular
belief that developing countries import more waste than developed countries. More so, because
both developing and developed nations import e-waste it is unclear as to what variables induce
a nation-state to import electronic waste.

39

Electronic waste is represented by UN Commodity HS 854810. UN Commodity HS 854810 is defined as electrical machinery and
equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts
and accessories of such articles // Waste and scrap of primary cells, primary batteries and electric accumulators; spent primary
cells, spent primary batteries and spent electric accumulators; electrical parts of machinery or apparatus, not specified or included
elsewhere in this Chapter.
UN Commodity HS 854810 import volume data 1996-2015.
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Fig. 1.5 Global Import Volume Developed versus Developing Country

PURPOSE AND CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH
Data and previous studies indicate that both developed and less developed countries
are active participants in global waste trade. Therefore, rather than adding to the abundance of
literature that analyzes the differences between bilateral trading partners, the aim of this study is
to provide insight to a more pragmatic question, what drives a country to import electronic
waste. Beyond this, the research explores (i.) What factor(s) have the largest impact on
electronic waste import volume (ii.) Do the factors’ effect size on electronic waste import volume
differ between developed and developing countries? (iii.) Did the factors effect on electronic
waste import volume change after Basel repositioned its view on waste?
Most experts agree that economic, political and environmental variables impact waste
trade. However, a comprehensive model does not exist and consequently has not been used in
prior studies. Additionally, many studies tend to be myopic. They include one or two of the
factors. Also, current research tests the individual variables effect on waste volume. However,
the economic, political and environmental factors consist of more than a single variable. The
project creates an inclusive conceptual model that is a consists of multiple variables per factor.
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The model is then tested using the partial least squares-structural equation modeling method
(PLS-SEM). This method provides evidence as to what variables are important to the factor
while simultaneously testing the impact of the factors on electronic waste trade import volume.
Furthermore, it is largely assumed that differences between developed and less
developed states economic status, political structure and environmental regulations influence a
country’s level of participation in global trade. Nonetheless, few waste trade studies test and
compare differences between country types. The study identifies if developed and less
developed countries e-waste volume are driven by different factors. In doing so, it contributes to
the debate on theories of why both advanced and less advanced countries import a substantial
amount of e-waste.
Lastly, this study is innovative in two ways. To my knowledge, it is the first study to
create a comprehensive model and use it to analyze waste trade. In doing so, it is the first
project to simultaneously explore the multiple theories that scholars cite as drivers of waste
importation. This study is also groundbreaking in that it identifies the importance of variables
that current research does not address. Most importantly, the culmination of these advantages
produces a research study that is a robust analysis of drivers of electronic waste importation
that is absent from current literature.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW: DOWN IN THE DUMPS

In studying nation-state behavior in relation to hazardous waste trade practices, scholars
have documented links between the economic condition of a country, its domestic regulations
and environmental initiatives and policies. However, there is little consensus on what factor has
the largest effect on hazardous waste import volume. Additionally, there is discord on whether
these factors perform differently in developed as compared to less developed countries.
There are generally five perspectives that explain what factors influence waste trade
importation practices. Neoclassical economics focuses on economic variables, such as capital
abundance and size of the economy. It also contends that “government policies can do little to
accelerate long term growth”.1 Under this theory, a country’s economic state influences waste
import volume and is not greatly affected by the political factor.
The domestic institutional approach is paradoxical to the neoclassical economic theory.
The domestic institutional approach asserts that the national regulatory structure of a nation is
the primary determinant that promotes or prohibits a state’s ability to import hazardous waste. It
does not account for the economic state of a nation.
The new endogenous growth theory recognizes the intersection of politics and the
economy. It asserts that the use of government policies impacts long-term economic
development.2 Following this theory, waste import volume is affected by both a country’s
political structure and economic position.
Neoliberal international institutionalism argues that international institutions and
international and regional environmental treaties influence state behavior. Therefore, waste
import volume is affected by a nation-states participation in international agreements. Lastly,
1

Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001), 110.

2

Ibid., 113-14.
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global environmental political theory argues that environmental concerns are addressed by the
interaction between state and nonstate actors at the domestic and international levels.3
Therefore, the amount of waste a country imports is impacted by the domestic regulatory
structure and environmental agreements.
The following section examines the current debates and theoretical gaps on factors that
impact waste trade importation practices.

Table 2.1 Theories Explaining Waste Importation
Num.

Argument
Economic variables mostly
influence waste importation.

Associated Theory
Neoclassical Economics

Relevant Literature
Montgomery (1992, 1995),
Sigman (1996), Levinson (1999),
Antweiler et al. (2001), Albers
(2015)

Domestic Institutionalism

2

National regulatory framework
is the primary influencer to
waste importation.

O'Neill (2000), Carrigan and
Coglianese (2011), Rahman
and Subramanian (2012)

3

Economic variables and the
regulatory framework
influence waste importation.

New Endogenous
Growth Theory

Clapp (1994, 2001), Baggs
(2009), Kellenberg (2012),
Estrada-Ayub & Kahhat (2014)

4

Environmental agreements
and international institutions
influence waste importation.

Neoliberal International
Institutionalism

de Zeeuw (2008, 2015),
Kellenberg (2012, 2014, 2015),
Lepawsky (2015), Khan (2016)

International environmental
agreements and the domestic
regulatory framework
influence waste importation.

Environmental Political
Theory

Maxianova (2008), Marcoux &
Urpelainen (2012), Jing (2014),
Lucier & Gareau (2015)

1

5

Note: Bolded literature focuses on electronic waste.

3

Pamela S. Chasek, David L. Downie, and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics, 6th ed., Dilemmas in World Politics
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2014), 37.
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ECONOMIC EXPLANATION
The neoclassical economic view argues that nation-states focus on capital accumulation
via capital and labor. Along similar lines, scholars contend that waste import flows largely
depend on capital abundance.4 Therefore, state level economic variables such as gross
domestic product (GDP) - the economy size, the wealth of a nation, GDP/capita, government
debt, disposal costs and the country’s openness to trade are key determinants that partially
explain waste trade. However, there is not a consensus on the role each determinant has when
a country evaluates whether to import hazardous waste. For example, the importance of GDP
might vary between developed and developing states.
Baggs’s (2009) research, one of the first statistical studies on waste trade, evaluates
determinants that influence hazardous waste trade patterns. She examines the relationship
between GDP and hazardous waste import volume. The results indicate that as a country’s
GDP increases, trade in hazardous waste also increases. Higashida and Managi’s (2014) study
on determinants of trade in recyclable wastes produce similar findings.5 The results of their
research demonstrate that as a country’s economy grows the amount of imported waste
increases.
Contrarily, because importing waste is a source of revenue, countries with low GDP, less
developed countries, import waste as a means of economic development. Lepawsky’s (2009)
study of e-scrap on the grey market indicates that as a country’s GDP decreases the likelihood
that it imports e-waste increases.6 This finding aligns with sentiments expressed by proponents
of the North-South divide/Race to the Bottom Theory that claim less advanced countries

4

Adam B. Jaffe et al., "Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell
Us?," Journal of Economic Literature 33, no. 1 (1995); Werner Antweiler, Brian R. Copeland, and M. Scott Taylor, "Is Free Trade
Good for the Environment?," American Economic Review 91, no. 4 (2001).
5

Keisaku Higashida and Shunsuke Managi, "Determinants of Trade in Recyclable Wastes: Evidence from Commodity-Based Trade
of Waste and Scrap," Environment & Development Economics 19, no. 2 (2014): 265.
6

Josh Lepawsky, "Tracking E-Scrap on the Grey Market," Resource Recycling 28, no. 12 (2009).
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(nations in the south) are often poor and riddled with debt which induces them to invest in dirty
industries (hazardous waste importation).7 Consequently, it is logical to expect a positive
correlation between debt and waste import volume. However, interestingly, Lepawksy and
McNabb (2010) found no evidence of a significant relationship between net trade balance and
debt service ratio. Additionally, the study did not find a significant relationship between net
trade balance and public debt as a percentage of GDP.8
GDP is also considered in electronic waste because it affects disposal costs. Some
studies assert that waste disposal cost is one of the most critical variables a country evaluates
when deciding if and how much hazardous waste to import. Waste disposal costs reflect a
complex system comprised of transportation costs, disposal fees (landfill or incinerator costs)
and separation (labor) costs. Separation costs are the cost of disassembling and sorting
recycled materials and storing them by material type. Transportation cost is the amount paid for
the movement of waste from the point of entry to the point of treatment or landfill.9 On a high
level, the profitability of importing waste is the import value (revenue) of waste plus the value of
re-saleable components minus disposal cost.

Net Profit = import value (revenue) + revenue of re-saleable components - disposal cost
Disposal cost = transportation costs + disposal fees (landfill or incinerator costs) + labor
costs - Tax Incentives and Subsidies10

7

Jennifer Clapp, "The Toxic Waste Trade with Less-Industrialised Countries: Economic Linkages and Political Alliances," Third
World Quarterly 15, no. 3 (1994): 506.
8

Josh Lepawsky and Chris McNabb, "Mapping International Flows of Electronic Waste," Canadian Geographer 54, no. 2 (2010):
188.
9

Delta Institute, "Waste Managment: Unrealized Environmental and Economic Benefits for Chicagoland," (Chicago, IL Delta
Institute 2014), 9.
10

Van Passel et al. (2013) discuss how the profitability of urban mining waste is dependent on governments creating incentives for
private actors. Sigman (1996) and Levinson (1999) discuss the impact of tax incentives on hazardous waste disposal.
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High capital costs associated with the development and operation of landfills may affect
the ability to provide waste management services.11 Therefore, a widely accepted principle is
that hazardous waste flows to less developed countries where disposal costs are presumably
lower than costs in developed countries. Four major items facilitate lower disposal cost in less
developed countries. First, labor costs are lower stemming mainly from lower wages and low
environmental, health and labor standards.12 Secondly, operational costs of disposal facilities
are likely lower because of minimal or no capital equipment expenditures. This in turns limits
maintenance costs on machines. Lastly, as countries compete for investment, governments are
liable to provide tax incentives and subsidies for corporations.13 The culmination of these
factors decreases total disposal cost and yields a favorable cost-benefit analysis for developing
nations to import waste.14
However, the results of a cost-benefit analysis can also be positive for developed
countries. Firms in developed countries have sufficient capital to invest in technology and
procure advanced machinery. These capabilities lead to two major benefits, lower production
costs15 and improved sorting precision. Efficiencies in sorting decreases labor hours while
simultaneously increasing volume of waste processed. This in turn, increases revenue.
Additionally, enhanced sorting precision increases the likelihood that more precious metals are
extracted from the waste.16 Consequently, developed countries can operate disposal and

11

United States International Trade Commission, xv.

12

Jan Albers, "The International Trade in Hazardous Wastes and Its Economic Background," in Responsibility and Liability in the
Context of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes by Sea, Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs (Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2015), 27. Derek Kellenberg, "Trading Wastes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64, no. 1
(2012): 71.
13

Arik Levinson, "Nimby Taxes Matter: The Case of State Hazardous Waste Disposal Taxes," Journal of Public Economics 74, no. 1
(1999).
14

It is more likely that illegal dumping occurs in developing nations to circumvent disposal fees.
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INSEAD Cornell University, and WIPO "The Global Innovation Index 2015," in Effective Innovation Policies for Development, ed.
Bruno Lanvin Soumitra Dutta, and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent ( Geneva, Switzerland2015), 81.
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recycling facilities more efficiently and cost effectively which yields a higher profitability margin
than what developing countries can obtain.
Baggs (2009) evaluates capital/worker to assess the relationship between capital
abundance (the ability to buy technical equipment to maximize productivity) and hazardous
waste volume. For importing nations, capital/worker is positive and significant indicating that as
capital/worker increases, import volume increases as well. Kellenberg (2012) extends on
Baggs’s study. However, rather than focusing only on hazardous waste, he evaluates all waste
import volume. In assessing capital/labor, the coefficient is positive but insignificant.17 The
results of these studies suggest capital abundance may impact import volume by increasing
efficiency.
Kellenberg (2012) conceptualizes GDP/capita as a proxy for recycling productivity
because it is highly correlated with recycling wages. The results illustrate that GDP/capita in
relation to import volume has an inverse relationship. The more efficient at recycling an
exporting country is in relation to the importing country the less likely it is to export waste.
These findings suggest that although richer countries might have higher labor costs, as
compared to developed countries, their productivity increases. This makes enables advanced
economy countries to achieve economies of scale resulting in a favorable cost-benefit analysis
to import waste.
Along similar lines, GDP/capita is also associated with influencing import volume.
Scholars believe that as citizens become richer, environmental awareness increases and
regulations become more stringent. These changes should lead to less waste importation.18
Results from Baggs’s (2009) study align with this purview. Her findings illustrate that
GDP/capita for exporting nations is positive and GDP/capita for importing nations is negative.
17

18

Kellenberg, 79.

GDP/capita has been operationalized as a measure of environmental regulatory stringency. This is demonstrated in Dasgupta
and Wheeler (1997), Mani and Wheeler (1998), Dasgupta (2002), Cole (2004), Kellenberg (2009), Baggs (2009), Higashida and
Managi (2014).
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Baggs interprets these results to mean that as a country becomes richer it is likely to import less
waste and export more. Alternatively, as a country becomes poorer the more likely it is to
become a net waste importer. Lepawsky and McNabb’s (2010) conclusions are congruent to
Baggs’s. They discover a statistically significant inverse relationship between GDP/capita and
volume, as a country’s GDP/capita decreases the likelihood of it being a net importer of e-waste
increases.
In contrast, Higashida and Managi’s (2014) evaluation of recyclable waste yields
opposing results. Their findings indicate that GDP/capita is positive for both importing and
exporting countries. As countries become richer per capita they both import and export more
waste. Notably, the coefficients for the importing countries are not significant, an indication that
environmental awareness can be effective.19

LIMITATIONS OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
Existing research suggests that economic variables are important in waste importation
for both developed and developing countries. However, conflicting results in the way economic
variables influence waste importation is a critical weakness of using the economic perspective
as the primary determinant to explain what induces states to import hazardous waste.
Some studies indicate that as GDP increases states import more waste. Contrarily,
other studies show that as GDP decreases a state becomes a net importer of waste. In
addition, the findings of GDP/capita’s impact on import volume also vary between studies.
Some studies find that as GDP/capita increases waste importation decreases. Paradoxically,
other studies indicate that as GDP/capita rises waste importation increases. Notably, the

19

Higashida and Managi, 265.
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contradictory results can be attributed to the various types of waste studied. The typology of
waste can be identified relative to its value and hazard level.

Table 2.2 Typology of Waste
High Hazard

Low Hazard

High Value

E-waste

Metals

Low Value

Medical waste/
Chemical waste

Municipal Solid Waste

One perspective is that as GDP/capita increases citizens demand stricter regulations.
Under this condition a state might be confined to import low hazard waste. Alternatively, lower
GDP/capita might induce states to accept high value waste despite hazard levels. Baggs (2009)
evaluates all hazardous waste which is a combination of both high and low value and hazard.
Lepawsky (2009) focuses on e-waste scrap which is primarily high value and high hazard.
Kellenberg (2012) reviews all waste because “sometimes waste is not demarcated as
hazardous even though it is.” Along similar lines, Higashida and Managi’s (2014) study on
recyclable waste includes several commodity codes. Applying this approach to e-waste
research is beneficial because the dichotomy of e-waste (a hazardous and recyclable
commodity) enables countries to report inbound shipments of e-waste under non-hazardous
commodity codes (i.e. copper waste and scrap- 740400, nickel waste and scrap-750300 or
aluminum waste and scrap- 760200). In turn, the countries circumvent regulations associated
with importing hazardous waste.
The impact of disposal costs on waste importation is another area of divergence in the
waste trade literature. Disposal costs are a significant component in calculating whether the
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financial gains of importing waste outweigh the associated environmental risks and costs.
O’Neill contends that the broad differences between how the multiple actors are involved in
waste trade makes it nearly impossible to calculate the costs and benefits of importing waste.20
Admittedly, conducting a cost-benefit analysis is difficult. However, studies demonstrate that
the non-state and state actors collaborate because it is in their best interest to do so.21 After all,
the state determines the regulations, environmental and tax regulations that private waste
management actors must adhere to which affects their profitability.22
Additionally, the emphasis placed on disposal cost and cost-benefit assessments might
be futile in that a nation-state will import waste only if it is beneficial to do so.23 Montgomery
(1992) and Albers (2015) contend that both developing and developed countries import waste
because the financial incentives are worth the risk.24
Capital/worker presents challenges to understanding how capital intensity influences
waste importation. Waste trade studies use general capital/labor, which includes all industries.
Although capital/labor is a reasonable proxy, it is not a precise measurement. Capital/labor in a
country could be high because the country has lucrative industries, other than waste disposal
services, that increases capital.
Another issue is that current studies use the general population. This too can yield
misleading results. More so, some of the countries that import a significant proportion of global
waste, such as China and India, also have large populations. Consequently, their capital/labor
will always be lower. A better measure is to evaluate the capital/worker within the waste
20

Kate O'Neill, Waste Trading among Rich Nations: Building a New Theory of Environmental Regulation, ed. Sheldon and Kraft
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disposal and recycling industry. Notably, this information would be difficult to obtain however; it
would provide a more accurate representation of how capital plays a role in waste importation.
Waste trade studies that focus on economic parameters suffer from omitted variable
bias. Neoclassical economist attributes economic growth to the endowment of its production
factors (availability of capital, labor and land). This perspective does not consider technology’s
influence on economic growth. However, technology and innovation are endogenous to
economic growth because they are a conscious result of an individual or firm’s investment of
capital in labor and equipment.25 The Global Innovation Index states, “the competitiveness of
both companies and countries depends on their ability to innovate and move in the direction of
frontier technology and knowledge.”26 When studies do consider technology, the focus is
primarily on developed countries innovation and research and development initiatives.
Innovation is predominately associated with developed nations because they possess sufficient
capital and the academic/industry framework to support research and development. However,
innovation and technology are not limited to advanced countries. “[Developing countries] have
realized that technology adoption alone is no longer sufficient to maintain a high-growth
scenario; rather, investment in innovation is now crucial to spur further catch-up.”27
Equally important is the omission of the impact trade openness has on waste import
volume. Baggs (2009) indicates that the more open a country is to trade the more likely it is
import waste. However, very few studies evaluate openness to trade as a key variable when
evaluating waste trade volumes.
Proponents of the race to the bottom theory assert that developing countries import
waste not only to earn revenue but also to participate in the global economy. These countries
are believed to not have other valuable, tradeable commodities and therefore import waste to
25
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improve their economic and political positions in the global market. 28 To assess this claim,
waste trade studies should incorporate a country’s percent of world trade or the percent of
export of goods and services.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE EXPLANATION
The domestic institutional approach contends that evaluating the national regulatory
structure and regulatory style of the importing nation is the best method to evaluate a country’s
level of waste importation. The premise of the theory is that how policies are “formulated,
enacted and implemented” are key to assessing state and private actors’ behavior in regard to
importation practices. 29 This approach posits that the domestic regulatory structure is either
centralized decentralized. The regulatory structure is defined as being either centralized or
diffused. In a centralized structure, a single government agency holds all authority for the
management and regulation of the waste management industry. Conversely, in a diffused
(decentralized) structure regulatory responsibility is at the national and local level. Three
dimensions are evaluated in determining the regulatory structure. First, the ownership structure
of the waste management industry- meaning the extent of private versus public ownership and
the level of competition amongst firms. Next, the degree to which the government is centralized
versus decentralized. This relates to the division of regulatory responsibilities between national
and local government agencies. Lastly, the regulatory structure includes whether the state is
federal or unitary. Federal systems consist of multiple local authorities with environmental

28
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regulatory responsibility. Alternatively, in unitary systems political authority is held by the central
government.30
The regulatory style of a nation is dependent on the style of policy making and how
policies are implemented. Access to policy making describes the relationship of business,
society and interest groups in relation to the government in policy making. Closed regulatory
styles is characterized with government officials working with business interests in policy
formation while broader societal interests are excluded. Open systems are characterized with
no single group having privilege in policy planning. Policy implementation can be either rigid or
flexible. Rigid systems are likely to have strict national standards. On the other hand, flexible
systems apply standards on a case basis.31
O’Neill contends that a country is more likely to import waste under three conditions.
First, states with a decentralized regulatory framework in which regulatory responsibilities are
divided among different agencies at both the national and local levels, are more likely to import
waste. Secondly, a closed environmental policy system fosters waste importation. Closed
systems promote collaboration between government officials and business interests.
Additionally, closed systems exclude other societal groups such as environmentalists from
policymaking. Finally, countries that are flexible in terms of policy implementation are more
likely to import waste. Firms that are privy to flexible environmental regulations are under less
strict regulations and can assume more risk because the government is less likely to monitor
and control the movement of hazardous risk.32 O’Neill posits that nations whose waste disposal
industry is privately owned and highly competitive are more likely to have a decentralized
regulatory structure and are likely to import more waste.33
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LIMITATIONS OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
A shortcoming of the domestic institutional approach is that it embeds the structure of
the waste management industry, the extent to which the industry in privately versus publicly
owned, as component within a nation’s regulatory structure. Embedding the waste
management structure in the regulatory framework conjectures that the extent to which the
industry is publicly or privately-owned influences the regulatory structure. However, this can be
perceived as overreaching. It is reasonable to assume that the structure of the waste
management industry, the amount of competition and extent of private versus public firms in the
market, has no or minimal influence on changing the regulatory structure of country because a
government can decide to change the amount of ownership it has in the waste management
industry and not change the level at which environmental and waste disposal regulations are
made. Equally, a government can decide to change the level at which these regulations are
made even though the waste management industry has not changed. This scenario can occur
as nongovernmental organizations and international institutions play an active role in shaping
international trade agreements that ultimately alter and/or influence national regulatory
practices.
A weakness of the domestic institutional approach is that it omits variables that impact
the domestic regulatory style and structure of a state. First, the domestic institutional approach
contends that it is not necessary to evaluate international environmental agreements (IEAs),
specifically the Basel convention, among trade between developed partners because waste
trade agreements tend to follow other trade agreements that are based on military or security
alliances and former colonial ties.34 Ederington, Levinson and Minier (2005) findings support
O’Neill’s position that most trade takes place among developed countries that share similarly
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high levels of environmental stringency.35 However, similarities among trading partners is not a
sufficient reason to disregard IEAs. Excluding international environmental agreements is
erroneous in that it ignores the influence they have on the national regulatory structure of
importing nation-states. Putnam (1988) suggests that domestic and international politics are
entangled in a “two-level game.” The author explains that nation-state leaders participate in
two-level games often simultaneously; one game between the domestic leader and the state,
the other game between the domestic leader and the international community. The difficulty of
two-level games is that the leader must negotiate a win-set that satisfies domestic and
international goals and responsibilities.36 Because of this entanglement, it is likely that some
states adhere to international agreements to participate in the global economy. For example, a
growing number of international trade organizations such as the WTO (World Trade
Organization) and UN Development Programme (United Nations) include environmental
governance parameters that all states must adhere to. Alternatively, some nations might desire
to alter domestic environmental regulations but lack the political might to change domestic
regulations without the influence of powerful global actors. Lastly, eliminating international
agreements undermines the utility of multilateral initiatives in domestic and international politics
in waste trade. Multilateral action “leads to enhanced environmental efficacy of individual
national responses and minimizes distortions in competitiveness that arise from disparate
national policies.”37
Another limitation of the domestic institutional approach is that it fails to consider how
corruption might affect both how policies are created and implemented at the state level. A
caveat is that because her O’Neill focuses on democratic countries, it can be inferred that
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corruption between politicians and waste management industry leaders does not exist or has a
negligible effect on policies in developed countries. Literature offers evidence that support this
presumption. Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) conclude that big governments in rich countries do not
have a high level of corruption.38 Saha and Gounder (2013) indicate that a strong negative
correlation between income and corruption exists across countries; higher income reduces
corruption.39 Ali and Isse (2003) assert that government regulations tend to increase the size of
bureaucracies and in turn, large bureaucracies increase the opportunity for corruption.40
Following this logic, developed countries tend to have large governments and therefore are
susceptible to corruption. Corruption can play an integral role in a nation-state’s regulatory
structure and style. Therefore, it should be included among variables when assessing waste
trade.

CORRUPTION AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Rose-Ackerman (1978) posits that two levels of corruption exist, high and low levels.41
Low-level corruption occurs when bribes to public officials have no impact on the governing
agency’s budget. High-level corruption materializes when bureaucrats’ acceptance of bribes
alters legislative demands and an agency’s appropriations budget. Wilson and Damania (2005)
characterize corruption as either grand or petty corruption.

42

An example of grand/ high level

corruption is firms contributing to politicians so that the policy makers create regulations, such

38

P. Graeff and G. Mehlkop, "The Impact of Economic Freedom on Corruption: Different Patterns for Rich and Poor Countries,"
European Journal of Political Economy 19, no. 3 (2003): 615.
39

Shrabani Saha and Rukmani Gounder, "Corruption and Economic Development Nexus: Variations across Income Levels in a
Non-Linear Framework," Economic Modelling 31 (2013): 77.
40

Abdiweli Ali, "Determinants of Economic Corruption: A Cross-Country Comparison," Cato Journal 22, no. 3 (2003): 460.

41

S. Rose-Ackerman, "Corruption - a Study in Political Economy," (United States1978), 60, 67.

42

John K. Wilson and Richard Damania, "Corruption, Political Competition and Environmental Policy," Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 49, no. 3 (2005): 517.

29
as tax incentives or environmental regulations, in the industry’s favor. This type of corruption is
likely to occur in developed nations. Contrarily, petty level corruption is prone to exist in less
advanced countries and can appear as bribes to political figures who have the authority to grant
firms ‘legal’ permits to either transport or dump illicit hazardous waste. Albeit, the type of
corruption might differ between developed and developing countries, a growing body of
literature demonstrate a connection between corruption and environmental policy in both rich
and poorer nations.
Damania, Fredriksson, and List (2003) test linkages between trade policy, corruption,
and environmental policy using a mix of developed and developing countries. Their findings
identify an interaction between environmental policy and corruption. A lower amount of
corruption relates to more stringent environmental policies. Interestingly, an increase in the
demand for environmental policy is also conditional on the level of corruption.43 Fredriksson
and Svensson (2003) contribute to the debate of policy formation by studying political
instability’s (corruption’s) effect on environmental policy formation in developed and developing
nations. The results highlight that the stringency of environmental regulations is conditional on
the amount of corruption; more corruption yields less stringent environmental policies.44

ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLANATION
Growing environmental concern spurs an ongoing fiery debate, in both the scholarly and
mainstream realms, on the nexus between globalization and its effect on the environment.
Particularly, increased international free trade is criticized for not only causing disparities
between advanced and non-advanced economies but also damaging the global environment.
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Environmentalists contend that the rapid growth and exorbitant volume of electronic waste can
have grave consequences on human health and the vitality of the ecosystem. The Bali
Declaration on Waste Management for Human Health and Livelihood “affirmed at the political
level that waste, if not managed in a safe and environmentally sound manner, may have serious
consequences for the environment, human health and sustainable livelihood.”45 These
concerns led to global environmental governance initiatives such as the United Nations
Environment Programme, OECD Environment Directorate Environment Policy Committee and
the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs were established. Leaders in the organizations
recognize that consequences of environmental damage transcend state borders and thus
require a global solution.
Neoliberal international institutionalists argue that the primary purpose of an international
environmental agreement (IEA), an intergovernmental document legally binding nation-states, is
to prevent or manage human impact on natural resources.46 Additionally, environmental
agreements seek to reduce negative externalities on the environment caused by states, firms
and citizens.47 To accomplish these goals, IEAs are usually composed of two public policy
approaches, policy intervention and policy regulation. Public policy regulation includes setting
minimum standards for harmful quantities or establishing liability parameters for those who
violate these standards. Conversely, policy intervention encompasses incentives for industry to
reduce hazardous waste production.48
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BASEL CONVENTION
The Basel Convention, the international environmental treaty on hazardous waste,
addresses transboundary movement of hazardous waste and its disposal.49 The Convention
uses a combination of intervention and regulation to accomplish its overall objective of
protecting human health and the environment from the effects of toxic waste disposal.
The overarching objective of the treaty focuses on three principle aims. First, it seeks to
be a resource of information on sound toxic waste management practices for governments that
dispose of hazardous waste. This is accomplished in two ways. First, the convention publishes
protocols and provides training on sound waste management practices. The inaugural protocol
was published in 1994. More recently, in 2011, the Convention established a Partnership for
Action on Computing Equipment (PACE) that provides guidance on the end of life management
of computing equipment. In 2015, the Convention established technical guidelines for the
transboundary movement and disposal of electric and electronic waste. Secondly, the
Convention supports its aim of being a resource to waste importers by establishing Regional
Training Centers (BCRCs) that teach advanced waste disposal technology practices and better
manage toxic waste disposal techniques, specifically to less developed countries.
The second goal of the Basel Convention is to minimize the volume of waste trade,
specifically to less developed countries. In 1995, the convention adopted the Ban Amendment
(Annex VII) which prohibits OECD countries from sending recyclable and non-recyclable waste
to non-OECD countries. The Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage, formed
in 1999, regulates civil liability due to damage that occurs during transboundary movement of
hazardous waste, including illegal movements. The protocol focuses on holding exporters
accountable for providing remuneration to importing countries that experience toxic waste
damage.
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The third initiative of the Basel Convention is to monitor the transboundary movement of
waste. The convention established a verification process in which importing nation-states are
responsible for reporting import volume, the number of facilities with capacity and formal
consent to receive hazardous waste. The Promoting Implementation and Compliance
Committee within the Basel Convention, implemented in 2002, was established to assist nations
to create a tracking system that enable nations to comply with the measures set forth in the
convention. In the same year, the Strategic Plan for Implementation of Basel Convention was
established solely to assist less developed nations with implementing the parameters and
obligations set forth in the convention.

LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
Critics of IEAs conjecture that because there is not a supranational governing body to
force nation-states to comply with IEAs they have minimal influence on national regulations and
have a nominal impact on protecting human health and the environment from harmful effects of
waste trade.50 Additionally, without a global authoritative body, countries are left to selfenforcement and self-reporting which can lead to corruption and weak compliance.51
Consequently, IEAs are only successful to the extent to which governments are committed to
cooperative efforts.52 Jing (2014) argues that international e-waste regulations have a
‘jurisdictional mismatch’ where international regulations do not have authority over national
signatories.
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The Basel Convention has several structural weaknesses that minimize its efficacy in
monitoring and controlling the transboundary movement of toxic waste and waste disposal. The
principal motivation for the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) agreement was to “assist developing
countries that might have limited regulatory capacity or difficulty controlling imports to implement
their own domestic environmental and public health policies.”53 Under this structure, countries
self-report the number of available disposal facilities. However, the convention does not
establish a method for countries to access information on the number of adequate disposal
outlets an importing country possesses.54 This framework makes it difficult for exporters to
determine whether the importer truly has capacity to dispose of waste properly. Consequently,
not having independent third party verification makes the system vulnerable to abuse by corrupt
officials.55
Additionally, the effectiveness of the Compliance Committee is constrained. Because
the Convention is an agreement between states, its provisions do not directly bind non-state
actors such as private companies. Consequently, the convention does not have the authority to
fine parties, states nor private actors, which violate the agreement. “The state, therefore, acts
as an intermediary by passing appropriate domestic laws which implement the Convention at a
national level to regulate private actors.”56 The effectiveness of the Protocol on Liability and
Compensation for Damage is also limited. It lacks the ability to force exporting nations to
compensate importing nations that have suffered severe environmental and health
consequences from hazardous waste caused by the exporting country.57
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Krueger (1999) claims that the Ban Amendment, which prohibits hazardous waste
exportation from rich countries to poor countries, is the Basel Convention’s greatest
achievement.58 However, other scholars argue that the Basel Convention may now be
obsolete. Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) contend that the Basel Convention has had virtually
no impact on waste flow patterns nor has it altered waste trade volume. Therefore, the
regulation is unnecessary.59 In 2011, at the 10th annual Conference of Parties meeting, the
convention affirmed, “that wastes should not be considered merely an unwanted and costly byproduct of modern society, but can be recognized as a potentially valuable resource.”60 Lucier
and Gareau (2015) state that the treaty’s shift to viewing waste as a lucrative commodity
undermines the legitimacy and the original intent of protecting poor countries from rich countries
dumping waste on poor states. The authors further contend that the revision will cause “certain
industries to dismantle some environmental regulations while at the same time promoting the
increase of other regulations enabling the importation of hazardous waste in less developed
countries.”61 This change makes the ban amendment irrelevant. However, findings by
Lepawsky and McNabb (2010) and Lepawsky (2014, 2015) disprove the notion that waste flows
from rich countries to poor ones. Nonetheless, they agree that the Basel Amendment is
ineffective in prohibiting waste importation by poor countries. These studies demonstrate that
waste trade occurs within regions and between similar country economy types, developed
countries tend to trade with other developed countries and developing nations trade with other
developing nations.
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To some extent, waste importation by poorer countries would not be as grave of a
concern if the convention was successful in transferring technology to less developed countries.
Unfortunately, the Convention has failed to establish a regular funding mechanism for
technology centers which has limited technology and knowledge transfer to countries in need.62

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLANATION
Many studies explain waste trade importation with the race to the bottom theory or
pollution haven hypothesis. They consider the nexus between economic benefits and
regulations. Clapp (1994) asserts that developing nations in need of revenue lower their
environmental standards despite their inability to properly dispose of hazardous waste. These
states are willing to assume risk because the economic benefit outweighs the grave
environmental and health concerns.63 Albers (2015) conjectures, “recent developments show
that entire production processes, which are very waste- intensive, are moved to developing
countries with less stringent laws.”64 Lucier and Gareau (2015) contend that the shift of e-waste
from a toxic resource to an economic commodity induces nation-states to create regulations that
appear environmentally friendly but actually promote economic interests. The authors further
assert that lax environmental regulations promote competition for firms to build new facilities in
developing countries.65 These studies suggest that regulations are structured to exacerbate
economic gains.
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Jing (2014) suggests that e-waste regulation is afflicted with the ‘tragedy of the
regulatory commons’66, a situation in which ineffective overregulation abounds. Exorbitant
regulation causes government structures to become decentralized67 which can lead to more
waste importation. Lucier and Gareau assert that changes in the regulatory structure can
exacerbate waste trade to less advanced economies.68 However, Jing argues that conjectures
that although decentralization at the domestic level initially appears to counteract international
environmental initiatives “[it] is a better approach to effectively promoting human and
environmental health.”69 He further contends that shifting regulation from an international
approach to a national decentralized structure enables government actors and private actors
who have more authority and ability to ensure waste is disposed of properly while
simultaneously pursuing profit. Contrarily, Marcoux and Urpelainen (2012) argue that some
developing countries are not entirely opposed to international regulations. In fact, those
supporting the Basel Convention have gained benefits from regulatory capacity building.
“International treaties could coordinate training programs, fund demonstration projects,
collect and administer information, orchestrate activities in the private sector, and create
scientific research programs. Second, the treaty could contain provisions that indirectly
mitigate the national regulatory problem.”70
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) states that most waste
management firms are not large transnational corporations seeking to take advantage of lower
environmental standards in developing countries. Rather they are small to mid- size enterprises
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“that lack the interest, the capital, and the legal and regulatory expertise necessary to establish
overseas affiliates.”71
There are substantially divergent perspectives on how economic and political variables
impact environmental regulations and ultimately hazardous waste import volume.
Consequently, future studies should continue to research how variables within these factors
affect import waste volume.

LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON WASTE TRADE
Existing waste trade studies are incomplete in two ways. First, studies tend to use one
theory to explain what drives a country to import waste and dismiss the importance of other
factors. Secondly, by using a single approach research omit key variables that are pertinent to
explaining the phenomenon.
The domestic institutional approach theory insists that tenets of traditional neoclassical
economy theory, revenue maximization, cost benefit analysis, and comparative advantage, are
difficult to calculate and do not sufficiently explain waste trade.72 Undeniably, obtaining landfill
costs is challenging which makes calculating economic gains at a national level an ambitious
task. However, qualitatively assessing the regulatory structure of a nation-state is equally
difficult. Therefore, it is insufficient to use the ease or difficulty to access data as a primary
reason to exclude variables when analyzing waste trade practices.
In agreement with O’Neill, comparative advantage theory is not sufficient in explaining
why a country imports waste. However, I differ in the reason why comparative advantage is
insufficient to explaining waste importation practices. A significant problem with comparative
advantage is that there are discrepancies in what constitutes a comparative advantage.
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Comparative advantage can be defined by labor, capital, environmental stringency, disposal
capacity. O’Neill restricts comparative advantage to disposal capacity.73 She argues that
proponents of the comparative advantage believe that increased disposal capacity leads to
more waste importation. Although she recognizes that the regulatory framework of a nation
influences waste importation practices, she fails to consider the regulatory structure as a
comparative advantage. This is a major drawback because the basis of the race to the bottom
theory and the pollution haven hypothesis is that lax environmental regulations, a result of the
regulatory structure, are a comparative advantage.
Another problem with using comparative advantage in evaluating waste trade is that it is
difficult to pinpoint what amount of labor/capital or how lax a regulation needs to be for a nation
to be considered as having a comparative advantage. These benchmarks are to some extent
arbitrary.
There are a few studies that recognize the relationship between economic, political and
environmental factors. However, they tend to use the race to the bottom theory to explain waste
importation practices. In doing so, the studies focus on how these factors influence waste
importation to developing countries. This is problematic because developed countries also
import hazardous waste. There is an increase in both environmental awareness and
hazardous waste import volume in both developed and developing countries. Therefore,
research studies should consider the new growth theory and environmental political theory in
explaining what drives waste importation. These theories recognize the government’s (political)
influence on economic and environmental factors.
A weakness in waste trade studies is the omission of critical variables. Both the
neoclassical economic and the domestic institutional approach do not consider international
environmental agreements, polity and corruption despite the known linkages between
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government type, economic development, corruption, and regulation (freedom to trade and
environmental). Utilizing the domestic institutional approach as the sole method when analyzing
waste trade fails to capture a state’s pursuit of capital accumulation that characterizes the
regulation of the global hazardous waste trade.74 Along similar lines, the neoclassical economic
approach mildly considers regulations that impact waste importation.
The domestic institutional approach argues that IEAs lack ‘authority or influence’ on
national regulations, domestic environmental performance and is therefore inconsequential to
understanding waste trade patterns. However, I have not found many studies that test the
number of IEAs ratified relative to domestic regulations and environmental performance to
substantiate the claim that IEAs have no or minimal effect on citizens’ health and the
environment. Prior studies focus on specific components of environmental concerns such as
pollution, land use or energy consumption. 75 This is in large part due to the lack of an
environmental performance index. However, the Environmental Performance Index (a
development of the Environmental Sustainability Index) established in 2001 provides
researchers a comprehensive database scaling the extent to which countries protect human
health and the environment from hazardous substances. Consequently, scholars are better
able to assess the relationship between the number of IEAs ratified and actual environmental
performance.
Furthermore, generally, it is assumed that democratic countries are more likely to
participate in international treaties and are also more prone to protect the environment than less
democratic nations. Empirical results demonstrate a positive relationship between democracy
and state commitment to compliance with environmental treaties.76 These findings demonstrate
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how political variables (factor) moderate in the relationship between the environmental factor
and electronic waste trade. Therefore, polity should be included in waste trade studies.
Another shortcoming in waste trade literature is the exclusion of innovation and
technology. These variables are critical for a few reasons. First, innovation is firmly recognized
as a central driver of economic growth and development.77 Long-term economic growth is not
only contingent on the endowment of a country’s production factors it also in its improvement in
production technologies.78 Additionally, innovation and technology are connected to regulations
and economic benefits. A substantial amount of innovation in e-waste disposal and recycling
occurs between private and public partnership, however, government officials at both the
national and local levels seek to control a certain percent of the market for governmental
revenue. Consequently, local and municipal governments can make the provision of waste
management services as barriers for private firms to enter the market.79 Nonetheless, scholars
argue that regulations promote innovation which leads to higher efficiency while reducing
harmful environmental consequences.80
A review of waste trade literature reveals an undeniable link between trade (openness),
economic development, the political framework and environmental regulations. Montgomery
(1992) conjectures that state behavior to importing waste is based on economics, domestic
politics, foreign policy, and even environmental protection laws.81 Ederington and Minier (2003)
contend that governments can manipulate trade volume, the functionality of industries and
industry structure by altering domestic policies such as environmental standards and subsidies
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and taxes.82 Nonetheless, few existing waste trade studies offer a comprehensive lens through
which waste importation for developed and developing countries can be analyzed. A more
thorough approach is needed to understand how variables impact a state’s proclivity to import
hazardous waste. Future studies should include economic, domestic political structure and
international environmental variables to determine how these factors influence import waste
volume.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN: FINDERS KEEPERS…LOSERS WEEPERS

The rapid emergence of waste trade has resulted in a proliferation of studies debating
the nuances of the phenomenon. Researchers use quantitative, qualitative and modeling and
simulation methodologies to explain what influences a state’s propensity to import waste. The
following sections outline the methodological tradeoffs between the approaches, highlight
research designs of waste trade studies and discuss their limitations. The final part establishes
this study’s methodology, operationalization of constructs and variables and discusses its
restrictions.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES
Qualitative research is “useful for generating hypotheses, identifying key variables and
building theories because they allow researchers to tease out causal mechanisms.”1 However,
qualitative methodology is not without shortcomings. Qualitative research has a small sample
size which makes it weak for theory testing. Furthermore, the case selection can be biased in
that it is likely that authors include cases that illustrate the outcome the researcher seeks to
support.2 “For qualitative researchers, a theory is usually only one critical observation away
from being falsified.”3 Lastly, some of the causal methodology used in qualitative work is difficult
to translate into quantitative and modeling research efforts.4
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Alternatively, quantitative studies have a larger sample size which makes them more
robust in theory testing. Whereas qualitative studies outline causal factors, statistical methods
aid in identifying which factors are substantively and statistically significant. However, arguably,
a drawback to statistical research is that its focus on the “effects-of-causes” demonstrates a
causal correlation5 and is not necessarily an indication of causality. Instead the coefficient of
the independent variable indicates the magnitude of change the dependent variable
experiences due to a change in the independent variable.
Modeling and simulation is an increasingly applied approach to explaining international
relations phenomena. Modeling and simulation allows the examination of many strategies in a
complicated setting and permits dynamic adjustment.6 Computational models have advantages
in that they force precision in concepts and allow “focused realism-the representation of
complex structures and processes without losing analytic focus.”7 These traits provide flexibility
with the unknowns in theories.
Nonetheless, a significant difficulty in using modeling and simulation to explain global
developments is the complexity of the international system.8 The international system is
composed of many actors with varying policies. Consequently, accurately (re)creating events in
models can be challenging and/or biased. For example, in modeling a researcher rather than
actors create the rules in the model. There is the possibility that the modeler might create rules
that the actual actors might not construct nor follow. Therefore, although complex adaptive
simulations are promising they [can be] incomplete.9
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QUALITATIVE WASTE TRADE STUDIES
O’Neill’s (2000) study provides an institutional framework comprised of two
determinants, regulatory structure and regulatory style that should be evaluated when assessing
how a nation’s domestic framework influences its waste importation practices.10 O’Neill
evaluates the regulatory structure of 5 OECD nations, Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan
and Australia, relative to their net import volume to test her hypothesis that the more
decentralized, closed and flexible a country is, the more likely it is to import waste.11
This research illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of case-oriented work. The
sample appears unbiased in that the results illustrate that not all the countries align with her
hypotheses that the more decentralized, closed and flexible a country is the more likely it is to
import waste. Japan is as an outlier because its regulatory structure indicates that it should be a
large importer of waste yet it is not.12 This can be attributed to Japan’s focus on its waste
management laws. Because of the densely populated urban areas and the short lifespan of
disposal sites, Japan created laws to minimize waste production and promote recycling.13
Nevertheless, the study’s sample size is too small and thus her findings cannot be
generalized to a more diverse and larger set of countries. To combat the anticipated critique
that the framework is applicable only to her sample, she contends that “the qualitative model of
environmental regulation can be applied, with minimal adaption, across countries.”14 Albeit, the
regulatory structure is straightforward, the model is far from being easily applicable to other
countries, especially to developing countries. The primary obstacle is that information is not
easily accessible. For example, the approach considers the structure of the waste management
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industry, the extent to which it is privately or publicly owned and its degree of competitiveness.15
This information can be challenging to acquire for developing countries that are high net
importers of hazardous waste such as India and the Philippines. Additionally, converting the
qualitative measures into quantitative scores is equally challenging.16 It is difficult for instance to
decide at what point the waste management industry is considered competitive. Also, the
process of converting the measures into scores (coding) would be quite laborious for such a
large dataset. Although the construction of a comprehensive index (database) would enable a
systematic comparison and analysis across a larger number of observations, the
aforementioned complexities make it difficult to apply the regulatory framework to a broader
context. Consequently, the author’s position that the domestic institutional approach is the best
method that explains what conditions promote waste importation is not well supported.
Despite these shortcomings, a significant strength of the research is that it offers a
thorough analysis of the political economy of hazardous waste trade. In doing so, it evaluates
the role of business, state and society in waste importation practices. This is especially
valuable because other theories evaluating waste trade do not consider the involvement various
actors have in not only creating environmental regulations but also the extent to which the
actors interact when creating policies that impact waste trade.
Clapp (2001) offers a qualitive work on waste trade that focuses on developing
countries. She conjectures that waste importation is intricately linked to economic factors and
that globalization facilitates an environment in which regulations are exploited and manipulated
for economic benefits. Clapp further contends that countries riddled in international debt
purposely adjusted trade policies (liberalized trade). More so, these adjustments were made
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under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank during the 1980s and 1990s as a quid pro
quo for the rescheduling of debt by donor countries and banks.17
To reinforce her assertion that developing countries with weak political and economic
environments are often preyed on, Clapp cites events that occurred in the 1980s and early
1990s when hazardous waste was markedly received by poorer countries. She describes the
infamous 1986 Khian Sea case in which a cargo ship carrying nearly 14,000 tons of toxic fly-ash
set sail from the United States scoured the world- the Caribbean, Africa, Europe, the Middle
East and East Asia, seeking a port that would accept the waste. Facing defeat, after 27 months
the ash mysteriously disappeared. Clapp outlines the 1988 Guinea- Bissau incident in which
the country was offered 4 times its GNP (nearly twice as much as its external debt) if it agreed
to accept 15 million tons of waste. She continues with an example from 1991 in which a
Somalian health minister was supposedly bribed to accept 500,000 metric tons of waste.18
A weakness of the study is that it fails to demonstrate that debt laden countries alter or
maintain lax trade and environmental regulations to preserve toxic waste importing practices as
an avenue to economic gains. Additionally, most examples of hazardous waste trade are
limited to occurrences before the ratification and adoption of the 1989 Basel Convention
ratification and the 1995 Basel Ban Amendment. These milestones are key initiatives enacted
to prohibit rich countries from ‘dumping’ on poor countries. Therefore, instances in which
hazardous waste trade flowed from rich to poor countries after these measures would better
support her assertions that advanced economy sends waste to countries burdened with debt.
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QUANTITATIVE WASTE TRADE STUDIES
Waste trade scholars generally agree that waste trade is impacted by factors that are
measured by more than one variable. In that the economic state of a country is measured not
only but GDP but also by GDP/capita. However, when evaluated waste trade patterns, most
quantitative waste trade studies use linear multiple regression models which focuses on how the
individual variable affects waste import volume. For example, Baggs’s (2009) study includes
economic variables, gross domestic product, and trade openness, to assess hazardous waste
import volume. The results of the study indicate that the coefficient of GDP for importing nations
is positive and significant. The coefficient for trade openness is also positive and significant.19
Because the coefficients of both variables are positive and significant we can infer that the
economic factor has a positive significant relationship on waste import volume. However, if
GDP and trade openness yielded opposite results, a negative coefficient for one variable and a
positive coefficient for the other variable, we would not have insight to how the economic factor
impacts import waste volume. Therefore, linear regression is beneficial in identifying specific
variables’ impact and influence on the dependent variable20, but fails to pinpoint how a group of
similar variables (a factor) affect waste import volume.
Additionally, leading waste trade studies employ a gravity model (a linear approach) to
test waste trade dynamics. This approach considers country level traits such as the average
wealth of a country and distance between trading partners to explain the determinants of
interaction between trading partners. Baggs (2009) uses standard ordinary least squares (OLS)
gravity model to examine mostly economic determinants that influence international hazardous
waste trade patterns. Kellenberg (2012) also examines trade patterns using the gravity
technique but focuses on whether differences in environmental regulations play a role between
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waste trading partners.21 Higashida and Managi’s (2014) research utilizes the gravity model to
explore factors that affect trade of recyclable waste of both exporting and importing countries.
Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) uses the gravity model to test the effects of ratification of the
Basel Convention on international waste shipments between trading partners. Although studies
using the gravity model approach are effective in providing insight to the relationship
(correlation) of variables between trading partners, which is paramount in identifying if a waste
haven effect is occurring between trading partners,22 it does not typically substantiate what
variables have a large effect on waste importation.
Another shortcoming of quantitative studies is that, to the best of my knowledge, existing
research fails to evaluate all three factors, political, economic and environmental, that affect
waste importation. Baggs (2009) considers economic variables to assess international waste
trade but does not consider political determinates. To her credit, she acknowledges that a
limitation of her study is that it does not include measures of regulatory stringency which is
critical to evaluate international waste trade.23 To remedy this, Kellenberg (2012) constructs an
environmental regulatory index. His study includes economic variables, GDP/capita as a proxy
for recycling productivity and as a control variable.24 However, the study does not focus on the
nexus between the stringency of environmental regulations and the wealth of a country.
Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) tests the effects of the Basel Convention and include GDP but
do not include domestic regulatory parameters. It would be beneficial to assess the relationship
between the Basel Convention and domestic environmental policies.
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MODELING AND SIMULATION WASTE TRADE STUDIES
Game theory, a form of modeling, is an alternative method to examine what induces
states to import electronic waste. A game theoretic approach is advantageous in evaluating
waste trade because it assesses the behavior of multiple stakeholders. It also is effective in that
it illustrates behavior by considering the likelihood that an event/decision will occur. Regarding
waste trade literature, the method accounts for how each actor is affected by the key factors,
economic, domestic regulations and international agreements, of waste trade.
Cassing and Kuhn (2003) creates a multistage game to analyze international trade of
hazardous waste when the market is oligopolistic and when both importing and exporting
countries utilize national environmental policies to attach taxes to waste trade. Kaushal and
Nema (2013) presents a non-cooperative game of multi-stakeholders (government,
manufacturer, recycler and consumer) in electronic waste management. The premise of the
study is that e-waste management is better understood by analyzing incentives and cost factors
of each stakeholder.25
A difficulty in using game theory is ensuring that the assigned behavioral probabilities
and payoffs mirror reality. These calculations consider the cost-benefit and regulatory restraints
in the system and requires an in-depth knowledge of each player. The number of players
involved in waste trade combined with the detailed knowledge of players required make it
difficult to estimate accurate payoffs. Additionally, the cost-benefit of importing waste is country
specific and thus a general probability cannot be easily applied to a generic model. These
limitations prohibit the game theoretic approach from being the best suited methodology in
explaining what factors have the most effect on import waste volume.
Lepawsky and McNabb (2010) and Lepawsky (2014) utilize computer network analysis
to illustrate the geography of global electronic waste trade. The graphical analysis is
25
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advantageous in illustrating waste trade flows. However, the network model cannot tell the
purpose for which trade occurs.26 In turn, it does not provide insight to what factors effect import
waste volume.

LIMITATIONS OF WASTE TRADE STUDIES
The methodologies used in existing waste trade literature share similar challenges.
Researchers agree that a state’s participation in waste trade, particularly to import waste, is
based on economic incentives, domestic regulations and environmental initiatives. However,
the qualitative and quantitative literature explains waste trade from a narrowly constructed
framework which yields conflicting results.
Qualitative and game theory approaches suffer from small sample sizes. These
methodologies tend to utilize a case based approach which cannot necessarily be applied to the
extensive number of players in international waste.
Modeling and simulation studies present a model with variables, economic, and
international environmental and domestic regulations, that states evaluate in the decisionmaking process on whether to import waste. Nonetheless, the weight of each factor is not
included in the model. Consequently, each factor is weighted the same. However, those who
believe that developing countries import hazardous waste despite the environmental
consequences for economic benefits are likely to argue that the economic factor should be
weighted more than the environmental factor. Because some modeling and simulation research
do not make a distinction of weight among the factors, the results are not necessarily applicable
to explaining waste trade importation practices.
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Limited time series is a weakness that all three methodologies share. Baggs’
quantitative assessment of waste trade includes data over a three-year period. Kellenberg
(2012) evaluates one year of waste trade. Lepawsky and McNabb’s (2010) computational
model explores a four-year timeframe. Qualitative studies tend to not examine import volume
over time. Instead, they focus on substantial events. Modeling and simulation studies do not
necessarily focus on a time nor a significant incident, rather they aim to create a model that can
be applied when specific conditions exist.
The most profound issue with current waste trade studies is their focus on ‘significance’
– to the exclusion of magnitude. Qualitative research typically uses case studies to argue which
factors are most significant (important) whereas quantitative studies focus on testing for
statistical significance. The issue is that “statistical significance does not answer a scientific
quantitative question. It is a philosophical, qualitative test. It does not ask how much. It asks
whether an effect exists.”27 In other words, existing waste trade studies whose results focus on
statistical significance are asking whether economics, environmental parameters or political
variables impact hazardous waste import volume. Statistical significance also indicates how
confident we are that a country’s economic health, regulatory structure and environmental
initiatives impact import waste volume. Essentially, testing for statistical significance is not as
important because, for the most part, scholars agree and are confident that the aforementioned
factors are significant to waste import volume. Therefore, the more interesting question is, how
much effect each factor has on hazardous waste import volume. From a pragmatic perspective,
which factor has the largest impact on import volume?
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METHODOLOGY
This study utilizes partial least squares-structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) to
examine the impact (effect size) that political, economic and environmental factors have on
electronic waste import volume. PLS-SEM is an effective method of analysis for this study in
several ways. First, its structure allows the researcher to evaluate the effect of variables that
are not directly observable (latent variables) on the dependent variable. This is especially
useful in analyzing waste trade theories that cite economic, political and environmental factors
as drivers of waste importation. Additionally, a key feature of SEM is its ability to easily
differentiate effect sizes for groups. This is especially advantageous in being able to discern if
the factors’ impact on waste import volume differ between developed and developing countries.
Furthermore, SEM allows statistical testing while accounting for causal assumptions.
Like ordinary least squares (OLS), SEM allows a researcher to identify the significance of
variables. In OLS the importance of an independent variable is based on its effect on the
dependent variable. However, SEM includes the relationship between independent variables
and latent variables. Therefore, the significance of a variable is based on its effect on the factor.
This provides the researcher insight to which variables are most important to the factor. This
study uses the bootstrapping approach to test for statistical significance. As recommended in
Hair et al., no sign changes were selected and the Bias-Corrected and Accelerated (BCa)
Bootstrap28 was employed because “it has reasonable computation requirements and produces
comparably narrow confidence intervals.”29 Following general convention, the significance is
tested using a two-tailed test and .05 represents the level of statistical significance.
PLS-SEM was chosen over CB-SEM (covariance-based structural equation modeling)
for several reasons. First, PLS-SEM is better suited in testing formative models. Formative
models assume that the independent variables make up the construct and that variation in the
28
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independent variables cause variation in the construct (x1Y1).30 The direction of the arrows
from the independent variable to the construct is an indication of the causal (predictive)
relationship in that direction. This study assumes that the independent variables make up the
construct and is therefore a formative model.
Secondly, PLS-SEM employs an OLS based approach (predictive) which is “the
preferred method when the focus of research is for theory development and explanation of
variance (prediction of the constructs).”31 Similar to traditional OLS regression, PLS-SEM
provides an R2 value. The R2 provides insight to how well the factors explain waste import
volume.
Additionally, in comparison to CB-SEM, PLS-SEM works more efficiently with smaller
sample sizes. It achieves high levels of statistical power with small sample sizes and does not
have identification issues.32 Lastly, the method is robust with handling missing values if the
missing values are below a reasonable level.33 Per Hair et al., this study uses 5% or less values
missing per indicator as a reasonable limit.34 The mean value treatment option is used to
handle missing values.
This research project tests for interaction between factors. A two-stage approach is
used to estimate the moderating effect between factors which the preferred method when
testing moderating effects in formative models.35
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PROPOSED MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
A review of the literature identified the variables and theoretical linkage among variables
which were used in the proposed model Table 3A. Based on the literature, it is presumed that
economic, political and environmental factors impact electronic waste import volume. It is
hypothesized that each factor has a small, medium or large effect, respectively ≤ .10, ≈.30 or ≥
.5036, on the dependent variable.

Fig. 3.1 Theoretical model and hypotheses represented as a nomological network
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From the theoretical framework, the study underscores five primary hypotheses:
H1a: The economic factor has a large positive effect on electronic waste import volume.
H2a: The political factor has a medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume.
H3a: The environmental factor has a small negative effect on electronic waste import volume.
H4a: The effect of the economic factor on electronic waste import volume depends on the
political factor such that when the political factor is smaller, the effect of the economic factor is
stronger.
H5a: The effect of the environmental factor on electronic waste import volume depends on the
political factor such that when the political factor is larger, the effect of the environmental factor
is stronger.
Development theory posits that less developed and developed countries’ political
economic systems are fundamentally different which lead to differences in their participation in
the global economy.37 Therefore this study includes alternative hypotheses related to a factor’s
effect on electronic waste volume within developed and developing countries.

H1b: Economic factor has a large positive effect on electronic waste import volume in developed
countries.
H1c: Economic factor has a large positive effect on electronic waste import volume in
developing countries.
H2b: The political factor has a medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume in
developed countries.
H2c: The political factor has a medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume in
developing countries.
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H3b: The environmental factor has a small negative effect on electronic waste import volume in
developed countries.
H3c: The environmental factor has a small negative effect on electronic waste import volume in
developing countries.

Hypotheses 1a-c identify the impact the economic factor has on electronic waste import
volume. Tenets from the neoclassical economic growth perspective posit that countries trade
goods it has a comparative advantage in. Arguably, more advanced countries have a
comparative advantage to import waste because it has the capital needed to invest in
machinery to maximize efficiency in mining e-waste. Contrarily, developing countries also have
an economic comparative advantage to import waste. Disposal fees, labor costs and corporate
taxes are often lower in developing countries which can promote a waste haven effect. Clapp
asserts that waste importation interconnects with a country’s economic position.38 Empirical
analysis of waste trade studies demonstrate that economic variables play a positive role in both
developed and developing countries waste importation practices. Therefore, I expect that the
economic factor will have a large positive effect on electronic waste import volume in both
developed and developing countries.
Hypotheses 2a-c highlight the impact the political environment has on electronic waste
import volume. The domestic institutional approach asserts that the domestic political structure
is the primary factor that drives waste import volume because the domestic state determines
trade and environmental policies that government and private actors are bound to. Following
this logic, the political factor impacts import volume regardless of political structure differences
between developed and developing countries. Therefore, I expect the political factor to have a

38

Clapp, Toxic Exports: The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from Rich to Poor Countries, 18.

57
medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume in both developed and developing
countries.
Hypotheses 3a-c measure the impact of environmental policies on electronic waste
import volume. The neoliberal international institutionalist approach argues that multilateral
environmental treaties will help mitigate the negative environmental consequences of trade.
Therefore, the more environmental treaties a country signs the more environmentally strict it is.
Following this logic, it is expected that environmental agreements (a proxy for environmental
stringency) will have a large effect on imported electronic waste volume. However, the number
of environmental agreements a country participates in is not necessarily an indication of
environmental stringency.39 A country can ratify an agreement and not be complicit with its
regulations. Empirical studies by de Zeeuw (2008, 2015), Kellenberg (2012, 2014), Lepawsky
(2015), Lucier and Gareau (2015) and Khan (2016) illustrate that environmental treaties have
been rather ineffective in governing waste trade. Consequently, it can be expected that the
environmental factor will have a small negative effect on electronic waste import volume in both
developed and developing countries.
Hypotheses 4a-5c measure the economic and environmental factors’ relationship with
electronic waste import volume when the political factor intervenes in the relationship. This
assumption is based on the new growth theory and environmental political theory conjecture
that the government (the political factor) influences the relationship between the economic and
environmental factors and trade volume. When the political factor moderates on the relationship
between the economy and electronic waste import volume, I expect the economic factor will
have a positive and stronger effect on volume when the political factor is lower as compared to
when the political factor is higher.
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When the political factor moderates on the relationship between the environmental factor
and electronic waste import volume, I expect the effect of the environmental factor will have a
negative and stronger effect on volume when the political factor is larger as compared to when
the political factor is smaller.
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Table 3.1 Hypotheses with Expected and Actual Factor Effects
Hypothesis
H1: Economic factor impact on electronic waste import
volume

Expected Effect Size
Combined Developed Developing
large/+

large/+

large/+

H2: Political factor impact on electronic waste import volume

medium/+

medium/+

medium/+

H3: Environmental factor impact on electronic waste import
volume

small/ -

small/ -

small/ -

+

+

+

-

-

H4: The effect of the economic factor on electronic waste
import volume depends on the political factor

H5: The effect of the environmental factor on electronic
waste import volume depends on the political factor
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50 positive = (+) negative = (-)

OPERATIONALIZATION OF FACTORS AND VARIABLES
This study is comprised of 12 independent variables that load onto 3 independent
exogenous (latent) factors, economic, political and environmental. The dependent variable
(endogenous factor) is electronic waste import volume (Figure 3.2). A table outlining the
operationalization of factors and variables is outlined in Table 5A.
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Fig. 3.2 Structural Equation Model

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Electronic waste import volume (kilogram) is represented by the United Nations (UN)
commodity code 854810. The commodity is defined as electrical machinery and equipment and
parts thereof; including sound recorders and reproducers, televisions, and parts and
accessories of such articles. It also consists of waste and scrap of primary cells, “primary
batteries and electric accumulators; spent primary cells, spent primary batteries and spent
electric accumulators.”40
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Economic Factor
An abundance of literature suggests that economic globalization induces waste trade.
The economic determinants used in this study are gross domestic product (GDP), gross
domestic product per capita (GDP/capita), percent of exported goods and services and total tax
rate. This study asserts that the status of economic development of a nation is largely
determined by these variables. Consequently, they provide insight as to whether the economic
factor impacts e-waste import volume.
GDP is the value of goods and services produced plus taxes and minus subsidies not
included in the value of the products.41 GDP measures the scale (size) of a country’s economy.
The literature indicates that economy size plays a significant role in waste importation. Larger
economies are more likely to be capital abundant (rich countries). These countries are able to
procure machinery needed to optimize mineral extraction. Contrarily, poorer countries are likely
to import waste as a means to increase state revenue and create a sustainable industry.
Although, the manner in which GDP impacts the economic factor difffers between the economy
types it is a key component of the economy. Therefore, the expected sign of the estimated
coefficient for GDP on the economic factor is positive in both developed and developing
countries.
Similarly, GDP/capita, a measure of the overall wealth of a country, is equally important
when assessing economic development. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by
midyear population. Some studies operationalize GDP/capita is as a proxy for environmental
stringency.42 These scholars contend that as citizens’ incomes increase they become more
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environmentally conscious. In turn, environmental regulations become stricter. It is important to
note that this causal relationship is more likely to occur in developed countries as opposed to
developing countries because the individual income gain in a developing countries is less likely
to be large enough (and widely distributed among citizens) to impact environmental regulations.
Despite this, GDP/capita is still critical to the economic factor in developing countries.
GDP/capita in developing countries is substantially lower than developed countries. A low
GDP/capita can motivate countries to import waste to create employment opportunties and
increase citizens’ income. Although GDP/capita functions differently in the country types, the
expected sign of the estimated coefficient for GDP/capita is positive in developed and
developing countries. Equally, I do not expect the level of importance to differ substantially
between the country types.
The percent of exported goods and services represents the value of all goods and other
market services provided to the rest of the world. Although developed countries tend to have
larger economies with a greater share of world trade the extent to which a country can
participate in the global economy impacts its economic status . It is expected that the coefficient
for percent of exported goods and services is positive on the economic factor in developed and
developing countries.
Total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by a
business in the second year of operation, expressed as a share of commercial profit.43 The tax
rate impacts the number of business operating in the region. Some sholars contend that
developing countries tend to have lower tax rates in an attempt to attract foreign direct
investment. The lower tax rate is perceived as being advantageous to the nation’s economic
status. Contrarily, the tax rate of operating a business in developed countries is higher which
can adversely impact the economic health of the nation. These differences might yield different
effect sizes of tax rate on the economic factor between the country types. However, because
43
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business taxes are a significant component to assessing the overall health of a national
economy the total tax rate will have a positive effect on the economic factor in both developed
and developing countries.

Political Factor
Studies suggest that an interconnection between regulatory policies, corruption levels,
and government type impacts economic growth. 44 Therefore, the political factor encompasses,
perceived level of corruption, government type, measures of innovation policies and policies
related to the freedom to trade.
The Polity Index, measures the extent to which a government is authoritarian versus
democratic. Polity data is sourced from the Polity IV Project Index. The polity score ranges
from -10 to +10. A score closer to -10 represents a completely authoritarian government and a
score +10 indicates a completely democratic nation.45 Government type is critical to the political
factor because it influences the policy making process, the type of policies constructed and its
overall compliance to the policies. It is expected that polity will have a positive effect on the
political factor in both developed and developing countries.
This study includes a corruption score which measures the level of perceived
governmental corruption. Corruption data is retrieved from the Corruption Perceptions Index.
The scale ranges from 0–100, a score closer to 100 is most favorable and indicates little
perceived corruption.46 Corruption impacts the stringency of regulatory policies created as well
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as influences the extent to which rules and regulations are adhered to. Recall that high level
corruption, bribes that impact legislation, can occur in both developed and less developed
countries. Therefore, it is expected that corruption will have a positive effect on the political
factor in both country types. However, I expect the effect size of corruption to be substantially
different in developed versus developing countries. I attribute this to the differences in the
overall perceived level of corruption in both country types. Developed countries are generally
viewed as having less corruption than developing countries in large part because lower level
corruption such as bribes for permits tend to be absent. Whereas, in some developing countries
bribes can be considered a ‘normal cost of doing business’.
This study uses the Index of Economic Freedom rating of freedom to trade. The index
quantifies the extent of tariff and non-tariff barrier policies that affect imports and exports of
goods and services. The scale ranges from 0-100 in which a score closer to 100 represents the
most freedom to trade.47 A nation’s ability to freely trade is reflective of its political economic
policies. It is expected that the estimated coefficient for freedom to trade will have a positive
effect on the political factor in both developed and developing countries. A popular assumption
is that democratic states tend to be more open to trade. Building on this logic, I expect the
effect size of the freedom to trade to differ substantially between developed and developing
countries.
Innovation policies affect the cost of waste management. The study includes the
innovation score from the Global Competitive Index that measures the extent to which policies
promote research and development. The scale ranges from 0-100 with scores closer to 100
representing a stronger existence of policies that support research and development. The
importance of innovation policies “is no longer the prerogative of high-income countries alone.”48
Therefore, it is expected that the coefficient for innovation will be positive on the political factor
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in both developed and developing countries. However, the size of the impact should vary
between country types. I expect innovation to have a higher impact on the political factor in
developed countries compared to developing countries.

Environmental Factor
One of the most significant issues to emerge in the global political economy is the effect
of trade on the environment. States and institutions, such as the WTO, created international
environmental treaties and inserted environmental standards and protocols in global trade
agreements. The European Commission created robust regulations to ensure international
waste trade “is managed in an environmentally sustainable way, and prevents shipments from
affecting human health.”49 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) includes
standards that promote environmentally sustainable development. This study conjectures that
environmental regulation at the domestic and international levels impact waste trade and thus
should be included waste trade studies. This research encompasses the number of
environmental treaties a state has ratified, its environmental protection score and its ratification
of the Basel convention and Basel Ban Amendment.
The number of environmental treaties is accessed from the Socioeconomic Data and
Application Center dataset. They represent the absolute number of multilateral environmental
treaties a country has agreed to. It is expected that the estimated coefficient for environmental
treaties will be positive on the environmental factor for both developed and developing
countries.
Environmental regulatory stringency plays a crucial role in state behavior in hazardous
waste trade. This study uses the environmental protection index (EPI) score as proxy to
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measuring regulatory stringency.50 Proponents of the race to the bottom theory and pollution
haven hypothesis contend that lax environmental regulations in developing countries induce
them to import hazardous waste. Empirical results from Kellenberg’s (2009) study supports this
theory.51 However, descriptive data illustrates that developed nations import the majority of
electronic waste. Because developed nations tend to have stricter environmental laws
compared to developing nation, yet still import waste I surmise that environmental regulations
will have a positive effect on the environmental factor in both developing and developed
countries.
The Basel Convention and the Basel Amendment are key variables of the environmental
factor. The focus of the treaties is to safeguard developing countries from importing hazardous
waste from developed countries. Ratification and/or acceptance of the treaties are sourced
from the Basel Convention database. The countries are coded dichotomously as either ratified
the agreement or not (1= ratify 0=not ratify). The provisions do not limit developing countries
from importing hazardous waste from other developing countries. In addition, in 2008 the Basel
Convention shifted its perspective of e-waste from trash to treasure. Therefore, I expect that the
two initiatives will have a negative effect on the environmental factor in developing countries. A
developed countries willingness to ratify the Basel Convention and Ban Amendment treaty is an
indication of its commitment to environmentally sound trading practice. However, the treaties do
not address importing by developed nations. Therefore, I expect the treaties to have a negative
effect on the environmental factor in developed countries.
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Table 3.2 Expected Outer Weights

Combined

Developed

Developing

ECONOMIC

GDP

+

+

+

GDP /capita (US $)

+

+

+

Export of Goods and Services

+

+

+

POLITICAL

Polity

+

+

+

Corruption

+

+

+

Freedom to Trade

+

+

+

ENVIRONMENT

Expected Outer Weights
Factor

Variable

Environmental Treaties

+

+

+

Basel Convention

-

-

-

Basel Ban Amendment

-

-

-

CONTROL VARIABLES
This study includes if a country is landlocked, population and population density as
measures of control. The data is sourced from the World Bank and the Yale Center for
Environmental Law and Policy. I expect that population and population density are likely to
have a negative small impact on electronic waste import volume because some developing
countries, particularly those in Africa and Asia, import waste despite being densely populated.
Population density is also less likely to impact waste disposal in advanced countries because
these countries generally have stricter environmental regulations prohibiting disposal in densely
populated areas.
A country’s proximity to a coast is also considered to influence waste import volume.
Landlocked countries tend to experience higher transportation costs while countries with at least
one coastal border are likely to have lower transportation fees. In reviewing e-waste trade data,
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the largest importers of electronic waste are coastal countries. Therefore, landlocked variable
will have a medium positive effect on electronic waste import volume.

DATA COLLECTION
This study evaluates economic, political and environmental factors’ impact on electronic
waste import volume of 130 countries, 36 developed and 94 developing from 1998-2014.52 757
country-years are assessed, 286 developed countries and 471 less developed countries. The
number of countries reporting importing electronic waste varies by year. Table 7A displays the
sample size by year. In 1998 approximately 60 countries reported importing electronic waste.
By 2014, the number of importers increased 61%.
Data used in this research is compiled from multiple sources. A table outlining the
source of the variables is outlined in Table 5A. Acquiring data for each variable for the desired
period among the many different datasets proved challenging. The Environmental Protection
Index is evaluated every two years whereas other index studies are conducted every year. Also,
the timeframe of availability of data between the sources vary. Availability of economic country
level data is available beginning in the 1960s. However, innovation policy analysis is a recent
phenomenon and data is available beginning in 2006.
Inconsistent data and data integrity are concerning when analyzing waste trade both
over time and within one year. Some nations record the value of imported waste without the
volume and vice versa. This leads to missing values which impacts the sample size. In turn, a
researcher’s ability to accurately assess electronic waste trade is hindered. Additionally, some
countries data is questionable. For example, from 1996 to 2012 China reported importing an
average of 444, 289 kg per year of electronic waste. However, it has not reported receiving
volume since 2012. It is unlikely that China has stopped importing electronic waste. More so, it
52

The list of countries used in the study is outlined in table 6A.
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is reasonable to assume that the country is either no longer reporting inbound shipments of
electronic waste or is using alternative commodity codes (i.e. copper waste and scrap- 740400,
nickel waste and scrap-750300 or aluminum waste and scrap- 760200).

LIMITATIONS
This research strays from other waste trade studies by not employing traditional ordinary
least squares (OLS). OLS measures independent variables’ direct effect on a dependent
variable. In contrast, PLS-SEM measures the direct effect of a factor on the dependent
variable. Consequently, this study does not evaluate the effect independent variables have on
electronic waste import volume.
Another limitation of the study is that in using formative modeling my model does not
account for outside variables that also might impact the factor. This is because formative
modeling assumes perfect measurement between the independent variable and the factor.
Therefore, my model only considers the variables in the model impact on the factor. Despite
this, my study includes the variables that literature indicates are most critical. Table 3A outlines
relevant literature associated with each variable.
Along similar lines, variables that do not align on the political, economic and
environmental factors are not considered. For example, studies seeking to provide insight to
the relationship between trading partners (testing the pollution haven hypothesis or race to the
bottom theory) tend to use the gravity model which takes considers distance and borders.
These variables are omitted from my study because I am not exploring trade patterns nor
evaluating characteristics relative to trading partners.
Other studies incorporate a country’s membership in free trade agreements to test the
effect size trade agreements have on waste import volume. In lieu of this, I use the freedom to
trade variable as a proxy for the absolute number of trade agreements. It is reasonable to
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assume that the more trade freedom a country has the more likely it is to have a higher number
of trade agreements.
Disposal capacity is considered a determinant a state evaluates when evaluating
whether to import waste. Some studies use the number of landfills as a proxy for disposal
capacity. This study does not include this measure because I believe it is not a suitable
measure for disposal capacity and it does not directly impact a country’s import volume. First,
using the number of landfills is problematic because it assumes that waste will be disposed of in
landfills. Electronic waste can also be incinerated. Additionally, not all electronic waste will be
discarded in a disposal facility (landfill nor incinerator). Electronic waste can be recycled for
valuable components, repurposed and then re-exported. Therefore, the number of disposal
facilities can be irrelevant because the importing country might not be the final destination of the
waste.
Furthermore, utilizing the number of facilities (landfills or incinerators) as a proxy for
available capacity is flawed because it is not an adequate representation of available disposal
capacity. A country can have many facilities with minimal available capacity. Alternatively, a
country can have fewer disposal facilities with a large amount of disposal capacity. Considering
capacity can be irrelevant all together in examining what influences states to import waste.
Nations can decide to import waste despite knowing existing inefficiencies and inadequacies in
waste management. They choose to improperly manage and dispose of electronic waste. This
is evidenced by countries such as India, Bangladesh and Nigeria that are ‘known’ for lax waste
disposal practices.
Additionally, capacity challenges have not stopped developed countries from importing
electronic waste. OECD countries are experiencing capacity challenges as they are not able to
construct new facilities due to social and economic constraints.53 The United States Trade

53

O'Neill, Waste Trading among Rich Nations: Building a New Theory of Environmental Regulation, 188.
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Commission echoes this sentiment in that it conjectures that high capital costs of landfills may
affect the ability to provide waste management services.54 Nonetheless, advanced countries
continue to import waste. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the number of operating
facilities in the study.
Components of the cost benefit analysis, such as disposal fees, local taxes and
employee wages, are not included in the study. I recognize that these variables are key
components of a cost-benefit analysis and that it is reasonable to consider profitability as a key
driver to import waste. However, I contend that taxes and wages these variables are
operational expenses that impact profitability at a granular level and therefore are better suited
for studies that seek to explore the cost-benefit of importing waste at the micro (city) and meso
(state) levels. Therefore, because this study focuses on determinants at the international level,
these variables are omitted.
Baggs (2009) explains that “the use of available average or aggregate tariffs by country
as proxies for tariffs specifically for hazardous waste is conceptually difficult since imported
hazardous waste is often of negative value, making an ad valorem import tariff of dubious
applicability.”55 This study uses the total tax rate and freedom to trade score per country in lieu
of tariffs for hazardous and or recyclable waste at the local level. The total tax rate illustrates
the rate a company pays in taxes to the state. The freedom to trade score considers trade
barriers such as tariff rates.
Clapp (2001) contends that international debt is a key driver for states to import waste.56
Lepawsky and McNabb (2010) examined the association between each country’s net trade
balance, debt service ratio and public debt as a percentage of GDP. Their findings illustrated
that no significant relationship exists between net trade balance and debt service ratio nor
54

United States International Trade Commission, xv.

55

Baggs, 8.

56

Clapp, Toxic Exports: The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from Rich to Poor Countries, 11.
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between net trade balance and public debt as a percentage of GDP. Therefore, central
government debt is not included in the study. Additionally, in reviewing data approximately 67%
of observations reported having no central government debt.57
It is important to note that although the variables in the political factor do not mirror the
structure outlined in O’Neill’s domestic institutional approach, I include variables that relate to
tenets in her framework. For example, the EPI score, a proxy for environmental regulatory
stringency, corresponds to the extent of regulatory stringency outlined in the regulatory structure
in the domestic institutional approach.

57

Statistic calculated from World Bank data 1998-2014.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS – OVERALL MODEL: NOT A LOAD OF RUBBISH

This chapter seeks to analyze the impact the economic, political and environmental
factors have on electronic waste import volume. The analysis evaluates three models; the
combined model includes both developed and developing countries, the developed model
focuses on developed nations and the developing model assesses developing nations. To have
a robust analysis, panel data spanning years 1998 to 2014 was evaluated. 757 country-years
are in in the combined model, 286 in the developed model and 471 in the developing model.
Each model consists of 3 constructs with 9 independent variables. 1 Because data for all the
variables is not available until approximately 2002, this model does not include innovation
environmental protection index scores and tax rates data.2 Tables 4.1and 4.2 outline the
indicators’ descriptive statistics and correlation values.

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Indicator
Volume (tons)
GDP (USD millions)
GDP/capita
% Exports
Polity
Corruption
Trade Freedom
Enviro Treaties
Basel Entry
Ban Amend
Population (millions)
Population Density

Mean
8,544.23
511,802.55
15,825.49
50.97
2.71
-0.27
71.74
3.04
0.93
0.40
50.44
334.15

Median
73.02
81,026.30
6,524.86
37.84
8.00
4.10
77.70
3.00
1.00
0.00
10.96
81.30

Min
0.00
349.46
111.53
0.00
-99.00
-99.00
-99.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.09
-99.00

Max
566,820.61
17,393,103.00
116,612.88
3,264.50
10.00
10.00
95.00
9.00
1.00
1.00
1,295.29
21,595.35

1

The term indicator will be used interchangeably with the term variable.

2

These variables will be assessed in the post Basel shift model discussed in Chapter 5.

Standard Deviation
35,831.25
1,613,808.38
19,563.90
128.65
17.52
22.80
24.21
1.75
0.26
0.49
154.01
1,640.74
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COMBINED MODEL

MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT
Collinearity
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues
exist. Table 4.3 reports the VIF values for all the indicators. All values are between .20 and
5, hence collinearity is not an issue.3

Table 4.3 Outer VIF - Combined Model
% Exports
Ban Amend
Basel Entry
Corruption
Economic * Political
Environmental * Political
GDP ($)
GDP/Capita
Landlock
Polity
Population Density
Population
Trade Freedom
Treaties

3

Hair, 143.

VIF
1.01
1.03
1.03
1.11
1.00
1.00
1.10
1.11
1.00
1.02
1.00
1.00
1.14
1.01
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Significance and Relevance of the Indicators
The outer weight value expresses a variable’s level of relative importance, or its relative
contribution, to forming the factor. The higher the value, the more important the indicator is to
the factor.4 The significance of a variable, an indication of whether the variable significantly
contributes to its corresponding construct, is determined by the p-value of the outer weight. An
indicator is significant if its outer weight p-value is less than .05. An indicator is of absolute
importance if the p-value of the outer weight is not significant, greater than .05, but its outer
loading is above .50.5
Table 4.4 outlines the weight (importance) and significance of the indicators. The
percent of exports of goods and services is the most relevant variable to the economic factor,
.931. The gross domestic product indicator is of medium importance with .383. GDP/capita is
the least important indicator to the economic factor, .031. Interestingly, none of the economic
indicators are significant, they all have p-values higher than .05, to the economic factor. More
so, only the percent of goods and services exported is important (it is not significant but its outer
loading is higher than .50).
Polity, the extent to which a government is democratic, is the most important indicator to
the political factor, outer weight .67. The freedom to trade is of medium importance with outer
weight of .417. Corruption is the least important indicator to the political factor, .386. Notably,
all political variables are statistically significant to the factor.
The number of environmental treaties is the most critical indicator to the environmental
factor with an outer weight of .936, and is significant. The Ban Amendment is of medium
importance with an outer weight of .354. However, it is not significant nor is it of absolute
importance to the factor. Although, the ratification of the Basel Convention is the least important
indicator, -.300, it is significant.

4
5

Ibid., 146.
Absolute importance is the information an indicator provides without considering the other indicators. Ibid., 148.
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Table 4.4 Variable Results - Combined Model

ENVIRONMENT

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

Factor

Variable

Outer Weights
(Outer
Loadings)

t Value

p Value

Significance
p value < .05

GDP

.383
(.36)

1.54

0.12

No

GDP /capita (US $)

.031
(.21)

0.18

0.86

No

% Export Goods and Services

.931
(.92)

1.88

0.06

No

Polity

0.67
(.79)

12.49

0.00

Yes

Corruption

0.386
(.49)

5.08

0.00

Yes

Freedom to Trade

0.417
(.75)

3.64

0.00

Yes

Environmental Treaties

0.936
(.91)

9.19

0.00

Yes

Basel Convention

-0.300
(-.19)

2.62

0.01

Yes

Basel Ban Amendment

0.354
(.27)

1.62

0.11

No
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses)
Collinearity
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues
exist. Table 4.5 reports the VIF values for all the factors.6 All values are between .20 and 5,
hence collinearity is not an issue.7

Table 4.5 Inner VIF - Combined Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Population Density
Population

VIF
1.96
1.08
1.03
2.02
1.27
1.18
1.37
1.03

Assessment of path coefficients8
Table 4.6 reports the standardized values and significance of the path coefficients.
Estimated coefficients closer to +1 represent strong positive relationship.9 The economic factor
has a medium sized effect on electronic waste import volume and is statistically significant. A
one-unit change in the economic factor increases waste importation .39 standard deviations,
13,795 tons10, when all other factors are held constant.
6

The terms factor and construct will be used interchangeably.

7

Hair, 143.

8

A robustness check was conducted with Mexico and South Korea as outliers. When dummy variables for Mexico and South
Koreas are set as control variables the results are similar. This illustrates that Mexico and South Korea’s volume do not alter the
factors’ effect on electronic waste import volume.
9

Hair, 195.

10

Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model. Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.
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The political factor’s effect on import volume is miniscule. When the political factor
changes by one-unit, electronic waste importation rises .062 standard deviations, 2,293 tons,
when all other factors are held constant.
The environmental factor is significant but also has virtually no effect on import volume.11
A one-unit change in the environmental factor decreases electronic waste importation .075
standard deviations, 2,616 tons, when all other factors are held constant.

Table 4.6 Structural Path Results - Combined Model
Path
Coefficients
0.39

t Value
2.26

p Value
0.02

Significance
p value < .05
Yes

Political Economy --> Import Volume

0.05

0.37

0.71

No

Political --> Import Volume

0.06

2.19

0.03

Yes

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-.012

0.55

0.58

No

-.073
3.59
positive = (+) negative = (-)

0.00

Yes

Paths
Economic --> Import Volume

Environment --> Import Volume
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50

11

Path coefficients may be significant but their effect size can be small. This usually occurs with large sample sizes.
Hair, 197.
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The model tests for the economic and environmental factors’ effect when the political
factor moderates on the relationship between the factors and e-waste import volume. Figure
4.1 explains the effect size of the economic factor based on the value of the political factor.
Regardless of the political factor’s value, the political factor does not impact the relationship
between the economic factor and electronic waste import volume (the slopes above, below and
at the mean political values are the same). This is likely because combining country types
obscures the effect as evidenced by richer effects when country types are modeled separately.
Nevertheless, in all 3 cases, as the economic factor gets larger, import volume increases.

Fig. 4.1 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Combined
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Figure 4.2 explains the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of the
political factor. The estimates illustrate that the relationship between the environmental factor
and volume is slightly stronger when the political factor’s value is higher (a steeper slope when
the political value is 1 standard deviation above the mean). Conversely, the environmental
factor has a weaker effect on volume when the political factor values are smaller (a less steep
slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation below the mean). In all 3 cases, as the
environmental factor gets larger, e-waste import volume decreases.

Fig. 4.2 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Combined
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Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination)
The R2 for the combined model is .189. Economic, political and environmental factors
explain 19% of electronic waste importation volume when both developed and developing
countries are evaluated in the same model.

Effect size of f2
The effect size of the construct, f2, was tested to determine whether a construct has a
substantive impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model. f2 values less than
.02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the
dependent variable.12 The economic factor will have nearly a medium sized effect on electronic
waste import volume if excluded from the model. The absence of the other factors will have
virtually no effect on volume.

Table 4.7 f2 - Combined Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Population Density
Population

12

Ibid., 201.

Import Volume
0.09
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Fig. 4.3 Structural Equation Model - Combined Model
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DEVELOPED MODEL

MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT
Collinearity Issues
Table 4.8 reports the VIF values for all the indicators. All values are between .20 and 5,
hence collinearity is not an issue.

Table 4.8 Outer VIF - Developed Model
% Exports
Ban Amend
Basel Entry
Corruption
Economic * Political
Environmental * Political
GDP ($)
GDP/Capita
Landlock
Polity
Population Density
Population
Trade Freedom
Treaties

VIF
1.18
1.06
1.12
1.36
1.00
1.00
1.19
1.09
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.36
1.06

Significance and Relevance of the Indicators
Table 4.9 illustrates the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developed
model. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the most important variable, .908 to the economic
factor. GDP/capita and the amount of exports as a percent of GDP are relatively equally
important with -.248 and -.218 values. None of the economic indicators are significant.
However, GDP is of absolute importance (outer loading = .93).
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Polity is the most critical indicator, .959, to the political factor and is the only significant
indicator in the model. Corruption is of medium importance to the political factor, .352.
Freedom to trade is the least influential in the political factor.
The Ban Amendment is the most pertinent indicator to the environmental factor, .686.
Ratification of the Basel Treaty is nearly as important with a .517 indicator weight.
Environmental treaties are the least essential indicator to the factor, .186. It is worth noting that
none of the environmental variables are significant. However, the Ban Amendment and Basel
Treaty are of absolute importance.
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Table 4.9 Variable Results - Developed Model
Outer Weights
Factor

Variable

(Outer
Loadings)

Significance
t Value

p Value

p value < .05

1.33

0.18

No

0.80

0.42

No

0.94

0.35

No

3.08

0.00

Yes

0.78

0.43

No

0.47

0.64

No

0.56

0.58

No

1.48

0.14

No

1.36

0.18

No

0.908
GDP
ECONOMIC

(.93)
-.248
GDP /capita (US $)
(-.13)
-.218
% Export Goods and Services
(-.55)
.959
Polity
POLITICAL

(.95)
.352
Corruption
(.23)
-.254
Freedom to Trade
(.03)
.186
ENVIRONMENT

Environmental Treaties
(.35)
.517
Basel Convention
(.72)
.686
Basel Ban Amendment
(.82)
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses)
Collinearity
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues
among the factors exist. Table 4.10 reports the VIF values for all the factors. The economic
and population factors exhibit collinearity. However, the economic construct is not deleted
from the model because literature indicates that it is essential to evaluate waste trade. The
collinearity issue is resolved when population is omitted from the model, the VIF value for
the economic factor is 3.14. Nonetheless, because population is a control variable it is not
necessary to exclude it from the model.

Table 4.10 Inner VIF - Developed Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Population Density
Population

VIF
10.12
1.96
1.14
9.71
2.85
12.20
1.78
10.20
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Assessment of path coefficients13
Table 4.11 displays the factors’ path coefficients, impact size, on electronic waste import
volume. Notably, none of the factors are statistically significant. The economic factor’s effect is
between small and medium. When the economic factor increases by one unit, e-waste volume
decreases .16 standard deviations, or -5,624 tons14, holding all other factors constant.
The political and environmental factors have an inconsequential effect on import volume.
When the political factor changes by one unit, e-waste volume decreases .06 standard
deviations, 2,214 tons, when all other factors are held constant. A one-unit change in the
environmental factor decreases waste importation .04 standard deviations, 1,336 tons, when all
other factors are held constant.

Table 4.11 Structural Path Results- Developed Model
Paths

Path
Coefficients

p Value
0.38

Significance
p value < .05
No

Economic --> Import Volume

-.16

t Value
0.89

Political Economy --> Import Volume

-0.26

0.75

0.45

No

Political --> Import Volume

-.063

0.35

0.73

No

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-0.06

0.49

0.62

No

0.66

No

Environment --> Import Volume
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50

-0.04
positive = (+)

0.44
negative = (-)

13

A robustness check was conducted on import volume per capita as the dependent variable. The results are similar to the output
in the study with the dependent variable as volume in tons.
14

Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model. Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.
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It is assumed that the political factor moderates the relationship between the economic
and environmental factors and e-waste import volume. Figure 4.4 explains the effect size of the
economic factor based on the value of the political factor. The estimates show that the
relationship between the economic factor and volume is stronger when the political factor value
is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above the mean).
Conversely, the economic factor has a weaker effect on volume when the political factor values
are low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation below the
mean). When the political value is high, as the economic factor gets larger volume
decreases.15 Alternatively, when the political factor is low as the economic factor gets larger
volume increases.

Fig. 4.4 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Developed

15

Downward slope of the line.
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Figure 4.5 explains the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of the
political factor. The environmental factor’s effect on volume is stronger when the value of the
political factor is high (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above the
mean). However, the value of the political factor changes the direction of the volume. When
the political value is low, as the environmental factor gets larger, import e-waste volume
increases. Alternatively, when the political factor is high, volume decreases as the
environmental factor gets larger. This result suggests that countries with high political scores
are likely to have political structures that reinforce environmental initiatives.

Fig. 4.5 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Developed

Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination)
The R2 for the developed model is .044. Economic, political and environmental factors
explain approximately 4% of electronic waste importation volume in developed countries.

91

Effect size of f2
The effect size of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model. None of the factors will
substantially affect electronic waste import volume if they are excluded from the model.

Table 4.12 f2 - Developed Model

Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Population Density
Population

Import
Volume
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
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Fig. 4.6 Structural Equation Model - Developed Model
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DEVELOPING MODEL

MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT
Collinearity
The VIFs for the path coefficients are below 5, indicating that no collinearity issues
among the indicators exist.

Table 4.13 Outer VIF - Developing Model
% Exports
Ban Amend
Basel Entry
Corruption
Economic * Political
Environmental * Political
GDP ($)
GDP/Capita
Landlock
Polity
Population Density
Population
Trade Freedom
Treaties

VIF
1.02
1.02
1.01
1.06
1.00
1.00
1.03
1.02
1.00
1.06
1.00
1.00
1.11
1.01

Significance and Relevance of the Indicators
Table 4.14 outlines the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developing
model. The percent of exports is the most critical indicator to the economic factor, .515. GDP is
of medium importance, .479. GDP/capita is the least important variable, -.038. Interestingly,
none of the economic indicators are significant. However, the percent of exports and GDP are
of absolute importance to the economic factor.
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Alternatively, all variables on the political factor are statistically significant. The freedom
to trade is the most profound indicator, .839. Polity is of importance with an outer weight of
.616. Corruption is of concern but is the least critical variable, .344.
The environmental indicators are all statistically significant to the environmental factor.
The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is the most relevant indicator,
.781. The Ban Amendment is also important, .512. Ratifying the Basel Treaty is the least
important indicator -.359.

Table 4.14 Variable Results - Developing Model

t Value

p Value

Significance
p value < .05

1.50

0.13

No

1.01

0.32

No

1.95

0.05

No

5.57

0.00

Yes

3.10

0.00

Yes

ECONOMIC

Outer Weights
(Outer
Loadings)
.479
(.57)
-.038
(.07)
.515
(.73)
.616
(.74)
.344
(.48)

GDP

POLITICAL

Variable

Polity

Freedom to Trade

.839
(.72)

2.82

0.01

Yes

ENVIRONMENT

Factor

Environmental Treaties

.781
(.81)

16.59

0.00

Yes

Basel Convention

-.359
(-.28)

5.80

0.00

Yes

Basel Ban Amendment

.512
(.53)

7.41

0.00

Yes

GDP /capita (US $)
% Export Goods and
Services

Corruption
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses)
Collinearity
The inner VIFs were assessed to determine if collinearity exists. Collinearity issues exist
for the economic and political economic factor, the values are above 5. The collinearity issue is
resolved when the political economic factor is excluded from the model, the economic VIF
becomes 1.12

Table 4.15 Inner VIF - Developing Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Population Density
Population

VIF
5.95
1.07
1.08
5.92
1.08
1.81
1.05
1.63

Assessment of path coefficients16
Surprisingly, the economic factor has a small to medium effect on electronic waste
import volume. Equally, unexpected is that the economic factor is not statistically significant.
When the economic factor increases by one-unit, electronic waste import volume increases .17
standard deviations, 5,914 tons17, holding all other factors constant.
The political factor has nearly a medium sized effect on volume. A one-unit change in
the political factor increases volume .21 standard deviations, 7,562 tons. The environment has
a small effect on electronic waste import volume and is statistically significant. When the
16

A robustness check was conducted on import volume per capita as the dependent variable. The results are similar to the output
in the study with the dependent variable as volume in tons.
17

Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model. Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.
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environmental factor increases one unit, waste importation decreases .09 standard deviations,
3,297 tons, holding all other factors constant.

Table 4.16 Structural Path Results - Developing Model
Paths

Path
Coefficients

p Value
0.44

Significance
p value < .05
No

Economic --> Import Volume

0.17

t Value
0.77

Political Economy --> Import Volume

0.90

2.26

0.02

Yes

Political --> Import Volume

0.21

1.98

0.05

Yes

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-.028

1.24

0.22

No

0.00

Yes

Environment --> Import Volume
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50

-.092
positive = (+)

3.65
negative = (-)

The model evaluates the economic and environmental factors’ effect on electronic waste
volume under the assumption that the political factor impacts the relationship between the
factors and e-waste volume. Figure 4.7 demonstrates the effect size of the economic factor
based on the value of the political factor. The relationship between the economic factor and
volume is equally strong when the political factor value is low and high (the slope of the line is
steep when the political value is 1 standard deviation above and below the mean). However,
the value of the political factor changes the direction of import volume (the slopes of the lines
are opposite). When the political value is low, as the economic factor gets larger, volume
decreases. This effect can possibly be attributed to less democratic nations (authoritarian
regimes) that are not as open to trade and are not large participants in the global economy.
Conversely, when the political factor value is high, as the economic factor gets larger, import
volume increases.
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Fig. 4.7 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Developing

Figure 4.8 demonstrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of
the political factor. The relationship between the environmental factor and volume is stronger
when the value of the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1
standard deviation above the mean). Alternatively, the environmental factor has a weaker effect
when the political factor is low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1 standard
deviation below the mean).
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Fig. 4.8 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor- Developing

Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination)
The R2 for the developing model is .384. Economic, political and environmental factors
explain 38% of electronic waste importation volume in developing countries.

Effect size of f2
The effect size of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.18 The political economy and the
political factor will have a small effect on volume if they are deleted from the model. All other
factors will have no effect on electronic waste import volume if absent from the model.

18 2

f values less than .02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the dependent variable.
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Table 4.17 f - Developing Model

Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Population Density
Population

Import
Volume
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
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Fig. 4.9 Structural Equation Model - Developing Model
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OVERALL FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

STRUCTURAL (FACTOR) ASSESSMENT
The economic, political and environmental factors better explain electronic waste import
volume practices in developing countries, (38%) as compared to the combined model (19%)
and developed countries (4%). Although developed and developing countries import volume
are both best explained by the new endogenous growth theory which claims that the policies
influence the economy and trade practices, the findings illustrate that economic, political and
environmental factors behave differently in developed and developing countries. These varied
results support tenets of development theory that contend that differences in the political
economic structure between advanced and less advanced countries impact each nation’s global
trade practices and levels of development.19
Table 4.18 outlines the hypotheses, the factors’ significance and expected/actual effect
sizes. In all models, the study hypothesizes that the economic factor is the dominant driver in
influencing waste importation. In doing so, it is suspected that the economic nationalist theory
best explains waste motivates states to import hazardous electronic waste. The results indicate
that the economic factor has the largest effect when country types are modeled jointly.
However, the economic factor is not as powerful as literature suggests. It has a medium sized
effect on volume in the combined model and a small to medium effect in developed and
developing countries. Additionally, the economic factor’s small increase on e-waste volume in
developing states belie proponents of the pollution/waste haven hypothesis that contend a poor
economic status drives a country to increase a substantial amount of waste.
The economic factor results also do not align with literature that claims capital
abundance increases waste importation.20 The economic factor decreases e-waste import
19

Gilpin, 307-11.

20

Discussed in Baggs (2009).
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volume in developed countries. Notably, the economic factor is only significant when country
types are modeled together.
It is expected that the political factor will have a medium effect and increase volume in all
models. The political factor has a small effect on volume in both the combined and developed
models. In developing countries, the political factor has a medium sized effect on e-waste
import volume. The findings suggest that the domestic institutionalist theory is more applicable
to developing countries as compared to developed countries. More so, the varied effect size of
the political factor when country types are evaluated independently indicate that is better to
assesses country types independently to determine whether the domestic institutionalist theory
explains electronic waste import behavior.21
The purpose of environmental policies and initiatives is to decrease hazardous activities.
Therefore, in all the models, it is hypothesized that the environmental factor slightly decreases
e-waste import volume. This hypothesis is accurate in all the models. However, the impact is
extremely small that the environmental factor has very little effect on e-waste import volume in
all model types. This can be attributed to states signing environmental treaties but not
complying with them.22 This outcome provides limited support to liberal international
institutionalist that conjecture international environmental agreements minimize hazardous
waste trade.
The study hypothesizes that when the political factor moderates the relationship
between the economic factor and import volume, the economic factor will have a positive effect
on volume. More so, it assumes that the economic effect will be stronger when the political
values are low. The study yields mixed results. In the combined model, the political factor has
no impact on the relationship between the economic factor and e-waste import volume. This

21

22

Institutionalist approach argues that the domestic political structure is the most impactful factor that affects waste trade.

Claire Brunel and Arik Levinson, "Measuring the Stringency of Environmental Regulations," Review of Environmental Economics
and Policy 10, no. 1 (2016): 50.
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result is likely to occur because combining the country types obscures the effects. The political
factor affects the relationship between the economic factor and volume when country types are
modeled separately. In developed countries, the economic factor has a stronger effect on
volume when the value of the political factor is low. Conversely, in developing countries, the
economic factor’s impact on volume is strong regardless of the value of the political factor.
Thus, in less democratic states that exhibit less freedom to trade, the economic factor plays a
stronger role, while in states with more freedoms, the economic factor plays a more muted role
in shaping e-waste import trade volumes. Notably, the factor is significant only in developing
countries.23
The study expects that when the political factor moderates on the relationship between
the environment and e-waste import volume, the environmental factor will have a negative effect
on volume. It also expects that the environmental factor will have a larger effect on volume
when the value of the political factor is high. This hypothesis is realized in all the models.
Consequently, the findings refute the race to the bottom theory that conjectures that state’s
political structure, especially developing nations, create lax environmental regulations to legally
increase toxic waste import volume. It is also worth mentioning that the results are not
significant in all models.

23

P values for each factor per model are indicated in Tables 4.6, 4.11, and 4.16.
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MEASUREMENT (VARIABLE) ASSESSMENT
Table 4.19 displays the expected and actual outer weights (loadings) of the indicators
onto the factor. Relative importance is determined by the value of the outer weight. The higher
the value the more important the variable. Table 4.20 outlines the variables’ significance and
importance. An indicator is significant if its outer weight p-value is less than .05 and is
absolutely important if it’s outer weight p-value is non-significant, greater than .05, but its outer
loading is above .50.
GDP is expected to be important to the economic factor in all models. The findings
indicate that GDP is of medium relative importance in the combined and developing models.
GDP is of high relative importance in developed countries. Although, GDP is not significant in
any model it is absolutely important when country types are evaluated independently.
Contrary to expectation, GDP/capita loads negatively on the economic factor when
country types are modeled separately. Additionally, GDP/capita is not important to the
economic factor in any of the models. These results are surprising because a substantial
amount of waste trade literature emphasize and utilize GDP/capita as one of the most important
indicators in assessing the economy of a country. Therefore, GDP/capita being irrelevant
contradicts studies that suggest capital abundance plays a role in the economics of waste trade.
Additionally, current literature focuses on GDP the primary indicator of economy size.
Many studies neglect the importance of the percent of goods and services exported. The
results indicate that the percent of goods and services exported is a much more critical variable
to the economy than literature suggests. It is the most relevant factor and of absolute
importance in both the combined and developing models. It is worth mentioning that none of
the economic variables are significant in any model.
The freedom to trade variable is expected to load positively on the political factor.
Freedom to trade is the most important variable in the combined and developing countries
model. However, it is not important in developed countries. This is surprising because although
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developed countries are likely to have a diverse and larger portfolio of exported goods and
services one would expect the percent of goods and services to be of importance to the
economic factor regardless of the amount of exportation.
Polity, government type, is expected to load positively on the political factor in all
models. This expectation is realized in all models. Additionally, polity is significant in all
models. However, interestingly, polity matters more in developed countries as compared to
developing countries.
As expected, corruption loads positively on the political factor in all the models.
Interestingly, corruption is of the same level of importance in developed and developing
countries. In some ways this is unexpected because it is a widely accepted belief that less
advanced countries political system is prone to more corruption as compared to developed
countries; consequently, one would assume corruption would be more important to the political
factor in developing countries.
It is hypothesized that the environmental treaty indicator is important variable to the
environmental factor. It is the most relevant variable in the combined and developing countries
models. It is not as important in developed countries. This is odd because it is reasonable to
assume that advanced nations have more concern and focus on maintaining environmental
integrity.
Some literature suggests that the Basel Convention and Basel Ban Amendment are
ineffective in managing waste trade. Therefore, it is expected that the ratification of will be
negative (of low importance) on the environmental factor in all the models. The results indicate
varied importance among the models. The Basel Convention and Ban Amendment are
important to developed countries. In fact, they are not only of moderate relative importance to
the factor they are also of absolute importance. Additionally, the Ban Amendment is nearly as
important in developing countries as it is in advanced nations. However, the Basel Convention
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is irrelevant to the environmental factor when the country types are combined and in developing
countries.
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Table 4.20 Variable Importance Comparison

ENVIRONMENT

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

Factor

Variable

Combined

GDP

Developing
Absolutely
Important

Absolutely
Important

GDP /capita (US $)
Export of Goods and Services

Absolutely
Important

Polity

Significant

Corruption

Significant

Freedom to Trade

Significant

Environmental Treaties

Significant

Basel Convention

Significant

Basel Ban Amendment

Developed
Absolutely
Important

Absolutely
Important
Absolutely
Important

Significant
Significant

Significant

Significant
Significant

Absolutely
Important

Significant

Absolutely
Important

Significant

Significant: p-value < .05
Absolutely Important: p-value > .05 and outer loading weight is > .50
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CHAPTER 5
PRE- & POST BASEL SHIFT: FROM TRASH TO TREASURE

Arguably the surplus of electronic goods and their valuable components exacerbated
global electronic waste trade and created a profitable industry. In 2008 the Basel Convention
recognized the benefits of waste and altered its view on hazardous waste from it being a value
less by-product to seeing it as a resource.1 The convention asserts, “the extraction of valuable
secondary raw material from wastes can create green business opportunities and decent jobs
for millions of often young people throughout the developing world, thus playing a part in
eradicating poverty.”2 Some scholars contend that Basel’s shift on waste promotes nationstates to alter their environmental and trade policies to increase waste import volume. 3 This
analysis evaluates the economic, political and environmental factors impact on electronic waste
import volume before and after Basel revised its view.

HYPOTHESES
Table 5.1 outlines the five primary hypotheses. The hypotheses are based on current
literature and prior empirical studies assessing factors that impact electronic waste import
volume.4 Electronic waste trade is governed by both international and domestic regulations.
However, following the domestic institutionalist theory, I posit that domestic factors have a
greater impact on electronic waste import volume than international initiatives. Therefore, Basel
shifting its view on waste does not alter the effect size of factors that impact electronic waste
import
1

Basel Convention, "Our Sustainable Future: The Role of the Basel Convention," 3.

2

Basel Convention, 3.

3

Lucier and Gareau.

4

Results from Chapter 4.
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Hypotheses 1a-c identify the impact the economic factor has on electronic waste import
volume. Building on previous empirical results5, in all models, I expect the economic factor has
a positive, medium sized effect on electronic waste import volume pre and post shift.
Hypotheses 2a-c highlight the impact the political environment has on electronic waste
import volume. Prior studies indicate that the government does not have a strong relationshiop
with e-waste volume.6 Therefore, the political factor is expected to have a positive small effect
in the combined model pre and post the shift. It is also hypothesized that the political factor has
a small effect in developed countries pre and post the Basel shift. However, volume is expected
to decrease pre-shift and increase post shift. I hypothesize that the political factor in developing
countries has a positive, medium sized effect on e-waste volume pre-Basel shift and a positive,
small effect post shift.
Hypotheses 3a-c measure the impact of environmental policies on electronic waste
import volume. The purpose of environmental policies and initiatives is to protect humans,
animals and the environment from harmful effects. This study conjectures that despite Basel’s
shift, these efforts are effective in managing electronic waste trade practices. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that the environmental factor has a small negative effect on e-waste import
volume pre and post Basel shift in all the models.
Hypotheses 4a-c identify the economic factor’s relationship with electronic waste import
volume when the political factor intervenes in the relationship. It is expected that the political
economic factor increases import volume in both country types when the political factor
moderates on the relationship between the economic factor and volume, in all models pre and
post shift. This is a reasonable assumption because developed countries’ regulatory structure
can support e-waste importation because they possess the capital necessary to procure
machinery to safely recycle and repurpose e-waste components. Alternatively, developing
5

Results from Chapter 4.

6

Ibid.
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countries’ regulations promote import volume because they lack sufficient capital and view
importing e-waste as a source of revenue
Hypotheses 5a-c assumes that environmental initiatives are effective in managing
waste. Additionally, it assumes that a nation’s political structure supports these endeavors.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that import volume decreases when the political factor moderates
on the relationship between the environmental factor and e-waste volume, in all models pre and
post shift.
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PRE BASEL SHIFT
The pre-Basel shift analysis, from 1996 to 2006, evaluates 372 country-years of
developed and developing countries, 152 and 220 respectively. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the
variables’ descriptive statistics and correlation values before Basel shifted its view on waste.

Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics - Pre Basel Shift
Indicator
Volume (tons)
GDP (USD millions)
GDP/capita
% Exports
Polity
Corruption
Trade Freedom
Enviro Treaties
Basel Entry
Ban Amend
Population (millions)
Population Density

Mean
5,204.89
445,831.83
12,688.33
42.88
4.05
-4.50
66.93
2.77
0.91
0.30
55.05
339.47

Median
44.35
67,561.29
5,065.34
36.88
8.00
4.00
73.00
3.00
1.00
0.00
10.59
80.33

Min
0.00
717.53
111.53
0.00
-99.00
-99.00
-99.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.27
-99.00

Max
115,352.79
13,855,888.00
88,680.24
216.34
10.00
10.00
90.00
7.00
1.00
1.00
1,280.40
21,595.35

Standard
Deviation
12,710.96
1,432,437.22
15,241.43
29.18
14.30
30.06
24.92
1.65
0.29
0.46
170.85
1,767.01
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COMBINED MODEL

MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT
Collinearity
Table 5.4 reports the variance inflation factor (VIF) values for all the indicators. All
values are between .20 and 5, hence collinearity is not an issue.7

Table 5.4 Outer VIF - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model
% Exports
BanAmend
BaselEntry
Corruption
Economic * Political
Environmental * Political
GDP
GDP/Capita
Landlock
Polity
PopDens
Population
Trade Freedom
Treaties

VIF
1.22
1.04
1.03
1.13
1.00
1.00
1.29
1.34
1.00
1.01
1.00
1.00
1.13
1.01

Significance and Relevance of the Indicators
The outer weight value expresses a variable’s level of relative importance, or its relative
contribution, to forming the factor. The higher the value, the more important the indicator is to
the factor.8 The significance of a variable, an indication of whether the variable significantly
contributes to the its corresponding construct, is determined by the p-value of the outer weight.

7

Hair, 143.

8

Ibid., 146.
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An indicator is significant if its outer weight p-value is less than .05. An indicator is absolutely
important if it’s outer weight p-value is nonsignificant, greater than .05, but its outer loading is
above .50.9
Table 5.5 outlines the weight (importance) and significance of the indicators. In the
combined model, all the economic variables are statistically significant. The gross domestic
product is the most critical variable to the economic factor, .897. GDP/capita is important, .679.
The percent of exports of goods and services is the least important indicator to the economic
factor, -.234.
Polity, the extent to which a government is democratic, is the most important indicator to
the political factor, outer weight .625. The freedom to trade is of medium importance with an
outer weight of .418. Corruption is also of medium importance to the political factor, outer
weight .470. All political variables are statistically significant.
The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is the most critical
indicator to the environmental factor with an outer weight of .998. Environmental treaties is the
only significant variable to the environmental factor. The Ban Amendment is of low importance
with an outer weight of .095. Ratification of the Basel Convention is essentially irrelevant, -.188.
Neither the Basel Convention nor the Basel Ban Amendment are significant nor of absolute
importance.

9

Absolute importance is the information an indicator provides without considering the other indicators. Ibid., 148.
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Table 5.5 Variable Results - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model
Outer
Weights
(Outer
Loadings)
.670
(.897)

t Value

p Value

Significance
p value < .05

4.48

0.00

Yes

GDP /capita (US $)

.508
(.679)

2.82

0.00

Yes

% Export Goods and Services

-.234
(-.232)

1.95

0.05

Yes

Polity

.625
(.691)

11.25

0.00

Yes

Corruption

.470
(.655)

5.34

0.00

Yes

Freedom to Trade

.418
(.623)

3.50

0.00

Yes

Environmental Treaties

.998
(.981)

7.13

0.00

Yes

Basel Convention

-.188
(-.120)

1.04

0.30

No

Basel Ban Amendment

.095
(.009)

0.45

0.65

No

ENVIRONMENT

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

Factor

Variable

GDP

STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses)
Collinearity
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues
among the factors exist. Table 5.6 reports the VIF values for all the factors. All values are
within .20 and 5, hence indicating that collinearity issues do not exist.
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Table 5.6 Inner VIF - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Pop Density
Population

VIF
2.48
1.27
1.09
2.18
1.84
1.59
1.97
1.06

Assessment of path coefficients
Table 5.7 outlines the standardized values and significance of the path coefficients
(factors). Estimated coefficients closer to +1 represent a strong positive relationship. 10 The
economic factor has the largest effect on electronic waste import volume.

A one-unit change

in the economic factor increases e-waste import volume .172 standard deviations, 2,186 tons11,
when all the other factors are held constant. The political factor has a small impact on volume.
A one-unit change in the political factor increases import volume .115 standard deviations,
1,462 tons. The environmental factor yields a small decrease in e-waste import volume. When
the environmental factor changes by one-unit, volume decreases .122 standard deviations,
1,551 tons.

10

11

Ibid., 195.

Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model. Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.
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Table 5.7 Structural Path Results - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model
Path
Coefficients
0.172

t Value
2.06

p Value
0.04

Significance
p value < .05
Yes

Political Economy --> Import Volume

-0.019

0.19

0.85

No

Political --> Import Volume

0.115

2.29

0.02

Yes

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-0.018

0.44

0.66

No

0.00

Yes

Paths
Economic --> Import Volume

Environment --> Import Volume
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50

-0.122
positive = (+)

3.38
negative = (-)

The model evaluates the economic and environmental factors’ effect on electronic waste
volume under the assumption that the political factor impacts the relationship between the
factors and e-waste import volume. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the effect size of the economic
factor based on the value of the political factor. The relationship between the economic factor
and volume is relatively the same regardless of the value of the political factor (all slopes of the
lines are similar). This is an indication that the political structure does not impact the
relationship between the economic factor and electronic waste import volume. Notably, in all 3
cases, import volume increases (upward slope of the lines) as the economic factor gets larger.
This suggests that nations with varying political structures value importing electronic waste.
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Fig. 5.1 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor Pre Shift Combined

Figure 5.2 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of the
political factor. Combining the country types does not produce significant differences between
levels of political values. When the value of the political factor is high, the relationship between
the environment and import volume is slightly higher as compared to when the political value is
lower. In all 3 cases, as the environmental factor gets larger, import volume decreases. This is
an indication that regardless of a country’s openness to trade the political factor does not thwart
the environmental factor’s purpose in decreasing electronic waste import volume. However, it is
important to note that merging the country types might disguise the political factor’s influence as
evidenced by more fruitful effects when country types are modeled separately.
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Fig. 5.2 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor Pre Shift Combined

Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination)
Economic, political and environmental factors explain roughly 10% of electronic waste
importation volume when both developed and developing countries are evaluated in the same
model.

Effect size of f2
The effect size of the construct, f2, was tested to determine whether a construct has a
substantive impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model. 12 f2 values less
than .02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the
dependent variable. None of the factors will have a statistical effect on e-waste import volume if
they are excluded.

12

Hair, 201.
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Table 5.8 f - Pre Basel Shift Combined Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Population Density
Population

Import Volume
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
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Fig. 5.3 Structural Equation Model – Pre Basel Shift Combined Model
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DEVELOPED MODEL

MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT
Collinearity Issues
Table 5.9 reports the VIF values for all the indicators. All values are less than 5, hence
collinearity is not an issue.

Table 5.9 Outer VIF - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model
% Exports
BanAmend
BaselEntry
Corruption
Economic * Political
Environmental * Political
GDP
GDP/Capita
Landlock
Polity
PopDens
Population
Trade Freedom
Treaties

VIF
1.20
1.04
1.10
1.52
1.00
1.00
1.25
1.13
1.00
1.01
1.00
1.00
1.54
1.06

Significance and Relevance of the Indicators
Table 5.10 illustrates the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developed
model. Gross domestic product is the most important variable to the economic factor and is of
absolute importance, .808.13 GDP/capita is of little importance, .059. The percent of exports of
goods and services is nearly irrelevant to the economic factor in developed countries, -.361.
None of the economic variables are statistically significant.
13

Outer weight p-value is nonsignificant, greater than .05, and its outer loading is above .50
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Polity is the most important indicator to the political factor and is statistically significant,
outer weight .946. Corruption is of medium important to the political factor with outer weight,
.366. The freedom to trade is the least important variable to the political factor, -.087.
Corruption and freedom to trade are not statistically significant nor of absolute importance.
Ratification of the Basel Convention is the only significant variable and the most critical
to the environmental factor. The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is
slightly important to the environmental factor, outer weight .296. Although it is not a significant
variable it is of absolute importance. The Ban Amendment is the least important indicator
importance with an outer weight of -.154.

Table 5.10 Variable Results - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model
t Value

p Value

Significance
p value < .05

1.89

0.06

No

0.24

0.81

No

1.10

0.27

No

2.96

0.00

Yes

0.46

0.65

No

0.10

0.92

No

ECONOMIC

Outer Weights
(Outer Loadings)
0.808
(.943)
.059
(.208)
-.361
(-.623)
.946
(.947)
.366
(.337)
-.087
(.214)

GDP

POLITICAL

Variable

Polity

ENVIRONMENT

Factor

Environmental Treaties

.296
(.512)

0.94

0.35

No

Basel Convention

.901
(.944)

3.29

0.00

Yes

Basel Ban Amendment

-.154
(.014)

0.41

0.68

No

GDP /capita (US $)
% Export Goods and Services

Corruption
Freedom to Trade
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses)
Collinearity
The VIFs for the economic and population factors have values above 5, indicating that
collinearity issues exist. The collinearity issue is resolved when population is omitted from the
model.14 However, it is not necessary to delete population because it is a control factor. The
economic factor is not eliminated because literature indicates that it is essential to the model.

Table 5.11 Inner VIF - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Pop Density
Population

VIF
11.18
3.67
1.35
2.97
2.47
3.44
2.36
13.03

Assessment of path coefficients
The economic factor has a small to medium effect on volume. When the economic
factor changes by one unit, e-waste import volume increases .173 standard deviations, 2,088
tons15, holding all other factors constant. The political factor has a small effect on e-waste
volume. When the political factor changes one unit, volume increases .088 standard deviations,
1,062 tons. The environmental factor has the largest effect on electronic waste import volume.
A one-unit change in the environmental factor decreases volume .214 standard deviations,
2,583 tons. It is critical to note that none of the factors are significant.
14

15

The VIF for the economic factor is 3.57 when the population factor is excluded from the model.

Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model. Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.
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Table 5.12 Structural Path Results - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model
Path
Coefficients
-0.173

t Value
0.64

p Value
0.52

Significance
p value < .05
No

Political Economy --> Import Volume

-0.098

0.21

0.83

No

Political --> Import Volume

0.088

0.26

0.79

No

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-0.029

0.05

0.96

No

0.31

No

Paths
Economic --> Import Volume

Environment --> Import Volume
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50

-0.214
positive = (+)

1.02
negative = (-)

The model assumes that the political factor influences the relationship between the
economic and environmental factors. Figure 5.4 illustrates the effect size of the economic factor
based on the value of the political factor. The economic factor is stronger when the value of the
political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above
the mean). In all three cases, as the economic factor gets larger, volume decreases. This
result suggests that the influence of the political factor decreases import volume despite the
economic benefits of importing electronic waste.

128

Fig. 5.4 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor - Pre Shift Developed

Figure 5.5 demonstrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of
the political factor. The relationship between the environmental factor and volume is slightly
stronger when the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard
deviation above the mean). Conversely, when the political value is low, the environmental
factor has a weaker effect on electronic waste import volume. In all three cases, electronic
waste import volume decreases as the environmental factor gets larger. This suggests that the
political structure does not hinder environmental initiatives to reduce hazardous waste import
volume.
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Fig. 5.5 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor Pre Shift Developed

Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination)
The R2 for the developed model is .114.16 Economic, political and environmental factors
explain roughly 11% of electronic waste importation volume in developed countries.

Effect size of f2
The effect size, f2, of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.17 If landlock were deleted from
the model it would have a small effect on volume. None of the other factors will statistically
affect the model if they were excluded waste volume if they were omitted.

16

2

The R does not change when population is omitted from the model to correct collinearity issues.

17 2

f values less than .02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the dependent variable.
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Table 5.13 f - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Population Density
Population

Import Volume
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
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Fig. 5.6 Structural Equation Model - Pre Basel Shift Developed Model
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DEVELOPING MODEL

MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT
Collinearity
The VIFs for the path coefficients are between .20 and 5, indicating that no collinearity
issues exist.

Table 5.14 Outer VIF - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model
% Exports
BanAmend
BaselEntry
Corruption
Economic * Political
Environmental * Political
GDP
GDP/Capita
Landlock
Polity
PopDens
Population
Trade Freedom
Treaties

VIF
1.15
1.02
1.02
1.05
1.00
1.00
1.07
1.10
1.00
1.01
1.00
1.00
1.04
1.01

Significance and Relevance of the Indicators
Table 5.15 outlines the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developing
model. The gross domestic product is the most critical variable to the economic factor relevant,
outer weight 1.00. GDP/capita is of little importance, .06. Both GDP and GDP/capita are
statistically significant. The percent of exports of goods and services is also relatively
unimportant to the economic factor, .048.
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All variables on the political factor are significant. Polity, the extent to which a
government is democratic, is the most important indicator, .631. Corruption and freedom to
trade are moderately important, outer weight .453 and .495.
The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is the most critical
indicator to the environmental factor with an outer weight of .822, and is the only significant
variable. The Ban Amendment is of medium importance with an outer weight of .449 and is of
absolute importance.18 Ratification of the Basel Convention is the least important indicator, .407.

Table 5.15 Variable Results - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model

t Value

p Value

Significance
p value <
.05

GDP

1.00
(.996)

4.48

0.00

Yes

GDP /capita (US $)

.069
(.157)

2.82

0.00

Yes

% Export Goods and
Services

.048
(-.145)

1.95

0.05

No

Polity

.631
(.681)
.453
(.617)

11.25

0.00

Yes

5.34

0.00

Yes

Freedom to Trade

.495
(.588)

3.50

0.00

Yes

Environmental Treaties

.822
(.822)

7.13

0.00

Yes

Basel Convention

-.407
(-.300)

1.04

0.30

No

Basel Ban Amendment

.449
(.450)

0.45

0.65

No

ENVIRONMENT

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

Factor

18

Variable

Corruption

Outer loading rounds to .50.

Outer Weights
(Outer
Loadings)
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses)
Collinearity
The inner VIFs were assessed to determine if collinearity exists among the factors.
None of the factor exhibit collinearity issues.19

Table 5.16 Inner VIF - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Pop Density
Population

VIF
2.80
1.14
1.22
1.77
1.12
1.37
1.14
3.76

Assessment of path coefficients
Table 5.17 reports the standardized values and significance of the path coefficients. The
economic factor has a large significant effect on e-waste volume. When the economic factor
changes by one unit, e-waste import volume increases .559 standard deviations, 7,140 tons20,
holding all other factors constant. The political factor has a significant small to medium sized
effect on volume. A one-unit change in the political factor increases e-waste import volume .185
standard deviations, 2,363 tons. Alternatively, the environmental factor has a small negative
effect on volume. A one-unit change in the environmental factor decreases volume .10
standard deviations, 1,277 tons. Although the effect is small, the environmental factor is
significant.

19

20

No collinearity issues exist if VIF value is between .20 and 5.

Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model. Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.
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Table 5.17 Structural Path Results - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model
Paths

Path
Coefficients

p Value
0.01

Significance
p value < .05
Yes

Economic --> Import Volume

0.559

t Value
2.64

Political Economy --> Import Volume

0.472

2.74

0.01

Yes

Political --> Import Volume

0.185

2.15

0.03

Yes

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-0.056

1.62

0.11

No

0.01

Yes

Environment --> Import Volume
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50

-0.100
positive = (+)

2.61
negative = (-)

Figure 5.7 demonstrates the effect size of the economic factor on electronic waste
import volume based on the value of the political factor. Import volume increases in all 3 cases
as the economic factor gets stronger. However, the relationship between the economic factor
and volume is stronger when the value of the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the
political value is 1 standard deviation above the mean). Alternatively, the economic factor has a
weaker effect when the political factor is low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1
standard deviation below the mean). These effects suggest that countries that are more
democratic and more open to trade take advantage of its neoliberal/free market structure and
import e-waste.
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Fig. 5.7 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor - Pre Shift Developing

Figure 5.8 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor on e-waste import
volume based on the value of the political factor. The environmental factor has a stronger
relationship when the value of the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political
value is 1 standard deviation above the mean). Alternatively, the environmental factor has
relatively no effect on import volume when the political value is low (no slope when the political
value is 1 standard deviation below the mean). Accordingly, when the political value is low, as
the environmental factor gets larger, volume does not increase nor decrease. Alternatively,
when the political value is high, waste import volume decreases. Hence, it is likely that these
countries are more democratic, want to participate in the global economy and consequently
adhere to international environmental agreements.
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Fig. 5.8 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor Pre Shift Developing

Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination)
The R2 for the developing model is .38. Economic, political and environmental factors
explain approximately 38% of electronic waste importation volume in developing countries.

Effect size of f2
The effect size, f2, of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.21 Excluding the economic and
political economic factors from the model would have a medium effect on e-waste import
volume. Omitting the political factor would have a small effect on volume. Precluding the
political factor would have a small to medium effect on volume. Deleting all other variables from
the model would not impact e-waste volume.

21 2

f values less than .02, .02, .15 and .35 respectively, represent no effect, small, medium or large effect on the dependent variable.
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Table 5.18 f - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model

Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Population Density
Population

Import
Volume
0.18
0.01
0.00
0.13
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.01
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Fig. 5.9 Structural Equation Model - Pre Basel Shift Developing Model

140
PRE BASEL SHIFT FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

STRUCTURAL (FACTOR) ASSESSMENT
The pre Basel shift analysis indicates that economic, political and environmental factors
better explain electronic waste import volume in developing countries, (38%) as compared to
developed countries (11%) and combined country types (10%).
Table 5.19 outlines the hypotheses with expected and actual effect sizes and the
significance of each factor for the models. The results indicate that the primary driver of ewaste varies between country types. The economic factor is the primary influencer to e-waste
volume in developing countries and when country types are evaluated together. Therefore, the
economic nationalist theory best explains waste importation in these models. Alternatively, ewaste volume in developed countries is driven by the environmental factor. Consequently, the
neoliberal international institutionalism best explains waste importation practices in developed
countries. Notably, none of the factors are significant in the developed model. Conversely,
nearly of all the factors have a significant effect on e-waste volume in developing countries.22
The economic factor is expected to moderately increase e-waste import volume in both
the developed and developing model. This is true in developed countries. However, the
economic factor has a large effect on e-waste import volume in developing countries. This
suggests that the economic factor is a key driver to e-waste importation in developing countries
and not as powerful in developed countries. This also illustrates that the economic nationalist
theory’s assertion that trade practices are determined by economic variables, is more so
applicable to developing countries as compared to developed nations.
The environmental factor is hypothesized to have a small, negative effect in developed
and developing countries. This is realized in the developing model. Alternatively, the
environmental factor has a larger effect in the combined and developed models than what is
22

P values for each factor per model are indicated in Tables 5.7, 5.12 and 5.17.
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hypothesized. More so, in all models the environmental factor reduces hazardous waste import
volume. Hence, the results provide support for the liberal institutionalist theory, the notion that
international environmental agreements are effective in managing global hazardous waste
concerns.
The political factor is expected to have a small negative effect on e-waste volume in
developed countries and a medium positive effect in developing countries. Surprisingly, the
political factor has a small effect in developed countries and a medium sized effect in
developing countries. The political factor is not the primary driver of electronic waste import
volume in neither developed nor developing countries. These results demonstrate that the
institutional approach, the assertion that the political factor is the most influential factor to waste
trade, is not true in any of the models. However, the direction and size of the effect are
compelling. The political factor increases e-waste import volume in both developed and
developing countries. This suggests that nations import waste regardless of the political
structure. Therefore, the notion that developed states regulatory structure is stricter than
developing countries which leads to reduced waste import volume is not supported.
In all the models, it is hypothesized that volume decreases when the political factor
moderates on the relationship between the environmental factor and volume. It is also expected
that the environmental factor will have a stronger effect on volume when the political factor is
larger. This holds true in all models. This effect in developing countries rebuts proponents of
the race to the bottom theory who conjecture that the government in developing countries lax
environmental regulations to import more electronic waste. When the political factor moderates
on the relationship between the economic factor and e-waste volume, it is expected that the
economic factor will have a positive and stronger effect on volume when the political factor is
lower, in all model types. The hypothesis is rejected in the developed model. The economic
factor has a stronger relationship with e-waste import volume when the political values are high.
Additionally, volume decreases as the economic factor gets larger. The hypothesis is partially
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accepted in the combined and developing model. In the combined model that political factor
does not impact the relationship between the economic factor and volume. However,
regardless of the political value import volume increases as the economic factor gets larger.
Alternatively, in the developing model, the economic factor has a stronger effect when the
political factor is low. Nonetheless, volume increases as the economic factor gets larger at all
political levels. Furthermore, the political economy effect size is small in developed countries
and is nearly large in developing countries. These results suggest that developing countries ewaste trade practices are guided by economic and regulatory policies. Therefore, the new
endogenous growth theory is more applicable to developing nations.
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MEASUREMENT (VARIABLE) Assessment
Table 5.20 displays the expected and actual outer weights (loadings) of the indicators
onto the factor. Table 5.21 outlines the variables’ significance and importance. Relative
importance is determined by the value of the outer weight. Then higher the value, the more
important the indicator. An indicator is significant if its outer weight p-value is less than .05 and
is important if it’s outer weight p-value is nonsignificant, greater than .05, but its outer loading is
above .50. Most variables load positively on the factor as is expected.
In all the models, as expected, GDP is the most relevant indicator to the economic
construct. It is significant in the combined model and developing countries and of absolute
importance in developed countries. GDP/capita is moderately important to the economic factor
in the combined model. Oddly, it is of very little concern in both the developed and developing
countries. The relative importance (the outer weight), is low. Additionally, it is neither significant
nor of absolute importance in either country type models. This result is unexpected in that
literature suggests that capital abundance plays a critical role in the economy and contributes to
a country’s decision to import hazardous waste.
Contrary to expectation, the percent of export of goods and services loads negatively on
the economic factor in the combined and developed model. This suggests that the amount of
goods and services is not relatively important to the economy. This is surprising because it is
reasonable to assume that the size and health of the economy, especially in developed nations,
is somewhat predicated on the extent of goods and services exported.
Polity is the most relevant indicator to the political structure in all models. It is
moderately important in the combined model and in developing countries. Polity is highly
important in developed countries. This is somewhat surprising because, considering developing
nations have a larger range of political structures, one would expect the extent of polity would
matter more in developing countries as compared to developed nations.
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Although corruption is relatively low in advanced nations, it is still expected to be of
concern to the political structure. Additionally, corruption is expected to be moderately
important in developing countries as well. Notably, the indicator is significant in the combined
and developing models.
Freedom to trade is the most critical variable to the political construct in the combined
and developing models. Consequently, it is significant in these models. Freedom to trade is of
low relative importance in developed countries. This is surprising because it is reasonable to
assume that regulations that promote freedom to trade is critical to all types of political
structures.
Environmental treaties are expected to be load positively on the environmental factor in
all models. This hold true in all cases. Environmental treaties are the most important indicator
in the combined and developing models and has a high relative value.23 Alternatively,
environmental treaties are not as important in developed countries. However, they are of
absolute importance.
The Basel Convention was created to manage global hazardous waste trade.
Therefore, it is expected that it is important to the environmental factor in all models. The
convention is relatively unimportant in the combined and developing models. This is sensible
because literature suggests that countries are likely to disregard the treaty. Alternatively, the
Basel Convention is important in developed countries. Despite the differing relative importance,
the Basel Convention is significant in both developed and developing models.
The Basel Ban Amendment prohibits developed countries from exporting hazardous
waste to developing countries. Therefore, it is expected that the indicator will be important to
the environmental factor in all models. Surprisingly, the amendment is of little relative
importance in the combined model. It is essentially unimportant in developed nations.

23

An indicator can be the most important to a factor because it has the highest outer weight out of all the indicators but it can be of
low relative importance because the value of the outer weight is low.
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However, it is moderately important and of absolute importance to the environmental factor in
developing countries.
Although the importance of the environmental indicators varies between models, these
results support liberal international institutionalist theory that conjecture international
environmental agreements are relevant to managing the effects of global waste trade on the
environment.
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Table 5.21 Assessment of Variable Significance and Importance - Pre Basel Shift

ENVIRONMENT

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

Factor

Variable

Combined

Developed

Developing

GDP

Significant

Absolutely
Important

Significant

GDP /capita (US $)

Significant

Export of Goods and Services

Significant

Polity

Significant

Corruption

Significant

Significant

Freedom to Trade

Significant

Significant

Environmental Treaties

Significant

Basel Convention

Significant

Significant

Absolutely
Important

Significant

Significant

Significant

Basel Ban Amendment

Significant: p-value < .05
Absolutely Important: p-value > .05 and outer loading weight is > .50

Absolutely
Important
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POST BASEL SHIFT
The post-Basel shift analysis, from 2008 to 2014, assesses 388 country-years
developed and developing states, 134 and 251 respectively. In the early 2000s as globalization
expanded, additional variables became important to the political economy. Innovation, tax rates
and environmental protection became critically important to a nation’s economic growth and
trade practices. Therefore, the post Basel shift takes these variables into account. Tables 5.22
and 5.23 outline the descriptive statistics and correlation values.

Table 5.22 Descriptive Statistics - Post Basel Shift
Indicator
Volume (tons)
GDP (USD millions)
GDP/capita
% Exports
Tax Rate
Polity
Corruption
Trade Freedom
Innovation
Enviro Treaties
Basel Entry
Ban Amend
Environmental Protection
Population (millions)
Population Density

Mean
11,770.81
575,545.69
18,856.71
58.78
38.06
1.41
3.81
76.38
-0.62
3.30
0.94
0.50
55.64
45.98
329.01

Median
89.20
98,266.31
12,556.32
39.34
39.30
8.00
4.30
82.00
3.69
3.00
1.00
0.00
62.90
11.13
82.42

Min
0.00
349.46
12,556.32
0.00
-99.00
-99.00
-99.00
-99.00
-99.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-99.00
0.09
2.66

Max
566,820.61
17,393,103.00
12,556.32
3,264.50
117.40
10.00
9.30
95.00
5.80
9.00
1.00
1.00
95.50
1,295.29
18,000.88

Standard
Deviation
48,446.95
1,769,167.69
12,556.32
177.75
23.19
20.07
10.74
22.55
21.16
1.81
0.23
0.50
36.13
135.63
1,508.72
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COMBINED MODEL

MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT
Collinearity
Table 5.24 reports the VIF values for all the indicators. All values are between .20 and
5, hence collinearity is not an issue.

Table 5.24 Outer VIF - Post Basel Shift Combined Model
% Exports
BanAmend
BaselEntry
Corruption
EPI
Economic * Political
Environmental * Political
GDP
GDP/Capita
Innovation
Landlock
Polity
PopDens
Population
Tax Rate
Trade Freedom
Treaties

VIF
1.00
1.08
1.03
1.19
1.09
1.00
1.00
1.11
1.09
1.42
1.00
1.10
1.00
1.00
1.02
1.31
1.04

Significance and Relevance of the Indicators
Table 5.25 outlines the weight (importance) and significance of the indicators. The
percent of exports of goods and services is most critical variable to the economic factor, outer
weight .931. GDP is moderately important, .340. Tax rate is slightly important to the economic
factor, .132. GDP/capita is of least importance, .015. Percent of export of goods and services is
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the only significant variable. Notably none of the other variables are significant nor of absolute
importance.24
Polity and innovation are significant to the political factor. Polity is the most essential
variable, .800. Innovation and corruption on slightly important, .289 and .212 respectively.
Freedom to trade is the least important indicator with outer weight value .068. However, it is of
absolute importance.
The number of treaties, ratification of the Ban Amendment and the environmental
protection score are significant to the environmental factor. The number of treaties is the most
critical variable, .761. The Ban Amendment is moderately important, .605. EPI and ratification
of the Basel Entry are not critical to the environmental factor, -.345 and -.219 respectively.

24

An indicator is absolutely important if it’s outer weight p-value is nonsignificant, greater than .05, but its outer loading is above .50.
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Table 5.25 Variable Results - Post Basel Shift Combined Model
Facto
r

Variable

ECONOMIC

GDP
GDP /capita (US $)
% Export Goods and
Services
Tax Rate

POLITICAL

Polity
Corruption
Freedom to Trade

ENVIRONMENT

Innovation

Outer Weights
(Outer
Loadings)
.340
(.343)
.015
(.144)
.931
(.923)
.132
(.167)
.800
(.897)
.212
(.365)
.068
(.454)
.289
(.601)

t Value

p
Value

Significance
p value <
.05

1.35

0.18

No

0.10

0.92

No

2.00

0.05

Yes

1.13

0.26

No

12.92

0.00

Yes

1.73

0.08

No

0.28

0.78

No

2.15

0.03

Yes

Environmental Treaties

.761
(.773)

3.09

0.00

Yes

Basel Convention

-.219
(-.123)

1.86

0.06

No

Basel Ban Amendment

.605
(.434)

2.91

0.00

Yes

Environmental Protection

-.345
(-.353)

2.00

0.05

Yes
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses)
Collinearity
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was assessed to determine if collinearity issues exist.
Table 5.26 reports the VIF values for all the factors. All values are between .20 and 5, hence
collinearity is not an issue.

Table 5.26 Inner VIF - Post Basel Shift Combined Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Pop Density
Population

VIF
1.99
1.04
1.03
2.27
1.19
1.67
1.05
1.05

Assessment of path coefficients
Table 5.27 reports the standardized values and significance of the path coefficients.25
The economic factor has a medium significant effect on e-waste volume. A one-unit change in
the economic factor increases import volume .371 standard deviations, 17,974 tons.26 The
political factor has little effect on volume and is insignificant. When the political factor changes
one unit, volume increases .094 standard deviations, 4,554 tons. The environmental factor has
a small significant effect on volume. A one-unit change in the environmental factor decreases
import volume .108 standard deviations, 5,232 tons

25

26

Estimated coefficients closer to +1 represent strong positive relationship.

Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model. Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.
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Table 5.27 Structural Path Results - Post Basel Shift Combined Model
Paths

Path
Coefficients

p Value
0.04

Significance
p value < .05
Yes

Economic --> Import Volume

0.371

t Value
2.03

Political Economy --> Import Volume

0.127

1.06

0.29

No

Political --> Import Volume

0.094

3.64

0.00

Yes

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-0.045

1.90

0.06

No

0.03

Yes

Environment --> Import Volume
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50

-0.108
positive = (+)

2.19
negative = (-)

The model assumes the environmental and economic factors’ effect on volume is
influenced by the political factor. This model tests this interaction. Figure 5.10 demonstrates
the effect size of the economic factor based on the value of the political factor. The relationship
between the economic factor and volume is stronger when the value of the political factor is
higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above the mean).
Alternatively, the economic factor has a weaker effect when the political factor is low (a less
steep slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation below the mean). In all cases, as
the economic factor gets larger, import volume increases. This is an indication that regardless
of the political structure, nations take advantage of the global economy of electronic waste
trade.
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Fig. 5.10 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor - Post Shift Combined

Figure 5.11 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of
the political factor. The relationship between the environmental factor and volume is stronger
when the value of the political factor is higher. (a steeper slope when the political value is 1
standard deviation above the mean). Alternatively, the environmental factor has a weaker effect
when the political factor is low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1 standard
deviation below the mean). In all 3 cases, as the environmental factor gets higher, import
volume decreases. This is an indication that the political structure does not thwart the efficacy
of environmental initiatives.
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Fig. 5.11 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor Post Shift Combined

Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination)
The R2 for the combined model is .211. Economic, political and environmental factors
explain approximately 21% of electronic waste importation volume when both developed and
developing countries are evaluated in the same model.

Effect size of f2
The effect size of the construct was tested to determine whether a construct has a
substantive impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.27 The economic
factor has a medium effect on volume if it was excluded from the model. All other factors have
virtually no effect.28

27

Hair, 201.

28

Guidelines for f values: <.02 = no effect, ~.02 = small, ~.15 = medium effect, ~.35 = large effect

2
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Table 5.28 f - Post Basel Shift Combined Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Pop Density
Population

Import Volume
0.09
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
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Fig. 5.12 Structural Equation Model – Post Basel Shift Combined Model
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DEVELOPED MODEL

MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT
Collinearity Issues
Table 5.29 reports the VIF values for all the indicators. All values are between .20 and
5, hence collinearity is not an issue.

Table 5.29 Outer VIF - Post Basel Shift Developed Model
% Exports
BanAmend
BaselEntry
Corruption
EPI
Economic * Political
Environmental * Political
GDP
GDP/Capita
Innovation
Landlock
Polity
PopDens
Population
Tax Rate
Trade Freedom
Treaties

VIF
1.38
1.18
1.19
1.52
1.10
1.00
1.00
1.16
1.04
1.52
1.00
1.04
1.00
1.00
1.22
1.03
1.11
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Significance and Relevance of the Indicators
Table 5.30 illustrates the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developed
model. None of the economic variables are significant. However, GDP/capita and the percent
of exports are of absolute importance to the economic factor. GDP/capita is the most relevant
variable, .705 followed by the percent of exports, .309. The tax rate is not important to the
economic factor, -.005. Additionally, GDP has very little importance to the economic factor, .570.
Innovation is the most critical variable, .994. Polity is slightly important to the political
factor, .154. Freedom to trade and corruption are not important, -.217 and -.951. None of the
political variables are significant. Furthermore, only innovation is of absolute importance.
The Basel Ban Amendment and the environmental protection score are significant to the
environmental factor. The Ban Amendment is the most critical indicator to the environmental
factor, 1.02. The number of environmental treaties a country participates in is moderately
important to the environmental factor, .239. EPI, is not important to the environmental factor, .051. Ratification of the Basel Convention is the least relevant variable, -.181.
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Table 5.30 Variable Results - Post Basel Shift Developed Model

ENVIRONMENT

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

Factor

Variable

Outer Weights
(Outer Loadings)

t Value

p Value

Significance
p value < .05

GDP

-.570
(-.597)

1.09

0.28

No

GDP /capita (US $)

.705
(.678)

1.41

0.16

No

% Export Goods and Services

.309
(.585)

1.18

0.24

No

Tax Rate

.005
(-.240)

0.02

0.99

No

Polity

.154
(-.327)

0.97

0.33

No

Corruption

-.951
(-.430)

1.22

0.22

No

Freedom to Trade

-.217
(.309)

0.48

0.63

No

Innovation

-.994
(.476)

1.19

0.23

No

Environmental Treaties

.239
(.244)

1.00

0.32

No

Basel Convention

-.181
(.197)

0.61

0.54

No

Basel Ban Amendment

1.02
(.964)

2.90

0.00

Yes

Environmental Protection

-.051
(.157)

0.15

0.88

Yes

163
STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses)
Collinearity
The VIFs for the path coefficients are between .20 and 5, indicating that no collinearity
issues among the factors.

Table 5.31 Inner VIF - Post Basel Shift Developed Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Pop Density
Population

VIF
2.62
1.14
1.33
2.40
1.71
2.67
1.23
3.53

Assessment of path coefficients
The effect of the factors is outlined in Table 5.32. Notably, none of the direct effects are
significant. The economic factor has the smallest effect on electronic waste import volume.
When the economic factor changes by one unit, e-waste volume decreases .017 standard
deviations, 830 tons29, holding all other factors constant. The environmental factor and political
factor have near a medium sized effect on import volume. A one- unit change in the
environmental factor decreases e-waste importation by .288 standard deviations, 14,070 tons,
when all other factors are held constant. When the political factor changes by one unit, e-waste
volume decreases .232 standard deviations, 11,334 tons, when all other factors are held
constant.

29

Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model. Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.
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Table 5.32 Structural Path Results - Post Basel Shift Developed Model
Paths

Path
Coefficients

p Value
0.89

Significance
p value < .05
No

Economic --> Import Volume

-0.017

t Value
0.13

Political Economy --> Import Volume

-0.028

0.19

0.85

No

Political --> Import Volume

0.255

0.90

0.37

No

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-0.232

0.80

0.43

No

0.07

No

Environment --> Import Volume
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50

-0.288
1.81
positive = (+) negative = (-)

Figure 5.13 demonstrates the effect size of the economic factor based on the value of
the political factor. The relationship between the economic factor and volume is nearly the
same when the value of the political factor is high and low (slope is the same when the political
value is 1 standard deviation above and below the mean). This is an indication that the political
factor does not influence the relationship between the economy and import volume.
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Fig. 5.13 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor - Post Shift Developed

Figure 5.14 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of
the political factor. The relationship between the environmental factor and volume is stronger
when the value of the political factor is higher (a steeper slope when the political value is 1
standard deviation above the mean). Alternatively, the environmental factor has a weaker effect
when the political factor is low (a less steep slope when the political value is 1 standard
deviation below the mean). At every political value, as the environmental factor gets larger,
electronic waste import volume decreases. This suggests that all political structures support
environmental initiatives that seek reduce the negative consequences from importing hazardous
electronic waste.
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Fig. 5.14 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor - Post Shift Developed

Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination)
The R2 for the developed model is .242. Economic, political and environmental factors
explain 24% of electronic waste importation volume in developed countries.

Effect size of f2
The effect size of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.30 The environmental factor will
have a nearly a medium sized effect on electronic waste import volume if it is excluded from the
model. The political and political environmental factors will have a small effect on electronic
waste import volume if they are omitted from the analysis. All other factors will have no effect
on volume if they are absent from the model.

30

2

Guidelines for f values: <.02 = no effect, ~.02 = small, ~.15 = medium effect, ~.35 = large effect
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Table 5.33 f2 - Post Basel Shift Developed Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Pop Density
Population

Import Volume
0.00
0.10
0.01
0.00
0.06
0.03
0.01
0.00
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Fig. 5.15 Structural Equation Model - Post Basel Shift Developed Model
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DEVELOPING MODEL

MEASUREMENT MODEL ASSESSMENT
Collinearity
The VIFs for the path coefficients are between .20 and 5, indicating that there are no
collinearity issues among the indicators.

Table 5.34 Outer VIF - Post Basel Shift Developing Model
% Exports
BanAmend
BaselEntry
Corruption
EPI
Economic * Political
Environmental * Political
GDP
GDP/Capita
Innovation
Landlock
Polity
PopDens
Population
Tax Rate
Trade Freedom
Treaties

VIF
1.02
1.03
1.01
1.17
1.03
1.00
1.00
1.09
1.06
1.48
1.00
1.24
1.00
1.00
1.09
1.40
1.01
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Significance and Relevance of the Indicators
Table 5.35 outlines the significance and relevance of the indicators in the developing
model. The percent of goods and services exported is the only significant variable and is the
most critical variable to the economic factor, .838. GDP is moderately important, .448 and is of
absolute importance. Tax rate is essentially irrelevant, -.001. GDP/capita is also not important
to the economic factor, -.037.
All of the political indicators are significant to the factor. Polity is the most relevant
variable, .734. Freedom to trade is moderately important, .310. Innovation is of absolute
importance to the political factor.31 Corruption is the least critical variable to the political factor,
.066.
Environmental treaties and ratifying the Basel Ban Amendment are significant indicators
to the environmental factor. The number of treaties a country participates in the most important
variable, .721. The Ban Amendment is of moderate importance, .598. Although participating in
the Basel Convention is significant it is not important to the environmental factor, -.218.
Additionally, the environmental protection score is of little contribution to the environmental
factor, -.255.

31

The variable is not significant but its outer loading is above .50 which makes it of absolute importance.
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Table 5.35 Variable Results - Post Basel Shift Developing Model
Factor

Variable

t Value

p Value

Significance
p value < .05

1.32

0.19

No

0.76

0.44

No

1.94

0.05

Yes

.001
(.130)
.734
(.519)
.066
(.223)
.310
(.684)

0.03

0.97

No

4.94

0.00

Yes

0.42

0.68

No

0.89

0.37

No

Innovation

.174
(.598)

0.90

0.37

No

Environmental Treaties

.721
(.768)

4.33

0.00

Yes

Basel Convention

-.218
(-.211)

2.09

0.04

Yes

Basel Ban Amendment

.598
(.569)

3.46

0.00

Yes

Environmental Protection

-.255
(-.238)

1.09

0.27

No

ECONOMIC

GDP
GDP /capita (US $)
% Export Goods and
Services
Tax Rate

POLITICAL

Polity

ENVIRONMENT

Outer Weights
(Outer
Loadings)
.448
(.558)
-.037
(.050)
.838
(.897)

Corruption
Freedom to Trade
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STRUCTURAL PATH MODEL ASSESSMENT (Test of Hypotheses)
Collinearity
The inner VIFs were assessed to determine if collinearity exists. Collinearity issues are
present in the economic and political economic factor. This issue is resolved when the political
economic factor is omitted from the model.32

Table 5.36 Inner VIF - Post Basel Shift Developing Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Pop Density
Population

VIF
7.05
1.05
1.07
8.66
1.20
3.78
1.04
1.16

Assessment of path coefficients
Notably none of the factors are significant. The economic and environmental factors
have a small effect. When the economic factor changes by one unit, e-waste volume increases
.105 standard deviations, 4,992 tons33, holding all other factors constant. A one- unit change in
the environmental factor decreases volume .095 standard deviations, 4,517 tons. The political
factor has a medium size effect on e-waste import volume. When the political factor changes by
one unit, e-waste volume increases .372 standard deviations, 17,688 tons.

32

33

Inner VIF for economic factor becomes 1.05.

Table 8A displays the calculated estimated weight change for each model. Weight is calculated by multiplying the standard
deviation of the import volume by the factor’s path coefficient.

173
Table 5.37 Structural Path Results - Post Basel Shift Developing Model
Paths

Path
Coefficients

p Value
0.76

Significance
p value < .05
No

Economic --> Import Volume

0.105

t Value
0.30

Political Economy --> Import Volume

1.343

1.69

0.09

No

Political --> Import Volume

0.372

1.15

0.25

No

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-0.070

1.49

0.14

No

1.79

0.07

No

Environment --> Import Volume
small ≤ .10, medium ≈ .30, large ≥ .50

-0.095
positive = (+)

negative = (-)

Figure 5.16 demonstrates the effect size of the economic factor based on the value of
the political factor. The relationship between the economic factor and volume is equally strong
when the value of the political factor is high and low (a steep slope when the political value is 1
standard deviation above and below the mean). This is an indication that the economic factor’s
effect on volume is strong in both more democratic developing countries as well as in
authoritarian developing nations. However, the extent of e-waste import volume varies based
on the political value. Volume decreases as the economic factor gets larger countries with
lower political values. This is likely because these countries have less freedom to trade and
innovation which limit their competitiveness in the global market. Conversely, nations with a
higher political value (more democratic, more openness to trade and regulations that promote
innovation) take advantage of the global economy.
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Fig. 5.16 Effect of Economic Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor - Post Shift Developing

Figure 5.17 illustrates the effect size of the environmental factor based on the value of
the political factor. The environmental factor has a strong relationship with import volume when
the political value is high (a steeper slope when the political value is 1 standard deviation above
the mean). Furthermore, volume decreases, as the environmental factor gets larger. Hence,
this is an indication that although these countries are likely to have more variables that promote
an increase e-waste importation (more openness to trade, higher investment in technology and
innovation) they do not do so. This result indicates that environmental initiatives are not
outweighed by political variables. Conversely, the environmental factor has no effect on volume
among countries with a low political value (no slope).
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Fig. 5.17 Effect of Environmental Factor Conditional on Value of Political Factor - Post Shift Developing

Assessment of R2 (Coefficient of Determination)
The R2 for the developing model is .394. Approximately 39% of electronic waste
importation volume in developing countries can be explained by economic, political and
environmental factors.

Effect size of f2
The effect size of each construct was tested to assess whether it has a substantive
impact on the endogenous factor if it is omitted from the model.34 Excluding the political
economic and political factors from the model will have a small to medium impact on e-waste
import volume, all other factors will have no effect on electronic waste import volume if they are
absent from the model.

34

2

Guidelines for f values: <.02 = no effect, ~.02 = small, ~.15 = medium effect, ~.35 = large effect
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Table 5.38 f - Post Basel Shift Developing Model
Economic
Environmental
Landlock
Pol -> Econ
Pol -> Enviro
Political
Pop Density
Population

Import Volume
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.07
0.01
0.06
0.00
0.01
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Fig. 5.18 Structural Equation Model - Post Basel Shift Developing Model
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POST BASEL SHIFT FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

STRUCTURAL (FACTOR) ASSESSMENT
The results of the study indicate that economic, political and environmental factors better
explain electronic waste import volume practices when country types are modeled
independently, 24% in developed and approximately 39% in developing countries, versus 21%
when country types are modeled jointly.
Table 5.39 outlines the factors’ significance and expected/actual effect sizes within each
model. The findings indicate that developed and developing countries import volume are driven
by different factors. E-waste import volume in developed countries is almost equally influenced
by the political and environmental factors. Therefore, environmental political theory best
explains effects on waste importation practices in developed countries. Conversely, the political
economic factor is the most impactful factor in developing countries. Accordingly, the new
endogenous growth theory explains waste trade in developing countries.
The economic factor is expected to have a medium positive effect on volume in all
models. This hypothesis is realized in the combined model. Additionally, in the combined
model, the economic factor has the largest impact on e-waste volume. However, when country
types are evaluated individually the economic factor has a small, negative effect on volume in
developed countries and a small positive effect on volume in developing nations. Consequently,
this study demonstrates that the economic nationalist perspective, the belief that the state of a
nation’s economy, is most applicable when country types are modeled together. Also, the small
effect size of the economic factor in the individual country models illustrate that the economic
factor is not as important as literature surmises. This finding is especially important to
proponents of the North to South Theory and Pollution/Waste Haven hypotheses who
conjecture that less developed countries are mainly motivated to import waste because of
economic reasons.
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It is hypothesized that the political factor will have a small positive effect on import
volume in all models. When the country types are modeled together, the political factor slightly
increases volume. However, when developed and developing countries are assessed
individually the political factor has a medium sized effect on import volume. Although the
political factor is not the primary driver of waste in either country types, its effect size is larger
than hypothesized. This gives some support to the domestic institutionalist position that the
political and regulatory structure of a nation is an important factor to hazardous waste import
volume.
This analysis assumes that environmental initiatives are effective in reducing hazardous
e-waste import volume. Therefore, the environmental factor is expected to have a small
negative effect on e-waste import volume in all models. The results indicate that this is true.
The environmental factor slightly decreases e-waste import volume in all the models. This
outcome provides evidence that international environmental agreements are effective in
reducing e-waste import volume. The results are particularly important for developing nations
because literature suggests that developing nations are more likely to suffer from environmental
hazards. It is worth mentioning that the environmental factor is significant only when country
types are modeled jointly.
It is expected that volume will increase when the political factor moderates on the
relationship between the economic factor and volume. The hypothesis is partially realized when
country types are modeled together. Volume increases as the economic factor gets larger.
However, the hypothesis is rejected in both developed and developing nations. Interestingly, in
developed countries, the political economic factor’s effect size is inconsequential (has virtually
no effect) and is not significant on e-waste import volume. Additionally, volume remains
relatively flat at all political values (no slope of line).35 In developing nations, the relationship

35

Refer to developed countries’ post Basel shift economic interaction plots.
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between the economic factor and e-waste import volume is strong when the political factor is
high and low. However, contrary to the hypothesis volume decreases when the political factor is
low. Despite this effect, the political economic factor is the most impactful factor in developing
countries. This suggests that the new economic growth explains electronic waste importation
practices in developing countries.
The analysis also tests the interaction between the domestic political factor’s influence
on the relationship between the environmental factor and e-waste import volume. The
assumption is that the political structure will not hinder environmental initiatives. Therefore, in
all models, it is hypothesized that e-waste volume will decrease when the political factor
moderates on the relationship between the environmental factor and e-waste volume. This
holds true in all models. As the environmental factor gets larger electronic waste import volume
decreases. 36 This finding is important because it refutes the race to the bottom and waste
haven hypothesis that conjecture states, in particular developing countries, create lax
regulations to import electronic waste.

36

Refer to combined model and developing countries’ post Basel shift environmental interaction plots.
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MEASUREMENT (VARIABLE) ASSESSMENT
Table 5.40 displays the expected and actual outer weights (loadings) of the indicators
onto the factor. Relative importance is determined by the value of the outer weight. Table 5.41
outlines the variables’ significance and importance. An indicator is significant if its outer weight
p-value is less than .05 and is absolutely important if it’s outer weight p-value is non-significant,
greater than .05, but its outer loading is above .50.
GDP and GDP/capita function as expected in the combined model. However, they do
not load as expected when country types are evaluated separately. In advanced countries,
GDP loads negatively and GDP/capita loads positively. Conversely, GDP is positive in
developing countries and GDP/capita is negative. These results support studies that illustrate
capital abundance (individual wealth) and the size (wealth) of the economy are important
variables to the economic factor. However, they also reveal that the importance of these
economic variables differs between country types. In developed nations, GDP/capita is the most
important indicator to the factor and is absolutely important. GDP is irrelevant in developed
countries. Alternatively, GDP is important in developing nations and GDP/capita is immaterial.
Interestingly, GDP is not significant to the economic factor in the developing model.
The percent of goods and services exported is positive in all models. However, the
relative importance differs. When country types are modeled jointly and in developing countries,
export matters substantially. However, the percent of exports is not nearly as important in
developed nations. This finding provides additional evidence that the size of the economy
matters more to the economic factor in developing countries than developed. Notably, the
percent of goods and services is significant in the combined and developed models.
Scholars and practitioners argue that corporate tax rates impact trade and
economic/industry development of the waste management industry. Therefore, it is expected to
be relatively important in all models. The tax rate is slightly important to the economic factor in
the combined model. It is nearly irrelevant to the economic factor in developed and developing
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nations. This is especially interesting because literature suggests that tax rates are especially
concerning to advanced nations because rates are generally higher in developed nations which
prohibits economic growth. More so, tax rate is not significant in any model.
Polity is hypothesized to be important to the political factor in all the models. This holds
true. Nonetheless the relative importance differs between country types. Polity is highly
important in the combined and developed model. Accordingly, it is significant in these models.
Polity is slightly important in the developed model. Polity being of greater relevance in the
developing model is to be expected considering the variation of political structures in developing
nations.
It is expected that corruption is of concern in all models. However, corruption is
immaterial to the political factor when country types are modeled independently. Corruption
loads negatively and is not important in developed nations. It loads positively in developing
nations but is essentially irrelevant. It is not surprising that corruption is not as important in
developed nations because some literature suggests that corruption is not as prevalent in
developed nations as compared to developing nations. However, because of corruption
appears to be more prevalent in less developed nations it is surprising that corruption is not
important to the political factor.
Freedom to trade is expected to have a positive impact on the political factor. Freedom
to trade is of little importance when the country types are combined. It is also not important to
the political factor in developed nations. Freedom to trade is moderately in developing nations.
Innovation policies are assumed to be important to the political factor as it relates to ewaste trade. Innovation is moderately important in the combined model. It is the most relevant
indicator in the developed model. Innovation is also slightly important in developing countries.
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This outcome supports literature that contends that developing countries are concerned about
technological advancements that are necessary to compete in the global economy.37
Environmental treaties is the most important indicator to the environmental factor in the
combined and developing models. Accordingly, they are significant in these models. However,
environmental treaties are of moderate importance in the developed model. Interestingly,
environmental treaties are more important in developing nations than the Basel Ban
Amendment which was created to safeguard it against hazardous waste.
Nonetheless, the Ban Amendment is important in all the models. It is the most relevant
to the environmental factor in developed nations. Additionally, it is of high importance to the
environmental factor in the combined and developing model. Notably, the Basel Amendment is
significant in all the models. Alternatively, ratifying the Basel Convention is inconsequential in
all models.
The environmental protection score is expected to be of importance in all models.
Oddly, it is not important in any of the models.

37

Discussed in the Global Innovation Index (2015).
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Table 5.41 Assessment of Variable Significance and Importance - Post Basel Shift
Factor

Variable

Combined

Developed

Absolutely
Important

ECONOMIC

GDP
Absolutely
Important

GDP /capita (US $)
Export of Goods and Services

Developing

Significant

Absolutely
Important

Significant

Tax Rate

ENVIRONMENT

POLITICAL

Polity

Significant

Significant

Corruption
Absolutely
Important

Freedom to Trade
Innovation

Significant

Environmental Treaties

Significant

Absolutely
Important

Absolutely
Important
Significant

Basel Convention

Significant

Basel Ban Amendment

Significant

Significant

Environmental Protection Index

Significant

Significant

Significant: p-value < .05
Absolutely Important: p-value > .05 and outer loading weight is > .50

Significant
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PRE & POST BASEL SHIFT FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
In 2008 Basel repositioned its view on waste from a value less by product to a profitable
commodity. This analysis tests whether this change altered nations’ economic, political and
environmental factors impact on hazardous electronic waste import volume. The study finds
that there is a sizeable explanation change pre to post shift in the combined and developed
models, approximately 10% to 21% and approximately 11% to 24%, respectively. Hence,
economic, political and environmental factors better explain electronic waste trade import
practices post Basel shift.

Table 5.42 R2 - Pre and Post Basel Shift
Model

Pre Basel

Post Basel

Combined

10.2

21.1

Developed

11.4

24.2

Developing

38

39.4

STRUCTURAL (FACTOR) ASSESSMENT
Table 5.43 displays the theories that best explain what drives waste import volume
before and after Basel shifted its view on waste. The economic nationalist theory, the notion
that economic variables drive a nation’s propensity to import electronic waste, explains waste
trade importation practices in the combined model before and after Basel shifted its view on
waste. The economic nationalist perspective theory explains waste import volume in the
developing model waste import volume pre Basel shift. However, post shift the new
endogenous growth theory better explains waste import practices in developing countries.
Lastly, tenets of neoliberal international institutionalism best explain waste import behavior in
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developed countries pre Basel shift. After the shift, developed countries’ import volume is best
explained by environmental political theory.

Table 5.43 Theory Explanation - Pre and Post Basel Shift
Model

Pre Basel Shift

Post Basel Shift

Combined

Economic Nationalist/
Neoclassical Economic Theory

Economic Nationalist/
Neoclassical Economic Theory

Developed

Neoliberal International
Institutionalism

Environmental Political Theory

Developing

Economic Nationalist/
Neoclassical Economic Theory

New Endogenous Growth Theory

In developing countries, the primary influencer of electronic waste import volume
changes from the economic factor pre Basel shift to the political economic factor after Basel
changes its perspective on waste. This change demonstrates that the political structure plays a
larger role with e-waste import practices after the shift. Additionally, the directionality of e-waste
differs pre and post shift when the political factor moderates on the relationship between the
economic factor and e-waste import volume.38 Before Basel altered its view on waste, all
developing nations regardless of their political structure import more electronic waste as the
economic factor gets larger. Conversely, after the shift, waste import volume increases only in
developing countries that are more democratic, are more open to trade and have higher levels
of innovation. Alternatively, countries that are less open to trade and less democratic (low
political value) import volume decreases as the economic factor gets larger. This suggests that
Basel’s shift on waste did not alter the behavior of developing countries that already had the
ability to participate in the global economy. However, it is possible that Basel’s change shifted

38

Refer to developing countries’ economic interaction plots.
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volume to developing nations who are already competitive in the market thereby reducing less
developed countries ability to import waste. Therefore, regarding electronic waste trade, it is
unlikely that Basel shifting its view induces a ‘race to the bottom’ in which states alter regulatory
parameters to import electronic waste and maximize economic benefits.
Basel altering its perspective on waste did not change the importation practices of
developing countries when the political factor moderates on the relationship between the
environment and e-waste import volume. 39 Notably, e-waste volume decreases more among
countries with higher political values (more freedom to trade and more democratic).
Nonetheless, import volume decreases in developing nations at all political levels (countries with
more and less freedom to trade and more and less democratic) pre and post Basel shift.
Hence, these results rebut literature that suggest the Basel shift causes a ‘race to the bottom’
among developing nations.
In developed countries before Basel shifted its view on waste the environmental factor is
the key driver on e-waste import volume. Hence, liberal international institutionalism explains ewaste trade practices. The environmental factor continues to be the primary driver post Basel
shift. However, the political and political environmental factors become equally as strong. This
suggests that post Basel shift the government plays a larger role in electronic waste importation
thus, e-waste trade practices are better explained by tenets of environmental political theory.
This is not surprising because environmental awareness continues to be of growing concern
among society and states. Consequently, it is understandable that import volume decreases
during pre and post Basel time periods at all political levels when the political factor moderates
on the relationship between the environmental factor and volume. 40 Notably, volume
experiences a sharper decline during the post Basel period when the political factor moderates
on the relationship between the environmental factor and volume (a steeper slope of the line).
39

Refer to developing countries’ environmental interaction plots.

40

Refer to developed countries’ environmental interaction plots.
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E-waste volume changes in developed countries when the political factor moderates on
the relationship between the economic factor and volume after Basel shifted its view.41 Pre
shift, when the political factor moderates on the relationship between the economic factor
volume decreases at all political levels. However, after the shift, volume remains relatively flat
and does not affect e-waste import volume. This suggests that post shift, developed countries
do not create political economic regulations that induce electronic waste importation.
The political factor increases volume pre and post Basel shift in both developed and
developing countries. However, in both country types, the factor becomes more important in ewaste volume after Basel altered its view on waste. This suggests that after the shift, the
political structure plays a larger role in enabling nations to import electronic waste. The growth
in the importance of the political factor gives credence to scholars that the shift will cause
countries to alter policies to increase import volume. This change also gives merit to domestic
institutionalist theory that contends a nation’s political structure determines the extent to which a
county imports hazardous waste. However, the domestic political structure is not as impactful
as both groups argue.
There are generally two arguments relating to the environmental factor. Some scholars
argue that despite the shift the increase in environmental awareness leads to international
environmental agreements which will decrease hazardous waste import volume. Another
perspective is that this effect is more likely in developed countries as compared to developing
nations because developing nations are not as environmentally conscious. The results indicate
that the environmental factor moderately reduces import volume in developed countries before
and after the shift. Additionally, the environmental factor causes a small decrease in electronic
waste import volume before and after Basel changes in developing countries. This outcome
validates international institutionalist that argue outputs of international institutions, such as

41

Refer to developed countries’ economic interaction plots.
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international environmental agreements, are effective in minimizing negative consequences
stemming from trade.
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MEASUREMENT (VARIABLE) ASSESSMENT
The findings illustrate that the importance of variables changed after Basel shifted its
view on waste. Table 5.45 outlines the actual outer weights of the variables pre and post the
Basel shift.
Prior to the shift, GDP is the most important variable to the economic factor in all the
models. However, after the repositioning GDP/capita is the most important indicator to the
economic factor in developed countries and the percent of exports of goods and services
becomes the most critical variable in the combined and developing models. This change is
understandable in that the percent of goods and services is a measure of a country’s level of
participation in the global economy. Therefore, it is likely that this variable is extremely
important to developing countries that import waste as a means of participating in global trade.
During the pre-shift period, polity is the most important variable to the political factor in
all the models. Polity remains the most critical variable after the shift in the combined and
developing models. Innovation becomes the most critical variable in the developed model after
Basel changed its perspective on waste. This change is not surprising in that enhancements in
that richer countries are more likely to have the desire and capital to invest in technology and
innovation to maximize profits. It is worth noting that corruption and freedom to trade become
less important after the shift.
Environmental treaties is the most relevant indicator to the environmental factor in the
combined and developing models pre and post Basel adjusting its view on waste. The Basel
Convention is the most critical factor in developed countries pre shift. This changes in the post
shift period. The Ban Amendment becomes the most important variable. This change is
interesting because once Basel decided that waste is a resource it is unlikely that developed
nations with equipment and capital that permits them to extract the valuable components from
electronic waste will have a desire to export the commodity.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: WASTE NOT…WANT NOT

There are generally five theories that explain hazardous waste trade. The economic
nationalist perspective posits that economic variables promote a country to import waste. The
domestic institutionalist theory argues that the domestic political structure is the leading
determinant of waste import volume. The new endogenous growth theory asserts that a
combination of regulations and economic variables influence waste import volume. Neoliberal
international institutionalism contends that international environmental initiatives influence waste
volume. Lastly, environmental political theory argues that environmental and political factors
impact waste import volume.
The overarching purposes of this study are first to identify factors that influence state
behavior in waste importation and secondly to determine which factor has the largest effect on
import volume. In doing so, the project identifies which theory best explains what drives
countries to import electronic waste.
As to be expected, the results reveal that one theory does not explain waste import
volume. In fact, different theories explain waste import volume when country types are modeled
independently versus when modeled jointly. The findings also illustrate that the impact of
factors changes over time. These changes represent the evolving nature of the political
economy of hazardous electronic waste trade.
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OVERALL MODEL
The overall model assesses electronic waste import volume from 1998 – 2014. The
economic factor has the largest effect on electronic waste volume in the combined model.
Therefore, the economic nationalist perspective best explains waste importation in the
combined model. Following this result, the economic status drives e-waste import volume.
Alternatively, the political economic factor has the largest effect on import volume in developed
and developing countries. Consequently, the new growth theory best explains what drives
waste importation in both developed and developing countries. This suggests that the
government’s impact on the economic factor plays a large role in hazardous waste import
volume.
Table 6.1 shows the hypotheses results for the overall model.1 Hypotheses 1a-c is that
the economic factor has a large positive impact on electronic waste import volume. These
hypotheses are partially accepted in the combined and developing model. Although the effect
small is smaller than what is hypothesized, volume increases as expected. The hypothesis is
rejected in the developed model. The economic factor has a medium sized effect and
decreases volume.
Hypotheses 2a-c state the political factor has a medium positive impact on electronic
waste import volume. The hypothesis is true in developing countries. The hypothesis is
partially accepted in the combined model. In this model, the political factor has a small effect on
e-waste import volume. However, aligning with the hypothesis, the political factor increases
volume. The hypothesis is rejected in the developed model. The effect of the political factor is
smaller than what is hypothesized and e-waste import volume decreases.
Hypotheses 3a-c posit that the environmental factor has a small negative effect on
electronic waste import volume. The hypotheses are accepted in all models.

1

Refer to Chapter 4.
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Hypotheses 4a-c assume expects the economic factor’s effect on e-waste import volume
will be stronger when the political value is lower. It also assumes that the economic factor
increases volume. The hypothesis is partially accepted in all the models. In the combined
model, as the economic factor gets larger, volume increases at all political values. However,
the economic effect size does not get change because of the political factor values. In the
developed model, the economic factor’s effect is stronger when the political value is low.
However, e-waste import volume decreases. In developing countries, the relationship between
the economic factor and e-waste import volume is equally strong among politically high and low
countries. Additionally, import volume increases only among politically high leveled developing
countries.
Hypotheses 5a-c conjectures that the influence of the political factor causes the
environmental factor to decrease volume. It also expects that the environmental factor will have
a stronger relationship on volume when the value of the political factor is higher. The
hypotheses are accepted in all the models. Additionally, the political environmental factor
decreases electronic waste volume in all models.
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PRE & POST BASEL SHIFT
The pre and post Basel shift analyses evaluate whether Basel shifting its view on waste
from a value less by-product to a profitable commodity altered a factor’s effect on electronic
waste import volume. The pre Basel shift analysis evaluates electronic waste import data from
1998 to 2006. The post Basel analysis evaluates 2008 to 2014.
In the combined model, the economic factor is the largest influencer pre and post Basel
changing its position on waste. Therefore, the economic nationalist theory, the assertion that
economic variables drive a nation’s propensity to import electronic waste, explains electronic
waste importation practices when country types are modeled jointly. However, combining
country types blends the effects of developed and developing countries. Evaluating country
types independently yields a more fruitful analysis.
Neoliberal international institutionalism best explains waste import behavior in developed
countries pre Basel shift. However, after the shift, import volume in developed countries is
almost equally explained by the neoliberal institutionalism, domestic institutionalism and
environmental political theory. The economic nationalist theory explains e-waste import volume
pre Basel shift in developing countries. However, post shift the new endogenous growth theory
better explains waste import practices.
Table 6.2 outlines the hypotheses results for the pre Basel shift model.2 Hypotheses 1ac is that the economic factor has a medium positive impact on electronic waste import volume.
This hypothesis is accepted in the combined model and partially accepted in the developed and
developing models. The economic factor has a medium but negative positive effect on volume
in developed countries. It has a large positive effect in developing countries.
Hypotheses 2a-c states the political factor has a small positive effect in the combined
model, a small negative effect in developed countries and a medium positive effect in
developing countries. The hypothesis is accepted when country types are combined and in the
2

Refer to Chapter 5.
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developing model. The hypothesis is partially accepted in developed countries. The political
factor has a small effect on electronic waste import volume but volume increases rather than
decreases.
Hypotheses 3a-c posit that the environmental factor has a small negative effect on
electronic waste import volume. The hypothesis is accepted in developing countries and
partially accepted in the combined and developed models. In the latter models, volume
decreases but the effect size is larger than what is expected.
Hypotheses 4a-c consider the economic factor’s effect size on electronic waste import
volume when the political factor intervenes on the relationship. It is hypothesized that that when
the political factor intervenes, the relationship between the economic factor and volume is
stronger when the political factor is lower. Additionally, it is expected that the effect will increase
volume. The hypothesis is partially accepted in the combined and developing models. In the
combined model, the political factor does not impact the relationship between the economic
factor and import volume. However, volume increases as suspected. Alternatively, in
developing countries, the economic factor does not have a stronger effect when the value of the
political factor is low but waste volume increases.
Hypotheses 5a-c evaluates the environmental factor’s influence on electronic waste
import volume when the political factor moderates on the relationship between the environment
and e-waste. The hypotheses conjectures that this influence causes the environmental factor to
have a negative effect on volume. It also expects the environmental factor to have a larger
effect on volume when the political factor is larger. The hypotheses are accepted in all models.
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Table 6.3 shows the hypotheses results for the post Basel shift model.3 Hypotheses 1ac is that the economic factor has a medium positive impact on electronic waste import volume.
The hypothesis is accepted in the combined model and partially accepted in developing models.
In developing nations, volume increases but the effect size is smaller than what is hypothesized.
The hypothesis is rejected in developed countries; the effect size is small and the directional
flow of waste is opposite to what is hypothesized.
Hypotheses 2a-c states the political factor has a small positive effect in all models. The
hypothesis is accepted when country types are combined. The hypothesis is accepted in the
combined model. The hypotheses are partially accepted when country types are model
independently. The political factor has a medium sized effect on electronic waste import volume
and increases volume in both developed and developing countries.
Hypotheses 3a-c posit that the environmental factor has a small negative effect on
electronic waste import volume. The hypothesis is accepted in the combined and developing
models. It is partially accepted in the developed model. The environmental factor has a larger
effect than what is expected.
Hypotheses 4a-c assume the political factor impacts the effect size of the economic
factor’s influence on electronic waste import volume. It is expected that the economic factor will
have a stronger effect on volume when the political value is low. It also posits that the influence
yields a positive effect on volume. The hypothesis is partially accepted in the combined model.
Volume increases but the relationship is stronger when the value of the political factor is higher.
The hypothesis is rejected in the developed and developing models. In the developed model,
the political factor does not influence the relationship between the economic factor and volume.
Additionally, volume remains relatively flat. In developing countries, the relationship between
the economic factor and e-waste import volume is equally strong at all political levels.
Furthermore, volume decreases when the political value is low.
3

Refer to Chapter 5.
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Hypotheses 5a-c expect the environmental factor’s impact on electronic waste import
volume is stronger when the political factor is larger. It is also expected that the effect will
decrease electronic waste import volume. The hypotheses are accepted in all the models.
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FUTURE RESEARCH
This study finds that developed and developing countries electronic waste import volume
are driven by different factors. Therefore, future studies should assess country types when
attempting to understand waste trade practices. While this project focused on factors that
influence electronic waste importation. An equally interesting project is to test relationship of the
factors between trading partners.
Furthermore, a large scale quantitative study such as this is useful for testing
hypotheses about what factors have the most effect on electronic waste import volume,
hypotheses which would be difficult or impossible to test using case study analysis. However,
future research should apply the Waste Trade Framework at the national level (individual
country case study) to explore how the factors influence a single country’s decision to import
electronic waste. For example, a qualitative project can assess the economic and
environmental policies that drive states to import waste. This type of analysis provides a more
granular view to the political economy of electronic waste importation.
Moreover, the results of this project reveal that innovation and the amount of goods and
services exported are more critical to the political and economic factors than what current
literature suggests. Future studies should not overlook these variables. Also, in alignment with
other studies on hazardous waste, the effect of capital abundance (GDP/capita) yields mixed
results. Although it would be difficult to obtain, capital/worker, specifically capital/worker in the
waste recycling industry, is a better measure to assess the effect of capital abundance in
electronic waste importation practices.
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APPENDIX

Table 1A Top Electronic Waste Importers (in tons)

Country
Mexico
Rep. of Korea
Belgium
Indonesia
Sweden
Canada
France
Slovenia
USA*
Germany
Spain
Czech Rep.
United Kingdom
Poland
India
Netherlands
Philippines
Austria
Estonia
Bulgaria

1996
31,265
3,244
30,015
387,544

1998
47,684
11,695
28,370
372
36,114

68,705
20,653

29,100
14,006

5,698
7

4,889
3,184

15,616

12,613

2,454

2000
38,512
15,154
46,909
67,901
33,813
39
24,776
24,199
14,190
8,350
21,731
1
15,208

33
5,347
18,890

657

2,906

2006
115,353
54,552
34,841
3,993
37,796
10,264
26,937
30,326
17,918
3,745
6,865
17,960
14,245
5,135
9,131
27,119
14,910
10,886
2,574

2010
199,580
197,739
76,385
312
31,668
106,875
37,185
37,878
37,420
24,076
33,964
39,334
25,011
19,013
4,256
23,704
4,028
13,373
17,222
5,638

2015
173,459
426,733
56,233
502
30,220
68,177
19,907
34,742
40,384
64,952
49,224
42,304
13,173
16,014
44,157
13,020
5,035
8,019
13,455
22,796

Source: UNComtrade Database
Notes:
*Country is a top exporter and importer of electronic waste.
Highest importers were chosen based on the highest average of the six- year period.
Belgium and Luxembourg reported imported volume jointly in 1996 and 1998. For this analysis, the volume was
relocated to Belgium for these time periods because it traded substantially more waste in subsequent years.
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Table 2A Export Volume of Highest Exporters (in tons)

Country
USA*
France
United Arab Emirates
Netherlands
Canada*
Belgium*
Japan
Singapore
Hungary
Germany*
Denmark
Switzerland
Dominican Rep.
Norway
Romania
South Africa
Kuwait
Finland
Chile
Lithuania

1996
1,899

1998
17,779
33,030

2000
14,300
40,197

2006
1,206,124
96,493

2010
307,863
113,029

10,542

29,935

751

27,915

50,861

42,638
3

22,629
104

21,543
55

9,124

30,154
47,747

115
14,360
228
4,291

19,615
25,921
21,501
7,624

18,954
19,856
27,196
8,272

4,989

3,827
10,681

12,133
420
4,035

22,585
131
447
5,937

22,568
23,254
19,635
11,478
867
18,423
7,210
1
11,592
4,526
1,733

31,995
13,515
24,661
25,759
27,726
18,509
4,818
1,171
17,165
16,509
20,933
16,395

2015
516,856
104,440
32,806
72,387
27,860
21,855
84,015
22,546
23,166
16,189
19,541
27,420
12,063
21,452
15,119
43,801
2,271
16,463
12,247

Source: UNComtrade Database
Notes:
*Country is a top exporter and importer of electronic waste.
Highest importers were chosen based on the highest average of the six- year period.
Belgium and Luxembourg reported imported volume jointly in 1996 and 1998. For this analysis, the volume was
relocated to Belgium for these time periods because it traded substantially more waste in subsequent years.
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Basel Convention Timeline1

1989

Basel Convention opts to control the transboundary movement and disposal of
toxic waste.

1994

Technical guidelines published for environmentally sound waste management
practices.

1995

Ban Amendment (Annex VII) adopted. Prohibits OECD countries from sending
recyclable and non-recyclable waste from OECD countries to non-OECD
countries.*

1998

Annex VIII and IX enacted. Add more types of waste that is regulated by the
convention.

1999

Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage formed to
regulate civil liability due to damage that occurs during transboundary movement
of hazardous waste, including illegal movement.*

2002

Promoting Implementation and Compliance Committee established to assist
nations to comply with the parameters and obligations set forth in the convention.
Strategic Plan for Implementation of Basel Convention established to assist
less developed nations with implementing the Basel Convention through 2010.

2003

Public-Private Partnership founded to create technical guidelines to manage
end-of-life electronic devices and electronic waste. Mobile Phone Partnership
Initiative developed guidelines for end of life mobile phones through 2008.2

2008

Basel Convention shifts view of waste from a costly by product to one of a
valuable resource.3

1

2

Basel Convention, "Milestones".

"E-Waste Overview," Accessed June 2016,
http://www.basel.int/Implementation/TechnicalAssistance/Partnerships/PACE/Overview/tabid/3243/Default.aspx.
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2011

Partnership for Action on Computing Equipment (PACE) provides guidance
document on the end of life management of computing equipment.4

2015

Technical guidelines established for transboundary movement of electronic and
electrical waste.5

*Not entered into force as of January 1, 2011.
Table 3A Waste Trade Framework: dimensionality and association between factors and indicators
Num.

Indicators

Relevant Literature

1

GDP

Antweiler et. al (2001), Clapp (2001), Bhagwati
(2004), Baggs (2009), Lepawsky (2009), Higashida
and Managi (2014)

2

GDP /capita (US $)

Montgomery (1992, 1995), Baggs (2009),
Lepawsky and McNabb (2010), Kellenberg (2012),
Estrada-Ayub & Kahhat (2014), Higashida and
Managi (2014), Lucier and Gareau (2015)

3

Export of Goods and Services

Krasner (1976), Clapp (2001)

4

Tax Rate

Levinson (1999a), Levinson (1999b), Cassing and
Kuhn (2003), Kellenberg (2010)

5

Polity

Sigman (1996), Levinson (1999), O'Neill (2000),
Drury 2006, Li and Reuvenuy (2006), Fiorino (2011)

Corruption

Graeff (2003), G. Fredriksson (2003), Nwabuzor
(2005), Wilson and Damania (2005), Drury (2006),
Billger and Goel (2009), Pieroni and d’Agostino
(2013)

7

Innovation

Jaffe and Palmer (1997), Hemmelskamp et. al
(2000), Gilpin (2001), United Nations
Environment Programme (2011), Ambec et.al
(2013), USTIC (2013), Global Index Report (2015)

8

Freedom to Trade

Graeff (2003), Nwabuzor (2005), Baggs (2009),
Billger and Goel (2009), Pieroni and d’Agostino
(2013)

6

3

Basel Convention, "Our Sustainable Future: The Role of the Basel Convention," 3.

4

Basel Convention, "E-Waste Overview".

5

Secretariat of the Basel Convention, "Technical Guidelines on Transboundary Movements of Electrical and Electronic Waste,"
(Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP, Basel Convention, 2015).
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9

Environmental Protection Index

Fiorino (2011), Kellenberg (2012), Brunel and
Levinson (2016), Green Growth (2015)

10

Environmental Treaties

Mitchell (2003), Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis (2002),
Barrett (2005), Bernhagen (2008), Kellenberg and
Levinson (2014)

11

Basel Convention

Wirth (2007), Andrews (2009), Baggs (2009),
Kellenberg (2012, 2014, 2015), Jing (2014), Lucier
and Gareau (2015), Khan (2016)

12

Basel Ban Amendment

Andrews (2009), Baggs (2009), Kellenberg (2012,
2015), Jing (2014), Lucier and Gareau (2015)

Note: Bolded literature focuses on electronic waste.
Table 4A Overview of waste trade studies and methodologies
Num.

Author

1

O'Neill (2000)

2

Clapp (2001)

Toxic exports: the transfer of
hazardous wastes from rich to
poor countries

Case Studies

3

Cassing and Kuhn (2003)

Strategic Environmental Policies
When Waste Products Are
Tradable

Mathematical Proofs
Game Theory

van Beukering et. al (2006)

Modelling and analysis of
international recycling between
developed and developing
countries

Mathematical proofs

5

Baggs (2009)

International Trade in Hazardous
Waste

Ordinary least squares gravity
model
1st Stage: Probit
2nd Stage: Maximum likelihood

6

Lepawsky (2009)

Tracking e-scrap on the grey
market

Network Analysis Model
Ordinary Least Squares

7

Lepawsky and McNabb (2010)

Mapping international flows of
electronic waste

Network Analysis Model

8

Kellenberg (2010)

Consumer Waste, Backhauling
and Pollution Havens

Mathematical proofs
Econometric model

9

Kellenberg (2012)

Trading Waste

Gravity model
Poisson pseudo maximum
likelihood

10

Kaushal and Nema (2013)

Strategic Analysis of Computer
Waste Management Options:
Game-Theoretic Approach

Game Theory

4

Title
Waste trading among rich
nations: building a new theory of
environmental regulation

Methodology
Case Studies
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11

12

13

Higashida and Managi (2014)

Determinants of trade in
recyclable wastes: evidence from
commodity-based trade of waste
and scrap

Lepawsky (2014)

The changing geography of
global trade in electronic
discards: time to rethink the ewaste problem

Wakolbinger et. al (2014)

When and for whom would ewaste be a treasure trove?

Gravity model
Poisson pseudo maximum
likelihood

Network Analysis Model
Mathematical proofs

Table 5A Waste Trade Framework

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

Factor

Indicator
(Variable)

Source

GDP

World Bank

GDP /capita
(US $)

World Bank

Export of
Goods and
Services
(% of GDP)

World Bank

Total Tax Rate

Global
Competitiveness
Index

Polity

Polity IV Project
Index

Corruption

Corruption
Perceptions Index

Innovation

Global
Competitiveness
Index

Freedom to
Trade

Index of Economic
Freedom

Definition
The sum of gross value added by all resident
producers in the economy plus any product taxes
and minus any subsidies not included in the value of
the products.
The sum of gross value added by all resident
producers in the economy plus any product taxes
and minus any subsidies not included in the value of
the products. GDP per capita is gross domestic
product divided by midyear population.
Exports of goods and services represent the value of
all goods and other market services provided to the
rest of the world. They include the value of
merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel,
royalties, license fees, and other services, such as
communication, construction, financial, information,
business, personal, and government services.
Measures the amount of taxes and mandatory
contributions payable by a business in the second
year of operation, expressed as a share of
commercial profit.
Measures government type. Scale ranges from -10
(completely authoritarian) to +10 (completely
democratic).
Measures the level of perceived governmental
corruption. Scale ranges from 0–100 in which a
score of 100 indicates very little perceived
corruption.
Ranking of countries' innovation measures that
promote research and development.
The extent of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect
imports and exports of goods and services. The
scale ranges from 0 -100 in which a score of 100 is
closest to the target and represents the most
freedom to trade.
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ENVIRONMENTAL

Table 5A Continued
Proxy for regulatory stringency. Measures the
protection of human health from environmental
harm. The scale ranges from 0 -100 in which a
score of 100 is closest to the target and represents
excellent environmental performance.

EPI

Environmental
Protection Index

Environmental
Treaties

Socioeconomic Data
and Applications
Center

Absolute number of environmental agreements a
country has ratified.

Basel Convention

Basel Convention

Dichotomous indicator of whether the Basel
Convention has been ratified and/or entered into
force.

Basel Ban
Amendment

Basel Convention

Dichotomous indicator of whether the Ban
Amendment of the Basel Convention has been
ratified and/or entered into force.
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Table 6A Countries in Study
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Country
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador

Developed
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Country
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Honduras
Hong Kong SAR, China
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lesotho
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao SAR, China

Note: 1 is developed country. 0 is not developed country.

Developed
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
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Table 6A Continued
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Country
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles

Developed
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Country
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Developed
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 7A Sample Size
Year

n

Developed

Developing

1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014

54
70
75
83
90
102
104
95
84

25
31
30
35
31
35
35
33
31

29
39
45
48
59
67
69
62
53

Total

757

286

471
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Table 8A Weight Conversion
Std Dev of Import Volume (Tons)
Overall

Pre Basel

Post Basel

Combined

35,831

12,711

48,447

Developed

35,150

12,070

48,853

Developing

35,840

12,773

47,547

Overall Weight Change (Tons)
Combined

Developed

Developing

Economic --> Import Volume

13,795

-5,624

5,914

Political Economy --> Import Volume

1,935

-9,069

32,113

Political --> Import Volume

2,293

-2,214

7,562

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-430

-2,004

-1,004

-2,616

-1,336

-3,297

Environment --> Import Volume

Pre Basel Weight Change (Tons)
Combined

Developed

Developing

Economic --> Import Volume

2,186

-2,088

7,140

Political Economy --> Import Volume

-242

-1,183

6,029

Political --> Import Volume

1,462

1,062

2,363

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-229

-350

-715

-1,551

-2,583

-1,277

Environment --> Import Volume

Post Basel Weight Change (Tons)
Combined

Developed

Developing

Economic --> Import Volume

17,974

-830

4,992

Political Economy --> Import Volume

6,153

-1,368

63,856

Political --> Import Volume

4,554

12,457

17,688

Political Environment --> Import Volume

-2,180

-11,334

-3,328

Environment --> Import Volume

-5,232

-14,070

-4,517
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